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ABSTRACT 
There has been a tremendous growth over the past decade in the use of wireless 
communication. As the cost of wireless access drops, wireless communications could 
replace wired in many settings. Today, widely travelling laptop users access the 
Internet at a variety of places including their homes, and even at public places such 
as airports. Mobile Wireless Ad hoc Networks (MANET) is one such type of 
wireless network that have many useful applications including Wireless Sensors 
Networks which is now used in many civilian and environmental application areas. 
In mobile ad-hoc networks, nodes act as both routers and terminals. For the lack of 
routing infrastructure, they have to cooperate to communicate. Misbehaviour means 
deviation from regular routing and forwarding. It occurs by either selfish or 
malicious nodes. In both types misbehaviour's impact on MANET's proves to be 
detrimental, decreasing the performance and the fairness of the network, and in the 
extreme case resulting in a non-functional network. In this thesis we have addressed 
the requirements that nodes misbehaviour detection solution in MANET's should 
achieve. Existing solutions related to nodes misbehaviour detection in MANET were 
shown to fail to meet all of our requirements. 
The main direction of our work has been to look for an effective approach that can 
satisfy our requirements. The result is a new novel low cost framework entitled 
Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection Framework (SMDF). It consists of three 
components, the detection component, the decision component and the isolation 
component. We analysed and evaluated the proposed schemes by simulation 
techniques. By comparing our results to those of other mechanisms available in the 
literature, we showed that our solution has low cost in terms of communication 
overhead and has the lowest False Positive as well as the highest value of True 
Positive Detection Rates. It also showed that our solution has lower energy 
consumption rate and is scalable. Finally we present a series of proposals for future 
research work that have been raised by this work, such as tackling detection 
complications in hybrid ad hoc network environments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Computer networks have come a long way since their initiation, and wireless 
networks are the new trend in the IT market. Wireless networks have become 
increasingly popular in the past few decades, particularly within the 1990's when 
they were adapted to enable mobility and wireless devices became popular. Wireless 
communication brings fundamental changes to data networking and 
telecommunications. Air is used as the transmission medium, which allows a great 
flexibility. This way, networks can easily and rapidly be deployed in environments 
where cabling is difficult. Low prices and good performance incite more and more 
companies and home users to choose those new kinds of networks. As the cost of 
wireless access drops, wireless communications could replace wired in many 
settings. Today, widely travelling laptop users access the Internet at a variety of 
places and environments including their homes, corporate offices, and even at public 
places such as conference venues, airports, shopping malls, hotels, libraries, arenas, 
and so on. One advantage of wireless is the ability to transmit data among users in a 
common area while remaining mobile. However, the distance between participants is 
limited by the range of transmitters or their proximity to wireless access points. 
Mobile Ad hoc wireless networks (MANET) solve this problem by allowing out of 
range nodes to route data through intermediate nodes. 
Interest in commercialization of MANET is recently growing at a much faster rate 
due to their portability and proliferation of mobile communication devices like 
laptops, PDAs, mobile phones, and other intelligent radio devices [Akyildiz'05]. 
Unlike the typical Internet, which has dedicated nodes for basic network operations 
such as authorization, routing, packet forwarding, and network management, all 
these functions should be performed by the nodes themselves in MANET. However, 
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typical nodes cannot be trusted with these important network functions. Thus, 
security has become an essential consideration in MANET, especially in open 
MANET, where a variety of mobile nodes supplied by different manufacturers 
compose a MANET in a self-organizing manner and share their resources for global 
connectivity with their own goals. Moreover, MANET nodes still have small storage, 
low bandwidth, high error rates, and limited battery power, in spite of recent 
appreciable advances in terms of power efficiency, flexibility, and robustness. For 
these reasons, common security algorithms designed for traditional networks are 
difficult to use in MANET. Hence, new security approaches need to be developed for 
MANET. 
There are currently two kinds of mobile wireless networks. The first is known as 
infrastructure networks with fixed and wired gateways. Typical applications of this 
type of "one-hop" wireless network include wireless local area networks (WLANs). 
The most commonly used wireless technology is the WiFi (802.11) also known as 
WLAN which enables network communication via the Internet Protocol (IP) 
[Basile'03]. There are two modes in which the WLAN technology can be used. The 
most common is the "Access Point" or hotspots mode where the clients, usually 
laptops or all other kind of mobile devices, connect to a network via an access point. 
In this scenario, the access point is typically connected to a wired network, which 
usually offers services e. g. Internet access. 
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The second type of mobile wireless network is the infrastructure-less mobile 
network, commonly known as the Mobile ad hoc network (MANET). Figure 1-1 
shows examples of the two kinds. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 1.1,1.2 and 1.3 we 
introduce Mobile Ad hoc Networks, their applications and their main characteristics 
respectively. The next two sections 1.4 and 1.5 discuss the wider context and outline 
the problem of node misbehaviour and its impacts in Mobile ad hoc networks. 
Section 1.6 sets out the aims of the thesis before we detail the novel results of our 
work in section 1.7. The chapter closes with a description of the thesis structure in 
section 1.8. 
1.1 Mobile Ad hoc Network 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) are collections of mobile nodes connected 
together over a wireless medium. Nodes are computing and communication devices 
that can be laptop computers, PDAs, mobile phones or even sensors. These nodes 
can freely and dynamically self-organise into arbitrary and temporary ad hoc network 
topologies, allowing people and devices to seamlessly internetwork in areas with no 
pre-existing communication infrastructure (e. g., disaster recovery and battlefield 
environments). Nodes in the ad hoc network are often mobile, but can also consist of 
stationary nodes, such as an access point to the Internet or as a wireless sensor 
network. The ad hoc networking concept is not new, having been around in various 
forms for over 30 years, packet radio network (1972), survivable adaptive radio 
network (1980), and global mobile information system (early 1990s) [Bruno'05]. 
Traditionally, tactical networks have been the only communication networking 
application that followed the ad hoc paradigm. Recently, the introduction of low-cost 
wireless technologies (e. g., Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11), together with the 
standardisation efforts of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) MANET 
Working Group [IETF'07], have been generating renewed and growing interest in 
research and development of MANET outside the military field. IETF MANET WG 
is standardizing four routing protocols, and 802.11 wireless cards are ubiquitous. 
3 
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MANET are built on a mix of fixed and mobile nodes interconnected via wireless 
links to form a multi-hop ad hoc network. Users' devices are an active part of the 
network, They dynamically join the network, acting as both user terminals and 
routers for other devices, consequently further extending network coverage. 
1.2 MANET Applications 
The set of applications for MANET is diverse, ranging from large-scale, mobile, 
highly dynamic networks, to small, static networks that are constrained by power 
sources. Besides the legacy applications that move from traditional infrastructure 
environment into the ad hoc context, a great deal of new services can and will be 
generated for the new environment [Akyildiz'05]. Typical applications include: 
1) Wireless Sensor network (WSI\9. It is one of the famous and successful 
applications of MANET. It is a wireless network consisting of spatially distributed 
autonomous devices using sensors to cooperatively monitor physical or 
environmental conditions, such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, motion or 
pollutants, at different locations. The development of wireless sensor networks was 
originally motivated by military applications where military sensor networks deploy 
to detect enemy movements and to allow the military to take advantage of 
commonplace network technologies to maintain an information network between the 
soldiers, vehicles, and military information head quarters. It can be also used for 
Chemical/Biological weapon detection. However, wireless sensor networks are now 
used in many civilian application areas, including environment and habitat 
monitoring, healthcare applications, home automation, and traffic control. 
2) Commercial applications. Ad hoc can be used in emergency/rescue operations for 
disaster relief efforts, e. g. in fire, flood, or earthquake. Emergency rescue operations 
must take place where non-existing or damaged communications infrastructure and 
rapid deployment of a communication network is needed. Information is relayed 
from one rescue team member to another over a small handheld. Other commercial 
scenarios include e. g. ship-to-ship ad hoc mobile communication, law enforcement, 
4 
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intelligent transportation systems, public Internet access and public safety, e. g. 
police, fire departments, first responders, and emergency services. 
3) Local level. MANETs can autonomously link an instant and temporary 
multimedia network using notebook computers or palmtop computers to spread and 
share information among participants at e. g. conferences or classrooms. Another 
appropriate local level application might be in home networks where devices can 
communicate directly to exchange information. Similarly in other civilian 
environments like taxicab, sports stadium, boat and small aircraft, mobile ad hoc 
communications will have many applications. 
4) Personal Area Network (PAA9. Short-range MANET can simplify the 
intercommunication between various mobile devices (such as a PDA, a laptop, and a 
cellular phone). Tedious wired cables are replaced with wireless connections. Such 
an ad hoc network can also extend the access to the Internet or other networks by 
mechanisms, e. g. Wireless LAN (WLAN), GPRS, and UMTS. The PAN is 
potentially a promising application field of MANET in the future pervasive 
computing context. 
1.3 Characteristics of MANET 
MANET has the following characteristics: 
1) Multi-hop routing. Basic types of ad hoc routing algorithms can be single-hop 
and multi-hop, based on different link layer attributes and routing protocols. Single- 
hop MANET is simpler than multi-hop in terms of structure and implementation, 
with lower cost of functionality and applicability. When delivering data packets from 
a source to its destination out of the direct wireless transmission range, the packets 
should be forwarded via one or more intermediate nodes. 
2) Dynamic network topology. Since the nodes are mobile, the network topology 
may change rapidly and unpredictably and the connectivity among the terminals may 
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vary with time. MANET should adapt to the traffic and propagation conditions as 
well as the mobility patterns of the mobile network nodes. The mobile nodes in the 
network dynamically establish routing among themselves as they move about, 
forming their own network on the fly. Moreover, a user in the MANET may not only 
operate within the ad hoc network, but may require access to a public fixed network 
(e. g. Internet). 
3) Autonomous terminal. In MANET, each mobile terminal is an autonomous node, 
which may function as both a host and a router. In other words, besides the basic 
processing ability as a host, the mobile nodes can also perform switching functions 
as a router. So usually endpoints and switches are indistinguishable in MANET. 
4) Distributed operation. Since there is no backbone network for the central control 
of the network operations, the control and management of the network is distributed 
among the terminals. The nodes involved in a MANET should collaborate amongst 
themselves and each node acts as a relay as needed, to implement functions e. g. 
security and routing. 
5) Fluctuating link capacity. The nature of high bit-error rates of wireless 
connection might be more profound in a MANET. One end-to-end path can be 
shared by several sessions. The channel over which the terminals communicate is 
subject to noise, fading, and interference, and has less bandwidth than a wired 
network. In some scenarios, the path between any pair of users can traverse multiple 
wireless links and the link themselves can be heterogeneous. 
6) Light-weight terminals. In most cases, the MANET nodes are mobile devices 
with less CPU processing capability, small memory size, and low power storage. 
Such devices need optimised algorithms and mechanisms that implement the 
computing and communicating functions. 
6 
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1.4 Node Misbehaviour in MANET 
Misbehaviour in mobile ad-hoc networks occurs for several reasons [Ang'04]. 
Mainly Selfish nodes misbehave to save power or to improve their access to service 
relative to others. These nodes aim to get the greatest benefits from the networks 
while trying to preserve their own resources, e. g. battery life or bandwidth. 
-_ c 
Figure 1-2: An example of node misbehaviour in MANET 
Selfish nodes attempt to maintain communications with the nodes it wants to send 
data packets to but may refuse to cooperate when it receives routing or data packets 
that it has no interest in. Therefore, it may either drop data packets as illustrated in 
figure 1-2, where node C misbehaves by dropping packets that should be forwarded 
to node D, or refuse to retransmit routing packets that it has no interest in. These 
nodes have four patterns of selfish behaviour as follows: 
1) Will not relay route request (RREQ) messages: while normal nodes relay RREQ 
messages to each other, selfish nodes will not relay these messages to avoid being 
included in the others' routes and avoid routing for others. 
2) Will not send HELLO messages: while normal nodes send HELLO messages, a 
kind of route reply (RREP) messages sent periodically to notify neighbour nodes of 
their presence and manage link state, selfish nodes will not handle messages that do 
7 
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not concern themselves. By behaving so, selfish nodes have no risk of being 
suspected by other nodes because they are not seen by others until they themselves 
send the first packet. As in 1), they will not relay RREQ messages. 
3) Intentionally delays relaying RREQ messages: after a selfish node that behaves as 
in 1) and 2) sends a packet, it will be found by its neighbour nodes. Then it would be 
easy for the node at the previous hop to detect its selfish behaviour by watching to 
see whether the selfish node relayed a RREQ message. However, if a selfish node 
relays a RREQ message with a delay near the upper limit of timeout, and another 
node can relay the packet, the selfish node can avoid relaying the packet because the 
other node will relay the RREQ message earlier than the selfish one, so a route will 
be established over normal nodes. If a selfish node relays RREQ within the time 
defined in the protocol, it would be difficult to conclude that the node is behaving 
selfishly because it does relay RREQ messages before the timeout specified in the 
protocol. 
4) Relays routing messages but not data packets: while a selfish node may correctly 
handle routing messages, it will not relay data packets. 
These selfish behaviours are difficult to distinguish from the packet loss of normal 
nodes or faulty nodes that simply misbehave accidentally [Buchegger'05]. Regardless 
of the motivation for misbehaviour its impact on the mobile ad-hoc network proves 
to be detrimental, decreasing the performance and the fairness of the network, and in 
the extreme case, resulting in a non-functional network. 
Recent studies show that most of one node's energy in MANET is likely to be 
devoted for packets relaying. For instance, the simulation study in [Buttyan'03] 
shows that when the average number of hops from a source to a destination is around 
5, then almost 80% of a node's transmission energy will be devoted to forward 
packets for others. This motivates nodes to behave selfishly, and makes them 
unwilling to relay packets not of direct interest to them. Another motivation for 
dropping data packets is to launch a Denial of Service (DoS) attack targeting either 
the source or the destination of packets. The full reliance on nodes' cooperation 
8 
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makes ad hoc networks hugely vulnerable to this attack. The packet dropping 
misbehaviour may lead to serious problems when performed by many nodes in the 
network, such as throughput degradation, latency rise, and network partition that 
threats the service availability which is one of the security requirements, which will 
be discussed later in chapter 2. All these problems affect both well-behaving and 
misbehaving nodes. Marti et al. [Marti'00] have shown by simulation that if 10% to 
40% among the network's nodes misbehave on data forwarding, then the average 
throughput degrades by 16% to 32%. Another study performed by [Buttyan'01 ] has 
been devoted to investigate the impact of the network size by simulating networks of 
different sizes with the same density, and comparing the effect of the same rates of 
misbehaving nodes on the throughput. The results show that large networks are more 
vulnerable to this kind of misbehaviour. 
1.5 Problem Definition 
In MANET, security is one of the most important concerns because a MANET 
system is much more vulnerable to attacks than a wired or infrastructure-based 
wireless network. Designing an effective security protocol for MANET is a very 
challenging task. This is mainly due to the unique characteristics of MANET, namely 
shared broadcast radio channel, insecure operating environment, lack of central 
authority, lack of association among users, limited availability of resources, and 
physical vulnerability. 
Due to this infrastructure-less features of MANET mentioned above, all networking 
functions must be performed by the nodes themselves. In particular, data packets sent 
between distant nodes are expected to be relayed by intermediate nodes, which act as 
routers and provide the forwarding service. The forwarding service correctly relays 
the received packets from node to node until reaching their final destination, 
following routes selected and maintained by the routing protocol. The routing and 
data forwarding together are at the core of the network layer. Even more challenging, 
stationary MANET and its successful type of applications namely the static wireless 
sensor networks are highly susceptible to denial of service attacks due to their 
inherent characteristics i. e., low computational power, limited memory and 
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communication bandwidth coupled with use of insecure wireless channel. Therefore, 
a sink/black-hole attack can be easily launched by an adversary node in the sensor 
network. The malicious node starts advertising very attractive routes to data sink 
(e. g. zero-cost routes to every other node) [Ahmed'05]. The neighbour nodes select 
the malicious node as the next hop for message forwarding considering it a high 
quality route and propagate this route to other nodes. Almost all traffic is thus 
attracted to the malicious node that can either drop it, selectively forward it based on 
some malicious filtering mechanism or change the content of the messages before 
relaying it. This malicious node has thus formed a sink-hole with itself at the centre. 
The sink-hole is characterized by intense resource contention among neighbouring 
nodes of the malicious node for the limited bandwidth and channel access. These 
result in congestion and can accelerate the energy consumption of the nodes 
involved, leading to the formation of routing holes due to nodes failure. With sink 
holes forming in a sensor network, several other types of denial of service attacks are 
then possible [Wood'02]. 
On the other hand, forwarding packets for other nodes is not always in the direct 
interest of every node, so there is no good reason to trust nodes and assume that they 
always cooperate. Indeed, nodes try to preserve their resources, and particularly their 
batteries. To mitigate such problem, many power-aware routing protocols have been 
proposed [Doshi'02b, Doshi'02a, Krunz'04, Jung'05, Djenouri'06a] but all of these 
solutions do not completely solve the problem due to the complex nature of the 
network. As a result, users will be concerned about their limited batteries, which may 
lead the nodes to behave selfishly and drop packets. A selfish node regarding the 
packet forwarding process is the one that takes advantage of the distributed 
forwarding service and asks others to forward its own packets, but would not 
correctly participate in this service. Without appropriate countermeasures, the effects 
of misbehaviour dramatically decrease network performance. Depending on the 
proportion of misbehaved nodes and their specific strategies network throughput can 
be severely degraded, packet loss increases, nodes can be denied service, and the 
network can be partitioned. Moreover, this misbehaviour represents a potential 
danger that threatens the quality of service, as well as one of the most important 
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network security requirements, namely the availability. The detrimental effects of 
misbehaviour result in unfairness and degraded performance and they can endanger 
the functioning of the entire network. 
1.6 Thesis Aims 
It is the aim of this thesis to describe a framework for detecting nodes misbehaviour 
in stationary MANET environments. The framework combine to provide high 
accuracy detection rates at lower cost in terms of communication overhead and 
energy consumption. In order to do this we must first address three issues: 
1. What are the requirements for a misbehaviour detection framework within ad hoc 
networking environments? Any requirements should take into account both the 
characteristics of MANET, in particular low power storage and multi-hop 
capabilities as well as the need for low cost. The design of a framework should 
have both simplicity as well as precision. 
2. What existing techniques are appropriate in developing solutions for these 
requirements? This literature survey shall examine the building blocks of 
misbehaviour detection enhancement as well as those efforts that have 
contributed directly to the knowledge about MANET security. 
3. Finally the framework should enable us to better understand the complex problem 
of Misbehaviour, both generally, and specifically in terms of mobile ad hoc 
networking. The framework should allow us to ask further research questions 
regarding the field. 
1.7 Novel Research Contributions 
The problem of node misbehaviour in stationary MANET and static wireless sensors 
network is rarely dealt with in a serious enough manner. All of the existing research 
solutions in the area of Data forwarding Detection are only focusing on mobile 
scenarios in MANET (i. e. when nodes are freely mobile). However, little has been 
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done in the terms of examine and applying such mechanisms to Stationary MANET 
when nodes are static or with very low level of mobility. An example of stationary 
MANET is a wireless sensor networks for civil and military applications (e. g. 
security management, surveillance, automation, wildlife and environmental 
monitoring) that are typically deployed today, and have small to medium scale (tens 
to hundreds of sensors) across small to medium geographical distances. Since every 
node is potentially a router, this adds new vulnerabilities to the network-layer 
problems experienced on the Internet. Misbehaviour detection protocols must be 
simple enough to scale up to large networks such as stationary wireless sensors 
networks, yet robust enough to cope with failures that occur many hops away from a 
source. This thesis contributes to our understanding of Security and Misbehaviour 
Detection Systems in wireless ad hoc environments in the following ways: 
" Our first contribution is to provide a set of requirements for an efficient 
misbehaviour detection framework in mobile ad hoc networking 
environments and examine these against existing research in literature 
[Fahad'06a]. These requirements enable the network providers to operate a 
secure system whilst consuming low energy and producing low 
communication overhead. The requirements are similar to those of existing 
work but have been reconsidered to reflect the changing nature of ad hoc 
networks, especially as it applies to sensor networks. A survey of research 
literature in the field revealed that no results completely meet these 
requirements. These techniques focus on either high accuracy detection rate 
at huge cost in terms of energy and communication overhead such as 
[Kargl'04, Djenouri'05] or on poor accuracy detection rate at a medium cost 
like [Marti'00, Buchegger'02b, He'04, Michiardi'02a, Miranda'03, Yang'02]. 
Others such as [Buttyan'03, Zhong'03, Papadimitratos'03] fail because they 
aim to encourage good behaviour among nodes without fair and firm 
mechanisms to deal with those who misbehave. Additionally we also bring 
together relevant ideas of use in search for effective misbehaviour detection 
in MANET environments. 
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Using the set of requirements and inspiration from relevant literature, this 
thesis proposes a novel solution to accurately and effectively detect and deal 
with node misbehaviour in mobile ad hoc networking environments including 
wireless sensor network, and it is called Sessions-based Misbehaviour 
Detection Formwork (SMDF) [Fahad'07a, Fahad'07b]. The new framework 
consists of three components, Detection Component, Decision Component 
and finally Isolation Component. Each component in SMDF provides 
different functionalities, and all of these components are integrated to provide 
an efficient and robust solution against node misbehaviour in MANET. The 
major advantages of our SMDF included its capability of working either 
independently or be integrated with other routing protocols. The new 
framework is also extensible and flexible as it has the capability of adding 
new components to it or removing existing components from it as necessary. 
Moreover, the new framework is transparent in terms of its capability to 
integrate with other mechanisms as required. The detection component 
contains our novel Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection Protocol SMDP to 
detect selfish or malicious nodes that drop packets partially or completely to 
launch either black-hole or data dropping attacks. For the decision component 
we have enhanced an existing Bayesian approach to decide whether the node 
deliberately misbehaved or not. For the Isolation component, we have 
modified an existing approach and used an Observation-Based Protocol to 
isolate misbehaving nodes. It uses neighbouring observations experience to 
isolate misbehaved nodes. We analysed and evaluated the proposed 
framework by simulation techniques. Our evaluation was focused on six 
important parameters, namely Throughput, Overheard, True Positive 
Detection Rate, False Positive Detection Rate, Power Consumption Rate and 
Scalability. By comparing our results to those of other mechanisms available 
on literature, we showed that our solution has low cost in terms of 
communication overhead than other approaches. We showed also that our 
framework has the lowest False Positive Detection Rate of misbehaving 
nodes amongst other approaches, and that it has highest value of True 
Positive Detection Rate compared with other approaches. Our evaluation also 
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showed that our solution has lower energy consumption rate compared with 
other existing approaches. The evaluation showed also that our framework is 
scalable and can work with higher number of nodes, especially in wireless 
sensor networks. 
" The first new component of our framework we have developed is the 
Detection Component, which is the most important component in any 
misbehaviour detection framework. For this reason we have developed a new 
novel Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection Protocol (SMDP) [Fahad'06b, 
Fahad'07a, Fahad'07b]. The SMDP deals with the network in terms of 
sessions, and uses cross-layer collaboration between the session layer and the 
network layer in order to know the start and the end of each session. In 
SMDP each node in the route session monitors all of its direct neighbours 
within a one hop communication, and checks whether they correctly forward 
packets or drop them completely or partially in order to launch an attack such 
as black-hole and packet dropping attacks. SMDP is cost effective as it 
reduces the communication overhead, by using only one hop communication 
(no flooding), and sending control packets only at the end of sessions, instead 
of doing so for each packet, in contrary to the current solutions that exist in 
literature. The new SMDP also has an advantage of being independent of the 
routing protocol, as well as its ability to work with any MANET routing 
protocol, unlike most of the existing mechanism in literature who work as an 
extension of one particular routing protocol. We evaluated the proposed 
protocol by simulation and showed that our approach is more efficient and 
scalable than other approaches found in the literature. It showed also that it 
has a low cost in terms of both communication overhead and energy 
consumption compared to other approaches. 
We have developed the second component of our framework (SMDF) which 
is the Decision Component [Fahad'07a, Fahad'07b]. After detecting those 
nodes dropping packets using our detection component SMDP, we have used 
the decision component of the SMDF to decide whether the nodes 
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misbehaved or not. As the nodes might drop packets for innocent reasons 
such as collision or faulty packets, the decision component of SMDF take all 
of this into account, in order to make a fair decision. For the decision 
component we have enhanced an existing mathematical estimation method, 
which has been used in the literature and we have modified it effectively to 
suit our new framework requirements. It based on Bayesian standard 
approach, which consists of estimating a parameter the observations of which 
follow a Bernouli distribution by a Beta distribution. In our approach, well 
behaving nodes improve their reputation, whereas misbehaving nodes in 
terms of either intentional or unintentional packet dropping will decreases it. 
Moreover, our approach allows redemption before making decisions, and 
decreases false accusations due to, for example channel conditions or 
collision. Furthermore, in Bayesian approach only the latest observations are 
watched over, and not all the observations, as a result it has the advantage of 
not requiring a memory. We evaluated our proposed approach by simulations 
and showed that our approach is more accurate in identifying the real 
misbehaving nodes than existing approaches. It also has lower 
communications overhead compared to other approaches. 
" Having identified the misbehaving nodes locally, we developed our Isolation 
Component which will then punish them by not routing packets through them 
and by not forwarding packets for them. For this component, we have 
modified an existing approach and we used an Observation-Based Protocol to 
isolate misbehaving nodes. Once a node is judged locally as misbehaving by 
some other node, this latter must approve its detection to ensure the isolation 
by all nodes. The Observation-Based Protocol uses neighbouring 
observations experience to mitigate false detections and false accusations 
vulnerabilities that exist in other approaches such as [Marti'00, 
Buchegger'02b, Djenouri'05]. In this protocol, a node that detects and accuses 
another node of misbehaviour must approve its accusation before taking any 
measure against it. It should not isolate the assumed misbehaving unilaterally, 
because this could result in false detections against it. However, it could 
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avoid routing its own packets through this node in all cases. The Observation- 
Based Protocol enforces the accusing node to collect a certain number of 
observations from neighbouring nodes in terms of signatures before isolating 
the detected node. Once the accuser node collects this number, it broadcasts 
an Isolation packet including all observations through the network to isolate 
the misbehaving node. This broadcast will not be performed until a node is 
detected and approved as misbehaving. As a result, our solution produces less 
overhead as long as nodes well-behave, as no opinions are exchanged 
periodically. Our simulation results suggest that our approach has the lowest 
percentage in falsely accusing well behaving nodes of misbehaviour 
compared to other existing approaches. It showed also that it has a low cost in 
terms of communication overhead. 
" Our final contribution is that this research poses some new questions that had 
not been made explicit before. Among the questions for further work are 
issues of tackling detection complications in hybrid ad hoc network 
environments. Two other important issues raised are those of dealing with 
control packets dropper and mobility handling issues in terms of mobile 
Wireless Sensor Networks. These questions are examined together with an 
evaluation of the project in terms of the shortcomings of the framework and 
comparison with closely related work. 
1.8 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is structured into the following six chapters: 
Our introduction to the area in Chapter 1 discusses the wider context and outlines the 
problem of node misbehaviour in Mobile ad hoc network. It outlines the definition of 
MANET and its main applications. It also identifies MANET main characteristics 
that make the design of routing and detection protocols of such kind of networks a 
challenging task. Chapter 1 also highlights the consequences of node misbehaviour 
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in MANET and its impact on MANET performance. Finally, we outline the thesis 
aims and the contribution of our work, and the structure of the thesis. 
In Chapter 2 we give an overview of MANET architecture and its security issues. We 
first discuss the security issues related to MANET Network layer. We also describe 
two main MANET routing protocols, namely Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and 
Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV). We highlight the security threats and 
attacks on routing protocols and list the most common attacks such as Denial of 
Service (DoS). Then we move down one step to the MAC layer and discuss its 
security issues in MANET, which includes misbehaviour issues in the channel 
access. At the end of this chapter we list the main security attributes and discuss 
some methods of achieving them including cryptography. 
In Chapter 3 we survey the literature and related work. We present and discuss the 
existing solutions that aim at detecting misbehaviour on packet forwarding when it 
appears in the network. We classify these solutions into two main techniques, 
Reactive and Preventive. The reactive solutions are split into two main classes, 
monitoring and reputation-based solutions. Chapter 3 also points out the main 
drawbacks of the existing work and issues that need to be addresses. 
In Chapter 4 we present our framework, Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection 
Framework (SMDF) and briefly describe its three components. First we describe our 
research objectives that form a comprehensive set of support mechanisms and 
schemes. We discuses the gaps in the current knowledge that this thesis will address 
in the requirements review. We identify requirements, issues and challenges are 
important when designing an effective misbehaviour Detection Framework in 
stationary MANET and static wireless sensor network. Then we present our SMDF 
and its cross layer collaboration. 
In Chapter 5 we describe each component of our framework SMDF in detail. We 
start with our new detection component and its novel Sessions-based Misbehaviour 
Detection Protocol (SMDP), where we explain the concepts of the monitoring 
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mechanism our protocol is using and the algorithm to do so. We give two case 
studies in order to illustrate how our SMDF works. Then we explain our modified 
Bayesian approach for the decision component. This is followed up by the Isolation 
component explanation where misbehaving nodes will be penalised for their attacks. 
In Chapter 6 we present the simulation design, analysis, results and performance 
evaluation of our SMDF. We start by showing how selfish misbehaviour affects the 
performance of MANET in terms of reducing the throughput. We then evaluate our 
system through simulation with two of the well-known existing systems, in terms of 
six different metrics. We then look at the overall achievements including evaluation 
against our initial requirements specified in chapter 4 and discuss the problems 
remaining. 
In Chapter 7, we look back at the achievements of the thesis and conclude what we 
have learnt from the field of misbehaviour detection in MANET. The chapter is then 
able to pose some further research questions, and finally provide our conclusion. 
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2. MANET: SECURITY OVERVIEW 
Security has become a major concern in order to provide safe and protected 
communication between MANET's nodes, especially in a hostile environment. 
Unlike the wire-line networks, the unique characteristics of MANET's create a 
number of huge challenges to security design, such as open peer-to-peer network 
architecture, shared wireless medium, stringent resource constraints, and nodes' 
misbehaviour. These challenges clearly give a motivation for building robust security 
solutions that achieve both broad protection and desirable network performance. This 
Chapter gives an overview of MANET architecture and its security issues. We first 
discuss the security issues related to MANET's network layer. We also describe two 
main MANET routing protocols, namely Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and Ad 
hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV). We highlight the security threats and 
attacks on routing protocols and list the most common attacks such as Denial of 
Service (DoS) and black-hole attacks. Then we move down one step to the MAC 
layer and discuss its security issues in MANET, which includes misbehaviour issues 
in the channel access. At the end of this chapter we list main security attributes and 
discuss some methods of achieving them including cryptography. 
2.1 MANET Architecture Overview 
Ad hoc networks are composed of autonomous nodes that are independent of any 
fixed infrastructure as shown in figure 2-1. Mobile ad hoc networks have a fully 
decentralised topology and they are dynamically changing. Besides this, the wireless 
transmission medium introduces limitations in communication. For these reasons, 
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providing security guarantees is particularly difficult. As mentioned in chapter 1, in a 
mobile ad hoc network every node acts as a router for its neighbours. The routing 
protocols that have been proposed assume that the nodes will fully participate. 
Unfortunately, node misbehaviour is a likely phenomenon. This misbehaviour is due 
to selfish or malicious reasons. Another reason is a faulty link due to the wireless 
medium. Misbehaviour can take place at all layers. At the Physical layer a 
misbehaving node can increase its transmitting power, adversely affecting the 
network performance. At the MAC (Medium Access Control) layer a node may 
choose to avoid waiting for his turn to access the medium, taking unfair advantage of 
the shared medium. 
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Figure 2-1: MANET Architecture 
The basic threat at the Network layer is the non-cooperative behaviour as far as 
packet forwarding is concerned. The proper execution of a routing protocol demands 
that the intermediate nodes in a path forward correctly the packets to the intended 
receivers. Misbehaving nodes may deny forwarding these packets. A routing protocol 
for MANET should give incentives for cooperative action or, at least it should be able 
to detect misbehaving nodes and punish them. At the Transport layer there is a 
research action that aims to improve the performance of TCP over wireless networks 
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[Hsieh'02, Chen'06]. At the Application layer there is a huge effort of developing 
applications that can perform well over mobile ad hoc networks. The misbehaviour 
problem is not clearly addressed in this area yet. There exist only a few intrusion 
detection techniques [Anjum'03, Huang'03, Kachirski'03, Zhang'03, Liu, Y. '06, 
Karim'06] that operate at this layer which are based on trace analysis of historical 
data. 
2.2 Network Layer Security Issues in MANET 
Protecting the network layer in MANET is a highly important issue. The core 
functionalities provided in this layer are routing and packet forwarding, and are 
closely related. These services (routing and data forwarding) together are at the core 
of the network layer. Next we discuss Routing issues in MANET. 
2.2.1 Routing Issues in MANET 
A MANET's routing protocol finds routes between nodes over which data packets 
are forwarded toward the final destination. In contrast to traditional network routing 
protocols, MANET routing protocols must be adaptable to cope with the features 
presented previously, especially the frequent changes in network topology. The 
challenging problem of routing in ad hoc networks has been extensively studied, 
particularly in the MANET working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) [IETF'07]. These studies have resulted in several mature protocols 
[Perkins'94, Johnson'96, Toh'96, Murthy'96, Park'97, Ko'98, Perkins'99], which can 
be divided into two classes: proactive (table driven) and reactive (on-demand). It has 
been shown in [Royer'99, Ashwini'05] that reactive protocols are more adaptable to 
MANET environments than proactive protocols. However, the problem with all of 
these solutions is that they trust all nodes and do not account for security, therefore 
they are vulnerable to attacks. It is highly important to secure the routing protocol. If 
the routing protocol can be subverted and messages can be altered in transit, then no 
amount of security on the data packets at the upper layers can mitigate threats. 
Recently, several secure MANET routing protocols have been proposed [Perrig'Olb, 
Hu'02a, Hu'02b, Castelluccia'02, Papadimitratos'02, Sanzgiri'02, Zapata'02, Hu'03, 
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Hu'04]. In the following we give a description of DSR and brief one for AODV, two 
protocols adopted by the IETF MANET working group. 
2.2.2 Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
Misbehaviour detection systems for mobile ad-hoc networks have mostly built on 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), monitoring node behaviour with a watchdog 
component. DSR is a protocol developed for routing in mobile ad-hoc networks and 
was proposed for MANET by [Broch'04]. Dynamic source routing is a Source routed 
On-Demand routing protocol in Ad Hoc networks. Source Routing is a technique by 
which the sender of a packet determines the complete sequence of nodes through 
which the node has travel to reach its final destination. The sender of the packet 
explicitly mentions the list of all nodes in the packet's header, identifying each 
forwarding `hop' by the address of the next node to which to transmit the packet on 
its way to destination host. In this protocol the nodes don't need to exchange the 
routing table information periodically and thus reduces the bandwidth overhead in 
the network. Each mobile node participating in the protocol maintains a `routing 
cache', which contains the list of routes that the node has learnt. Whenever the node 
finds a new route it adds the new route in its `routing cache'. Each mobile node also 
maintains a sequence counter `request id' to uniquely identify the requests generated 
by a mobile host. The pair < source address, request id > uniquely identifies any 
request in the ad hoc network. The protocol does not need transmissions between 
hosts to work bi-directionally. The main phases in the protocol are Route Discovery 
process and Route Maintenance process. 
a. Route Discovery 
Route discovery allows any host to dynamically discover the route to any destination 
in the Ad Hoc network. In DSR, a source initiates a route discovery process when the 
source wants to send a packet to a destination to which it doesn't have a valid route. 
The source, if it has a valid route in its routing cache then it uses it otherwise it sends 
a route request packet by broadcasting it to the neighbours. The route request packet 
contains the source address, request id and a route record in which the sequence of 
hops traversed by the request packet before reaching the destination are noted down. 
A node upon getting a route request packet does the following: 
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1. It checks to see if it has the pair <initiators address, request id> in its list of 
recently seen requests if so discards the packet. 
2. Otherwise, if this host's address is already present in the route record of the 
request packet then it discards the packet. This eliminates the looping problem. 
3. Otherwise, if the destination the source is looking for matches with its address 
then it sends the route reply packet to the initiator containing the list of nodes the 
request packet has traversed before it reached the destination. 
4. Otherwise, it appends its own address to the route request packet and 
rebroadcasts it. The route request travels the Ad Hoc network until it reaches the 
destination node. 
b. Route Maintenance 
Route maintenance is a procedure for monitoring the correct operation of routes in 
use. The host that uses the route does this maintenance. Since the nodes do not 
exchange any routing information in this protocol the route maintenance procedure 
monitors the operation of the route and informs the source of any errors. If a host 
node detects that its next hop neighbouring node is not working, then it will send an 
error packet containing its address and the address of the hop that is not working. A 
node upon receiving the route error packet removes the hop in error from its routing 
cache. Acknowledgements are used to verify the correct operation of the route. The 
route maintenance can be provided by using either hop-to-hop or by using end-to-end 
acknowledgements. Figure 2-2 shows the propagation of the Route Request and the 
building of route entry from the source `S' 1 to the destination `D' 7. 
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Figure 2-2: Propagation of the DSR Route Request 
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1. It checks to see if it has the pair <initiators address, request id> in its list of 
recently seen requests if so discards the packet. 
2. Otherwise, if this host's address is already present in the route record of the 
request packet then it discards the packet. This eliminates the looping problem. 
3. Otherwise, if the destination the source is looking for matches with its address 
then it sends the route reply packet to the initiator containing the list of nodes the 
request packet has traversed before it reached the destination. 
4. Otherwise, it appends its own address to the route request packet and 
rebroadcasts it. The route request travels the Ad Hoc network until it reaches the 
destination node. 
b. Route Maintenance 
Route maintenance is a procedure for monitoring the correct operation of routes in 
use. The host that uses the route does this maintenance. Since the nodes do not 
exchange any routing information in this protocol the route maintenance procedure 
monitors the operation of the route and informs the source of any errors. If a host 
node detects that its next hop neighbouring node is not working, then it will send an 
error packet containing its address and the address of the hop that is not working. A 
node upon receiving the route error packet removes the hop in error from its routing 
cache. Acknowledgements are used to verify the correct operation of the route. The 
route maintenance can be provided by using either hop-to-hop or by using end-to-end 
acknowledgements. Figure 2-2 shows the propagation of the Route Request and the 
building of route entry from the source `S' 1 to the destination `D' 7. 
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In case of hop-to-hop acknowledgements the hop in error is indicated in the route 
error packet. But in case of end-to-end acknowledgements the source node assumes 
that the last hop of the route to the destination is error. Figure 2-3 shows the 
propagation of the Route Reply containing the route entry from the destination `D' 7, 
to source `S' 1. 
Figure 2-3: Propagation of the DSR Route Reply 
2.2.3 AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector) 
AODV [Perkins'99, Perkins'03] is a hop-by-hop routing protocol. When a node needs 
to send a data packet to a destination to which it has no route, it has to broadcast a 
RREQ to all its neighbours, then each neighbour does so until reaching the 
destination (or a node with a valid route to the destination). This node sends a RREP 
packet that travels the inverse path until reaching the source. Upon the reception of 
this reply each intermediary updates its routing table. In this way a route between the 
source and the destination is built. Unlike DSR, the source does not put the whole 
route within the outgoing packets; rather, the decision about the next hop is made 
separately after each hop. Since it relies on the distance vector principle [Perkins'99], 
AODV assigns monotonically increasing sequence numbers to routes, which define 
route freshness, as well as hop-count, which defines route optimality. 
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2.2.4 Routing Security Issues and Attacks in MANET 
Security always implies the identification of potential attacks, threats and 
vulnerabilities of a certain system. Security attacks in MANET are divided into two 
categories: active and passive attacks [Nguyen'06]. Active attacks are performed by 
malicious nodes to harm the entire network operation intentionally, and include 
denial of service (DoS), tunnelling (wormhole attack), black hole, and impersonation 
[Hu'04, Nguyen'06]. Active attack can be further divided into external attacks and 
internal attacks. An external attack is one caused by nodes that do not belong to the 
network. An internal attack is one from compromised or hijacked nodes that belong 
to the network. Internal attacks are typically more severe, since malicious nodes 
already belong to the network as authorized parties. Therefore, such nodes are 
protected with the network security mechanisms and underlying services. On the 
other hand, passive attacks are done by selfish nodes whose goal is just to use their 
limited resources only for their own benefit. That some nodes could be selfish is a 
reasonable assumption, especially in the open MANET environment, since nodes 
owned by different commercial entities always attempt to maximize their own 
interests. They do not want to use their resources to support global connectivity, even 
though all nodes benefit from such a commitment in the long run. Among various 
resources associated with nodes, energy is one of the most important, so it needs to 
be conserved as much as possible. In terms of energy consumption, data transmission 
is the most expensive function in the MANET environment. To send a bit over 10 or 
100 m distance, nodes consume energy that can perform thousands to millions of 
arithmetic operations [Yang'04]. Thus, nodes may not forward others' packets and 
simply discard them on purpose. Or they may excessively reduce transmission power 
to save energy, resulting in network partitioning. Any such feature of nodes is called 
selfishness. 
Next, we describe some types of active attacks [Zhou'99, Deng, H. '02, Perkins'03] 
easily performed against a MANET in the network layer. 
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Black hole: Black hole problem in MANET [Deng, H. '02] is a serious security 
problem to be solved. In this problem, a malicious node uses the routing protocol to 
advertise itself as having the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to 
intercept. In a flooding based protocol, if the malicious reply reaches the requesting 
node before the reply from the actual node, a forged route then will be created. This 
malicious node then can choose whether to drop the packets to perform a denial-of- 
service attack or to use its place on the route as the first step in a man-in-the-middle 
attack. 
Denial of service: The DoS attack results when the network bandwidth is hijacked 
by a malicious node. It has many forms: the classic way is to flood any centralized 
resource so that the network no longer operates correctly or crashes. For instance, a 
route request is generated whenever a node has to send data to a particular 
destination. A malicious node might generate frequent unnecessary route requests to 
make the network resources unavailable to other nodes. 
Routing table overflow: The attacker attempts to create routes to nonexistent nodes. 
The goal is to have enough routes so that creation of new routes is prevented or the 
implementation of routing protocol is overwhelmed. 
Energy consumption: Energy is a critical parameter in the MANET. Battery- 
powered devices try to conserve energy by transmitting only when absolutely 
necessary. An attacker can attempt to consume batteries by requesting routes or 
forwarding unnecessary packets to a node. 
Impersonation: A malicious node may impersonate another node while sending the 
control packets to create an anomaly update in the routing table. 
Information disclosure: The malicious node may leak confidential information to 
unauthorized users in the network, such as routing or location information. In the 
end, the attacker knows which nodes are situated on the target route. 
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2.3 MANET Security Attributes 
Security is the combination of processes, procedures, and systems used to ensure 
confidentiality, authentication, integrity, availability, access control, and non- 
repudiation. 
  Availability is to keep the network service or resources available to 
legitimate users. It ensures the survivability of the network despite malicious 
incidents. Lack of availability occurs through denial of service (DoS) attacks. 
In MANET many of the security breaches are targeted to cause DoS attacks. 
  Confidentiality is to keep the information sent unreadable to unauthorized 
users or nodes. MANET uses an open medium, so usually all nodes within 
the direct transmission range can obtain the data. One way to keep 
information confidential is to encrypt the data, and another technique is to use 
directional antennas. In many applications of MANET like transformation of 
military secrets during war, confidentiality is a major concern. 
  Integrity is to be able to keep the message sent from being illegally altered or 
destroyed in the transmission. When the data is sent through the wireless 
medium, the data can be modified or deleted by malicious attackers. The 
malicious attackers can also resend it, which is called a replay attack. 
  Authentication is to be able to identify a node or a user, and to be able to 
prevent impersonation. In wired networks and infrastructure-based wireless 
networks, it is possible to implement a central authority at a point such as a 
router, base station, or access point for authentication. But there is no central 
authority in MANET, and it is much more difficult to authenticate an entity. 
Without authentication an attacker can impersonate as an authenticated node 
and thus gain control over the entire network. 
  Non-repudiation is related to a fact that if a node sends a message, the node 
cannot deny that the message was sent by it. By producing a signature for the 
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message, the entity cannot later deny the message. In public key 
cryptography, a node A signs the message using its private key. All other 
nodes can verify the signed message by using A's public key, and A cannot 
deny that its signature is attached to the message. It is particularly useful for 
detecting compromised nodes. 
  Access control is to prevent unauthorized use of network services and system 
resources. Clearly, access control is tied to authentication attributes. In 
general, access control is the most commonly thought of service especially in 
individual computer systems. 
2.4 Cryptography 
Cryptography is the science of secret writings. Cryptanalysis is the art or science of 
"breaking" the cipher texts without knowing the key used for decrypting. Those who 
"practice" cryptography are called cryptographers and those who "practice" 
cryptanalysis are called cryptanalysts [Stallings'05]. Nowadays cryptography is used 
for securing messages, certification, services and mechanisms used for electronic 
equipment networks. There are two types of cryptographic systems: symmetric and 
asymmetric encryption. 
2.4.1 Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryptions 
Encryption is the process of encoding a text so that its original meaning is observed. 
Decryption is the opposite process, a mechanism to reveal the original message from 
the encrypted one. The term encipher and decipher are used respectively. The 
original or unaltered version of the message is termed as plain text and the encrypted 
message is called ciphertext. 
Symmetric Encryption 
This encryption uses the same secret key for encryption and decryption. The 
cryptographic algorithms (ciphers) used in symmetric encryption systems are divided 
into stream ciphers and block ciphers. The stream ciphers may encrypt only a single 
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bit clearly at a time, while the block ciphers may encrypt more bits (64 or 128 bits) at 
a time. The most challenging task in symmetric encryption is to distribute and 
manage the shared secret (Key). DES (Data Encryption Standard) and AES 
(Advanced Encryption Standard - Rijndael) are examples of symmetric encryption. 
Asymmetric Encryption / Public Key Encryption 
Unlike the symmetric encryption it uses two separate keys for encryption and 
decryption. So keys come in pairs called private-public key pairs. The sender 
encrypts the message with his private key. Prior to this operation sender must send its 
corresponding public key to the receiver. On receiving the encrypted text, the public 
key is used to decipher the original plain text. The asymmetric encryption incurs 
quite high computational expense for an attacker, and its application is limited where 
both security and efficiency are concerned. The best known asymmetric encryption 
system is RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman). 
Generally, the symmetric algorithms are executed more quickly than asymmetric 
ones. In practice they are often used together, so that a public-key algorithm is used 
to encrypt a randomly generated encryption key, and the random key is used to 
encrypt the actual message using a symmetric algorithm. This is sometimes called 
hybrid encryption. 
2.4.2 Digital Signature 
Digital signature is an important cryptographic primitives used for authentication, 
authorization and non-repudiation [Stallings'05] . Digital signature has the best use of 
public key cryptography. An asymmetric encryption algorithm such as RSA can be 
used to create and verify digital signature [Stinson'02]. The simplest form of the 
protocol works as follows: 
Two parties Bob and Alice wish to exchange a signature: 
1. Bob encrypts the document with his private key, thereby singing the document. 
2. Bob sends the signed document to Alice. 
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3. Alice deciphers the document with Bob's public key, thus verifying the signature. 
The strength of the digital signature lies with the fact that although the public-private 
key pair for asymmetric encryption is mathematically related, it is computationally 
infeasible to derive the private key from the corresponding public key. Another 
fundamental process, termed a "hash function, " is used in both creating and verifying 
a digital signature. Hash functions the security primitives that ensure data integrity. 
Hash function is often called one-way hash function, because it is a computationally 
difficult problem to compute the inverse function. 
A digital signature must meet the following two properties [Pfleeger'02] 
" It must be authentic. If someone R receives a digital signature from S, R must 
be able to verify that the signature is really from S. 
" It must be un-forgeable. If an entity sings a document M with signature S(M), 
it is not possible for other entity to produce the same pair <M, S(M)>. 
In reality digital signature creation and verification are performed using the 
combination of hash function and asymmetric encryption. To create a digital 
signature the sender first computes the message authentication code (MAC) or hash 
of the original message and append the code with the message. Then the hash code is 
encrypted using asymmetric encryption. On the reception end the receiver uses the 
same hash algorithm to compute the hash code of the message decrypts the encrypted 
message using the corresponding public key and compares the hash value. 
2.5 Key Management Security Issues 
Most of the solutions proposed for securing routing and data forwarding that will be 
descried in the next chapter rely on cryptography described above, and assume the 
existence of an underlying mechanism for providing and managing keys. Many 
secure applications and services also use cryptography and rely on this assumption. 
However, because of the lack of any central infrastructure or administration, key 
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management is problematic in MANET. There are basically two kinds of key 
infrastructure. The first involves the private key infrastructure, which establishes 
common private keys used for symmetric cryptography, such as symmetric group 
keys used for securing group communications [Maki'00, Yasinsac'02, Chiang'03, 
Pietro'03, Lazos'03b]. The second kind is the public key infrastructure, which 
provides a couple of keys (public/private) used for asymmetric cryptography, as in 
digital signatures. Providing such an infrastructure in MANET is challenging, due to 
their infrastructure-less nature. Certainly, the role of this infrastructure should be 
spread out to all mobile nodes (or a subset of them), which form the key 
infrastructure. Therefore, the MANET key management system should neither trust 
nor rely on any fixed certificate authority (CA), but should be distributed and self- 
organised. 
2.5.1 Private Key Infrastructure 
The private key management protocols have been classified into two classes 
[Steiner'98]: key distribution protocols, which are centralised and based on a trusted 
third party, and key agreement protocols, which are distributed. The suitable class for 
our environment in MANET is certainly the second approach. [Diffie'76, 
Bellovin'92, Steiner'96, Becker'98, Wong'98, Ozaki'99, Sinha'99, Asokan'00, 
Perrig'Ola, Jetcheva'01, Li'02, Naor'02, Staddon'02, Liu, D. '03, Lazos'03a, Kaya'03, 
Das'03, Zhu'04] are solutions belonging to this class and some of them are especially 
devoted to MANET. 
2.5.2 Public Key Infrastructure 
The solutions we have mentioned above are related to private key management. We 
will now discuss the public key management problem. In a public key infrastructure, 
each node has a public/private key pair. Public keys can be distributed to other 
nodes, while private keys should be kept confidential to individual nodes. This type 
of key is essential for any service or application that employs asymmetric 
cryptography, such as many of the protocols described earlier, which use digital 
signature. In a traditional public key infrastructure, there is a trusted entity called a 
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certification authority (CA) that distributes nodes' public keys in certificates. The 
CA has a public/private key pair. The private key is used to sign certificates binding 
public keys the CA provides for nodes, while the public key is used by nodes to 
check the certificate's authentication. However, it is problematic in MANET to 
establish a key management service using a single CA. A standard approach to 
improve service availability is replication, but a naive replication of the CA makes 
the service more vulnerable, since compromising any single replica that possesses 
the service private key could lead to the collapse of the entire system. To solve this 
problem, recent solutions propose [Ostrovsky'91, Zimmermann'95, Zhou'99, 
Hubaux'01, Yi'03, Capkun'03] to distribute the trust over a set of nodes by letting 
them share the key management responsibility. 
2.6 MAC Layer Misbehaviour Issues in MANET 
In this section we present a misbehaving activity that threatens one of the most 
important purposes of MAC protocols, namely fairness in channel access. 
2.6.1 Misbehaving in Channel Access 
Since there is no central authority in MANET, Wireless Medium Access Control 
(MAC) protocols [Jurdak'04], such as IEEE 802.11, use distributed contention 
resolution mechanisms for sharing the wireless channel. The contention resolution is 
typically based on cooperative mechanisms that ensure a reasonably fair share of the 
channel for all the participating nodes. In this environment, some selfish hosts in the 
network may misbehave by failing to adhere to the MAC protocol, with the intent of 
obtaining an unfair share of the channel. The presence of selfish nodes that deviate 
from the contention resolution protocol can reduce the throughput share received by 
conforming nodes. The IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol [Gast'02], which is the standard 
MAC protocol for wireless networks, has two mechanisms for contention resolution: 
a centralized mechanism called PCF (Point Coordination Function), and a fully 
distributed mechanism called DCF (Distributed Coordination Function). PCF needs a 
centralized controller (such as a base station) and can only be used in infrastructure- 
based networks; thus, it is not to be considered in the ad hoc mode. In contrast, DCF 
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is widely used in infrastructure-based wireless networks as well as in ad hoc wireless 
networks. DCF uses the CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision 
Avoidance) option for resolving contention among multiple nodes accessing the 
channel. A node (sender) with data to transmit on the channel selects a random 
backoff value from range (0; CW), where CW (contention window) is a variable 
maintained by each node. While the channel is idle, the backoff counter is 
decremented by one after every time slot (a fixed interval of time), and the counter is 
frozen when the channel becomes busy. The node may access the channel when the 
backoff counter is decremented to zero. After the backoff counter is decremented to 
zero, the sender may reserve the channel for the duration of the data transfer by 
exchanging control packets on the channel. The sender first sends a RTS (request to 
send) packet to the receiver, then the receiver responds with a CTS (clear to send) 
packet. This RTS-CTS exchange is optional in IEEE 802.11; it aims to ensure the 
channel reservation for the duration of the data transmission. Both of the packets 
contain the proposed duration of the data transmission. Other nodes that overhear 
either the RTS or the CTS (or both) are required to defer transmissions on the 
channel for the duration specified in the RTS/CTS. After a successful RTS/CTS 
exchange, the sender transmits a DATA packet, which will be acknowledged by an 
ACK. If the node's data transmission is successful, the node resets its CW to a 
minimum value (CWmin); otherwise, if the sender does not receive the CTS, then 
CW is doubled, but it should not exceed a maximum value of CWmax. A 
misbehaving node may obtain more than its fair share of the bandwidth by: 
" Selecting backoff values from a different distribution with smaller average 
backoff value than the distribution specified by DCF (e. g., by selecting 
backoff values from the range (O, CW/4) instead of the range (O, CW)) 
[Kyasanur'03]. 
" Using a different retransmission strategy that does not double the CW value 
after collisions. 
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We note that it is not beneficial for a selfish node to not delay at all or to choose a 
very small constant period, since this may result in a very high collision rate, and 
thus the loss of the packets it sends. Such selfish misbehaviour can seriously degrade 
the throughput of well-behaved nodes. For instance, simulation results obtained by 
Kyasanur and Vaidya [Kyasanur'03] show that for a network containing eight nodes 
sending packets to a common receiver with one of the eight nodes misbehaving by 
selecting backoff values from the range (O, CW/4), the throughput of the other seven 
nodes is degraded by as much as 50 percent. There is no published solution proposed 
to this complex problem, except the solution proposed by [Kyasanur'03]. 
2.7 Misbehaviour Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) 
Wireless sensor networks, a special class of ad hoc networks applied to monitoring 
physical environments, have recently emerged as an important application of the ad 
hoc network paradigm. This technology has mainly been made possible by the 
convergence of micro-electromechanical systems technology, wireless 
communications, and digital electronics, enabling the construction of low-cost, low- 
power, multifunctional sensor nodes that are small in size and communicate un 
tethered in short distances, thus forming the sensor network [Akyildiz'02, 
Akyildiz'05]. 
A sensor network consists of hundreds to thousands of tiny devices equipped with 
signal processing circuits, microcontrollers, and wireless transmitters/receivers, in 
addition to embedded sensors. Nodes may be randomly and densely deployed over 
the sensing field, leading therefore to a need for auto-organization capability. 
Potential applications of sensor networks include, but are not limited to, geophysical 
monitoring (seismic activity), precision agriculture (soil management), habitat 
monitoring (tracking of animal herds), target tracking in battlefields, and disaster 
relief networks [Xu'02]. 
Early research efforts have focused on the development of a new network protocol 
stack, trying to meet performance requirements that are more stringent than in other 
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ad hoc networks, including energy efficiency, auto-organization, scalability to a high 
number of nodes, etc. However, most applications of sensor networks face acute 
security concerns, including packets dropping, eavesdropping, forgery of sensor data, 
denial of service attacks, and the physical compromise of sensor nodes [Wood'02]. 
It has been noticed that little research work has been conducted to investigate the 
development of security analysis models for ad hoc and sensor networks, especially 
those used for the quantitative performance evaluation of encryption algorithms, in 
terms of communication overhead and computational cost [Ganesan'03]. [Xie'02, 
Ganesan'03, Venugopalan'03] provided models that allow designers to project 
computational limitations and determine the threshold of feasible encryption schemes 
under a set of constraints for a given embedded architecture such as sensor nodes. 
Although "key management" is important for ensuring confidentiality and 
authentication, it still remains an unsolved problem in WSNs, mainly due to Key Pre- 
Deployment, Shared Key Discovery and Path-key Establishment. To overcome the 
shortcomings of traditional pre-deployed keying approaches, essentially the large 
size of the loaded key ring on each node, several alternatives have been proposed 
such as [Hofflein'98, Eschenauer'02, Chan'03, Zhu'03, Pietro'04, Gaubatz'04]. At the 
routing level, many sensor network routing protocols do not consider security as a 
primary goal. Consequently, these protocols are more susceptible to powerful attacks 
than in general ad hoc networks. Powerful and dangerous security attacks can be 
launched against sensor networks. Sinkhole and Hello Flood are examples of such 
attacks. [Perrig'Olb, Deng, J. '03a, Deng, J. '03b] have proposed solutions to deal with 
these attacks. 
2.7.1 Misbehaviour and security in WSN Data Aggregation 
Data aggregation (or data fusion) is a key emerging theme in the design and 
development of WSNs. In this process, intermediary nodes called "aggregators" 
collect the raw sensed information form sensor nodes, process it locally, and forward 
only the result to the end-user. This important operation essentially reduces the 
amount of transmitted data on the network and thus prolongs its overall lifetime, the 
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most critical design factor in WSNs. However, this functionality is made even more 
challenging due to the hostile deployment environment, which makes possible the 
physical compromise of aggregators and some of the sensor nodes. Indeed, possible 
threats can vary from denial-of-service attacks that try to stop completely this service 
to stealthy attacks where the attacker's purpose is to make the user accept false 
aggregation results. This latter is more difficult to detect. For data aggregation 
validity assurance, [Du'03] have proposed the use of redundant data fusion nodes as 
witnesses. These nodes conduct the same data fusion operations as aggregators, but 
send the result as a Message Authentication Codes (MAC) to the aggregator itself 
instead of sending it to the base station. In order to prove the validity of the 
aggregation results, the aggregator has to forward the received proofs from witness 
nodes along with its calculated result to the base station. If a compromised 
aggregator wants to send invalid fusion data, it has to forge the proofs on the invalid 
results. The aggregation result is confirmed when n out of m witness proofs agree 
with the aggregators results, otherwise this latter is discarded and the base station 
polls one of the witness node to send it the valid aggregation result. This solution is 
efficient when witnesses are supposed to be trusted enough; otherwise it requires an 
important additional overhead to attain acceptable aggregation results using the 
voting scheme. Moreover, the authors have not addressed issues about choosing 
witness nodes. In [Przydatek'03] the authors have proposed a security framework 
based on an aggregate-commit-prove approach to verify that the answer given by 
aggregators is a good approximation of the true value even if the aggregators and a 
fraction of the sensor nodes can be corrupted. In this approach the aggregator 
commits to the collected data by constructing a Merkle Hash-tree [Merkle'80]. The 
commitment ensures that the aggregator uses data provided by the sensors, and acts 
as a statement to be verified by the base station about the correctness of the 
aggregation results. Although the authors have proposed concrete protocols for 
securely computing the median, average, and some other types of specific 
aggregation operations, we think the proposed scheme remains somewhat generic, 
and may not be flexible enough to support other types of in-network processing, such 
as in tinyDB [Madden'02]. The in-network processing is one of the key issues that 
have to be considered in all layers of the WSN's network protocol stack in order to 
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minimize energy consumption. However, this operation cannot be efficiently done 
without being secured. Therefore, secure in-network processing should consider 
keying schemes that are more energy-efficient. Moreover, multi-tiered hierarchical 
aggregation approaches, such as in [Deng, J. '03c, Deng, J. '03a, Deng, J. '03b] would 
be the most efficient scheme when the WSN contains a high number of sensor nodes. 
For that, more research work should be undertaken on how to securely and 
efficiently construct such schemes and dynamically choose aggregation nodes. 
2.8 Summary 
In this chapter we have presented MANET architecture and its different security 
issues, and we have shown that the special features of this new architecture make it 
more vulnerable to threats, especially node misbehaviour and we noticed that 
solutions developed for standard networks are often either unsuitable or not directly 
applicable in this environment. We discussed several problems related to different 
layers in MANET. Starting from the network layer we discussed how important it is 
to protect this layer, as it is the provider of two important services, namely routing 
and data forwarding. We then discussed the routing issues and types in MANET, and 
we explained that reactive types of protocols are more adaptable to MANET 
environments than proactive ones. This is because, in reactive protocols a route is 
only calculated when it is needed, and there is no need to keep routing-information 
all the time to all nodes. 
Due to this fact we presented two of MANET main reactive routing protocols namely 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and Ad hoc on-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
protocols. The primary differences between AODV and DSR are: (1) DSR sources 
determine the whole path to the destinations, while in AODV the routing decision is 
made hop by hop; and (2) unlike DSR nodes, which can keep multiple paths in the 
routing cache, AODV nodes record the information of only a single route in the 
routing table. These two features of DSR are useful for increasing path reliability and 
overcoming misbehaving nodes. 
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We then highlighted and classified the security threats and attacks on routing 
protocols and list most common attacks namely, Denial of Service (DoS), Black 
Hole, Routing Table Overflow, Energy Consumption and Information Disclosure. 
We also emphasised the fact that security is the combination of processes, 
procedures, and systems used to ensure confidentiality, authentication, integrity, 
availability, access control, and non-repudiation. Cryptographic systems in terms of 
symmetric and asymmetric encryption have been discussed. Generally, the 
symmetric algorithms are executed more quickly than those asymmetric. In practice, 
symmetric algorithms are often used together with asymmetric algorithms. 
Next we moved down one step to the MAC layer and discuss its security issues in 
MANET. In particular, we presented the selfishness on channel access misbehaviour, 
which affects the fairness and significantly affects the network efficiency. The only 
solution proposed in the literature was presented and discussed. In our discussion we 
illustrated how this solution may wrongly accuse well-behaving nodes, and how it is 
unable to detect what we called cooperative misbehaviour. This problem represents a 
fruitful field of research. Finally, security issues related to Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSNs), which is a special type of Ad Hoc network, was outlined. This hostile 
environment makes adaptation of existing protocols, first proposed for general ad 
hoc networks, a challenging task. We believe the design of novel security 
mechanisms that take into account the unique features of WSNs, such as their new 
communication paradigm, would be a more thoughtful mechanism. 
Security in MANET remains an interesting research field that includes many 
research topics. In the following chapter we will give more attention to one of these 
topic related to an emergent security problem caused by nodes misbehaviour on 
packet forwarding. We will survey the literature and related works and discuss the 
existing solutions that specifically aim at detecting such misbehaviour when it 
appears in MANET. 
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DETECTION MECHANISEMS 
In this Chapter we survey the literature and related work. We present and discuss the 
existing solutions that aim at detecting misbehaviour on packet forwarding when it 
appears in the network. This Chapter also points out the main drawbacks of the 
existing work and issues that need to be addresses. 
3.1 Detection Solutions against Nodes Misbehaviour in MANET 
In this section we present and discuss a number of solutions that aim at detecting 
selfish misbehaviour on packet forwarding when it appears in the network. These 
solutions can be classified into two main techniques, Reactive and Preventive 
[Djenouri'05a]. The reactive solutions divided into two main classes, monitoring and 
reputation-based solutions. The monitoring class includes basic approaches that 
focus on the monitoring phase and suggest techniques to control the forwarding 
process. Reputation-based solutions propose mechanisms to isolate the nodes 
detected as selfish. However, these solutions incorporate a monitoring component 
that uses some of the promiscuous mode monitoring technique. On the other hand, 
preventive techniques proactively try to mitigate nodes misbehaviour or its effects, 
either by motivating nodes to cooperate or by taking measures to prevent packets 
from being dropped before sending them. 
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3.1.1 Reactive Solutions 
Here we present and discuss reactive solutions that aim at detecting selfish 
misbehaviour on packet forwarding when it appears in the network. As we will see, 
the detection may be limited to the route including the selfish node, or may give 
deeper information and identify the selfish node. Upon the detection of a selfish 
node, routing through this node will be avoided. More stringent solutions suggest 
punishing these misbehaved nodes by excluding them from the service, some of them 
allow the redemption and the reintegration of punished nodes. The reactive solutions 
split up into two main classes, monitoring and reputation-based solutions 
[Djenouri'05a]. The reactive mechanisms are not independent of the routing protocol 
and operate as an extension of it. Many mechanisms work only with one particular 
routing protocol 
A. Monitoring-based Solutions 
We will present here five monitoring approaches, two of them are based on the 
promiscuous mode monitoring, while the others rely on the employment of 
acknowledgments (ACKs). As we will see, the advantages of the promiscuous 
monitoring over the ACKs based monitoring employment is that the former imposes 
no additional overhead for monitoring, and allows monitoring of both unicast and 
broadcast packets. However, the promiscuous mode monitoring has many troubles 
regarding the accuracy of detection. The troubles of promiscuous mode monitoring 
include its failure to detect the misbehaviour in cases of collisions, partial collusion, 
and power control employment. 
1) End-to-End ACKs 
This mechanism consists of monitoring the reliability of routes by acknowledging 
packets in an end-to-end manner, to make the routing protocol reliable (like TCP). 
That is, the destination node acknowledges the successfully received packets by 
sending feedback to the source. A successful reception implies that the 
corresponding route is operational, while a failure in the ACK reception after a 
timeout is interpreted as an indication that the route is either broken, compromised, 
or includes selfish nodes. For each route the routing protocol maintains a rating 
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reflecting the route's reliability, which is updated each time a piece of data (a set of 
data packets) is transmitted across the route as follows: It is increased for each 
successful reception (when the source receives the ACK of that piece), and decreased 
for each failed piece (when a timeout expires without receiving an ACK). When the 
path rating of a given route decreases below a defined threshold, assumed to be high 
enough to overcome the losses due to collisions, this route will not be used any more. 
Moreover, the routing protocol may rely on this rating as a metric and choose the 
most reliable routes. The ACKs must be signed to ensure no-repudiation, otherwise a 
selfish node may misbehave by not forwarding packets and sending back a falsified 
ACK to the source without being detected. Note that it is beneficial to a selfish node 
to perform like this, since an ACK costs much less than a piece of data packets. The 
signature of the ACKs requires an end-to-end security association between the source 
and the destination. The major problem of this technique is the lack of the 
misbehaving node detection. This technique may detect routes containing 
misbehaving or malicious nodes, and those which are broken, but without any further 
information regarding the node causing the packet lost. However, this technique 
helps to avoid sending packets through unreliable routes, and it can be combined 
with other more sophisticated techniques. It is used in [Awerbuch'02, 
Papadimitratos'03] along with another technique, namely data dispersion and probing 
which will be presented later in section (c) of the preventive solutions in this chapter. 
Note that this mechanism is also used in [Conti'05], where the authors propose a 
cross-layer mechanism that exploits TCP ACKs instead of adding explicit ACKs at 
the network layer, which reduces the overhead. This mechanism, however, is not 
combined with any detective technique in this solution, since the latter aims only at 
avoiding unreliable routes. 
2) Watchdog 
The first paper addressed the problem of nodes misbehaviour in MANET is 
[Marti'00]. The authors define a watchdog concept, which is a basic technique on 
which many further solutions rely. It aims at detecting misbehaving nodes that do not 
forward packets, by monitoring neighbours in the promiscuous mode. Suppose node 
S sends packets to D using a route including (possibly amongst others) respectively 
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three intermediate nodes: A, B, and C. When A transmits a packet to B to forward to 
C, A can check whether B forwards each packet by analysing packets it overhears 
during a given timeout. If A overhears a packet it is monitoring during the fixed 
timeout then it validates its forwarding. Otherwise it raises a rating regarding B, and 
will judge that B is misbehaving and notify S as soon as the rate exceeds a given 
threshold. This monitoring is generalised for each pair of hops in the source route. 
The solution also includes the pathrater component that selects routes based on the 
link reliability knowledge. The watchdog is able to detect misbehaving nodes in 
many cases, and requires no overhead when no node misbehaves. It allows 
monitoring all packets regardless whether they are directed or broadcast. 
Nonetheless, the watchdog fails to detect the packet loss due to collisions, partial 
collusion, and power control employment. After a collision at C, B could circumvent 
retransmitting the packet without being detected by A. B could also circumvent the 
watchdog by partially dropping packets, viz. at low rate than the configured 
accusation threshold. The watchdog fails when two successive nodes collude to 
conceal the misbehaviour of each other, that is, B could collude with C and do not 
report to A when C misbehaves. Furthermore, the watchdog technique may cause 
false detections when the configured threshold fails, and especially when the 
monitored node uses the power control technique [Doshi'02b, Doshi'02a] to preserve 
its power. By using the power control technique, nodes in MANET can preserve their 
power, by only transmitting packets from one node to another using controlled power 
according to the distance separating them from each other. For example, when C is 
closer to B than A and B transmits packets using a controlled power according to the 
distance separating it from C, A could not overhear B's forwarding and may accuse it 
wrongly. 
The power control technique has been used by many routing protocols proposed 
after the watchdog's proposal in the field of power consumption optimization, such 
as [Doshi'02b, Doshi'02a, Krunz'04, Jung'05, Djenouri'06a]. Another serious problem 
with this solution is that it does not punish the detected misbehaving nodes. Upon the 
detection of misbehaviour, the detector informs the source node, thereby the rating 
regarding the misbehaving is updated. Despite this rating update ensures that 
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transmissions through the misbehaving node is avoided, no measure is taken against 
this node. 
3) Activity-Based Overhearing (ABO) 
In [Kargl'04] the authors propose the termed Activity-Based Overhearing, which is a 
generalisation of the watchdog. In this technique, a node constantly monitors in the 
promiscuous mode the traffic activity of all its neighbours, and oversees the 
forwarding of each packet whose next forwarder is also in its neighbourhood. This 
can increase the number of observations and improve the watchdog efficiency. It also 
mitigates the collusion problem. Nevertheless, this technique suffers from all the 
other problems of the watchdog, especially the one related to the power control 
technique as it relies on the promiscuous mode monitoring. 
4) Two-Hop ACK 
The authors in [Djenouri'05] propose a monitoring approach based on feedback 
called two-hop ACK. In the context of three aligned nodes, A, B, and C, such that A 
monitors B's forwarding to C, node C acknowledges packets sent from A by sending 
this latter via Ba special ACK that travels two hops. Node B could, however, escape 
from the monitoring without being detected by simply sending Aa falsified two-hop 
ACK. Note that performing in this way is power economic for B, since sending a 
short packet like an ACK consumes less energy than sending a data packet. To avoid 
this vulnerability, the authors use an asymmetric cryptography based strategy, and 
suggest that A generates a random number and encrypts it using C's public key, then 
A validates B's forwarding if and only if it receives later the random number it 
generated with the two-hop ACK. Otherwise, it notices packet dropping for B after a 
timeout. This random number received at A is ciphered by C with A's public key, C 
does so (ciphers the random number with A's public key) after deciphering the 
number with its private key. This way B could not falsify a valid two hop ACK, 
unless it gets or breaks C's private key. Like the watchdog, A accuses B as soon as 
the number of two-hop ACK detected dropped exceeds a given threshold. Since the 
validation at A is related to C's reception and not only to B's forwarding, the 
solution is independent of the power control usage, thus solves the watchdog's 
problems related to this issue. Unlike the watchdog, the two-hop ACK ensures that 
43 
Chapter 3: MANET Nodes Misbehaviour Detection Mechanisms 
after a collision at C, B could not escape from retransmitting the packet without 
being detected. The major drawback of this solution is its communication overhead, 
since a two-hop ACK is required for each data packet on each couple of hops. 
Although, the problem related to the overhead has been treated by the authors in their 
more recent work [Djenouri'06b] by the so-called Random Two-Hop ACK protocol, 
but still relatively high. In the random two-hop ACK protocol, instead of asking an 
ACK for each packet, the monitor node (node A) does this randomly with a 
probability continuously updated according to the behaviour of the monitored node 
(node B), in such a way to give more trust (low probability) to well behaving nodes. 
The Random Two-Hop ACK protocol is not independent of the routing protocol and 
operates as an extension of DSR. 
5) Probing 
Previously we have seen that the end-to-end ACK approach allows to monitor routes 
and to detect unreliable ones containing misbehaving or failed nodes, but fails to 
detect the appropriate nodes responsible of the unreliability. All the other monitoring 
solutions, however, directly monitor nodes. The probing approach could be viewed 
as a combination of route and node monitoring. This approach incorporates 
commands into data packets to acknowledge them. These commands are called 
probes and intended for selected nodes. Probes are launched when a route that 
contains a misbehaving node is detected (but not the ID of that node). [Awerbuch'02] 
was the first to use this mechanism. The protocol is based on the end-to-end feedback 
to monitor routes, thus requires the destination to return an acknowledgment ACK to 
the source for every successfully received data packet. The source keeps track of the 
number of recent losses (ACKs not received over a window of recent packets). If the 
number of recent losses exceeds the acceptable threshold, the protocol registers a 
fault between the source and the destination and starts a dichotomic search [Ferre'05] 
on the path, in order to identify the faulty link. The end-to-end ACK employed could 
be considered as the route monitoring phase, and the dichotomic search as the node 
monitoring on suspicious routes. The source controls the search by specifying a list 
of intermediate nodes on the future data packets. Each node in the list, in addition to 
the destination, must send an ACK for the packet. These nodes are called probed 
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nodes. The list of probes defines a set of non-overlapping intervals that cover the 
whole path, where each interval covers the sub-path between the two consecutive 
probes that form its endpoints. When a failure is detected on an interval, the interval 
is divided into two by inserting a new probe. This new probe is added to the list of 
probes appended to future data packets. The process of sub-division continues until a 
fault is detected on an interval that corresponds to a single link. This solution suffers 
from many drawbacks. In addition to the high cost of the communication overhead, 
there is no reliable detection of the dropper. A selfish node could analyse each packet 
it receives before deciding either to forward this packet or not. When it gets a probe 
packet it would notice that a probing is under way, and would consequently choose 
to cooperate and forward packets for a limited time, until the probe is over. 
In [Kargl'04] the authors propose an enhanced probing approach called iterative 
probing. It defers from the previous solution in the fact that each command is 
addressed to one node instead of a set of nodes. Therefore, the command contains 
one encrypted node ID added to a special field in data packets. If a data packet 
includes no probing command then the field will contain a random number, such that 
a recipient cannot distinguishe data packets including probing from regular data 
packets, unless it is the destination of the probing command. The solution suffers 
from the problem of high overhead, for an H hops route, O(H) ACK transmissions is 
required for the first phase and O(log(H)) ACK transmissions to detect a 
misbehaving node. Overall, O(H + log(H)) is the overhead communication 
complexity of the solution when a misbehaving appears. This solution is also 
unreliable. It allows to detect the link containing the selfish node but cannot 
distinguish which of the two nodes forming the link is actually the misbehaving one, 
since there is no knowledge of the selfish node behaviour upon the reception of a 
probing (either it sends back the ACK or not). To mitigate this problem Kargl et al. 
[Kargl'04] proposed the unambiguous probing. The principle of this mechanism is 
simple and can be summarised as follows: Assume after an iterative probing a link 
(Xi, Xi+1) will be detected. To determine which one of the two suspicious nodes is 
guilty (selfish), the source node asks the node Xi-1 to check if it can overhear the 
forwarding of Xi. If so then Xi+1 is the guilty, otherwise the guilty is Xi. This 
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mechanism (unambiguous probing) suffers from the watchdog's problems, as it relies 
on the promiscuous at the predecessor of the suspicious link. Note that like two-hop 
ACK, probing was proposed and is applicable only to directed packets. 
B. Reputation-based 
The reputation of a given community member can be defined as the amount of trust 
granted by the other members regarding its well-behaviour on a given function, 
according to their experience with it. Members that helpfully contribute to the 
community life get good reputation among community's members, while others who 
refuse to cooperate are badly reputed and gradually excluded from the community. In 
our context, the reputation of a node is the trustworthiness the other ones grant to it 
regarding its cooperation and participation in forwarding packets. This definition is 
large such that including both solutions that evaluate nodes' reputation by real values 
or Boolean values (well-behaving vs. misbehaving), provided that they punish bad 
reputation nodes. 
Reactive reputation-based solutions are more elaborate than the previous monitoring- 
based solutions, and deal with the post-detection issues. Still, to detect selfish nodes 
they simply incorporate approaches proposed by those basic monitoring solutions. 
Each node keeps track of each other's reputation according to the behaviour it 
observes, and the reputation information may be exchanged between nodes to help 
each other inferring the accurate values. There is a trade-off between efficiency in 
using available information and robustness against mis-information. If ratings made 
by others are naively considered, the reputation system can be vulnerable to false 
accusations or false praise. However, if only one's own experience is considered, the 
potential of learning from experiences made by others goes unused, which decreases 
the efficiency. In the following, we present four solutions based on this general 
principle of reputation. 
1) Signed Token 
In [Yang'02] the authors describe a unified network layer solution, based on the 
approach of mutually according admission in neighbourhood using signed tokens. It 
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aims at protecting both the routing and the data forwarding. Threshold cryptography- 
based signature [Shamir'79] and the watchdog technique [Marti'00] are at the core of 
this solution. The solution is structured around four closely interacted components: i) 
neighbour verification that describes how to verify whether each node in the network 
is well-behaving or selfish, ii) security enhanced routing protocol which enhances 
AODV [Perkins'99, Perkins'03] and extends to the termed AODV-S that explicitly 
incorporates the security information in routing, iii) neighbour monitoring that is 
based on the watchdog to describe how to monitor the behaviour of each node in the 
network, and how to detect packet droppers, iv) and finally the v)intrusion reaction 
which describes how to alert the network and isolate the misbehaving, and serves as 
a bridge between neighbour verification and neighbour monitoring. Nodes in a 
neighbourhood mutually accord participation admissions, and nodes without up-to- 
date admissions are excluded from any network service. Each node has a token 
issued by its local neighbours allowing it to participate in the network operations, 
which implements the concept of participation admission. The token has a period of 
expiration, whose value depends on how long the holder node has been behaving 
well (its reputation). This latter renews (updates) the token before its expiration. 
Nodes in a neighbourhood collaboratively monitor each other to detect any 
misbehaviour. 
This solution employs asymmetric cryptography. There is a global key pair SK/PK 
(Secret Key and Public Key). Each token carried by a node is signed with SK and 
broadcast periodically in the hello message to ask for a new validation. Note that the 
solution uses a hello protocol. PK is known by all nodes, but none has the SK. 
Indeed, each node has a partial key, which is as a part of SK and participates by 
providing a partial signature of order K, thereby K different partial signatures are 
sufficient to provide the right signature. In other words, SK is divided among nodes 
in such a way that K different signatures with K different partial keys are necessary 
and sufficient to make a signature equivalent to that made by SK. This technique is 
called polynomial secret sharing [Shamir'79]. To decide whether to provide a partial 
signed token for the requestor or not, the requestor's historical behaviour is 
considered, which is drawn according to information collected using the promiscuous 
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monitoring and detections of neighbours as well. Once a node is detected as selfish 
the detector informs its neighbours, and the selfish is isolated as soon as K different 
nodes detect it. Isolating a node in a neighbourhood is achieved by not providing it 
with tokens. Although the authors do not evoke the notion of reputation, we 
categorize this solution in the reputation-based class since each node is granted or 
denied services in its neighbourhood according to its past behaviour. The reputation 
value of each node could be simply considered Boolean, i. e. well behaving or selfish. 
Therefore, well-behaving nodes will be served and granted tokens, while 
misbehaving ones will be isolated. Since the detected misbehaving are isolated and 
excluded from any network's service, the lack of a punishment mechanism against 
detected misbehaving nodes problem of the previous basic solutions is resolved. 
However, this solution has many disadvantages. First, all the watchdog's problems 
described previously remain untreated, since the neighbour monitoring component 
completely relies on it. The second disadvantage of this solution is that it prevents a 
node which has less than K neighbours to communicate, and poses a critical issue on 
the choice of the parameter (threshold) K for the sharing of the secret key. The 
choice of low K weakens the key, whereas the choice of high values requires high 
connectivity, which is not always ensured in MANET. 
2) CORE 
Michiardi and Molva [Michiardi'02a, Michiardi'02b] suggest a generic reputation- 
based mechanism termed CORE, supposed to be easily integrated with any network 
function. Unlike the previous solution this one gives more precise definitions to the 
notion of reputation, and defines three types of reputations: i) subjective reputation 
that is calculated directly from a node observations, and gives more relevance to the 
past observations in order to minimize the influence of sporadic misbehaviour in 
recent observations, ii) indirect reputation, which is calculated based on the 
information (observations) provided from other nodes, and iii) functional reputation 
that combines the subjective and indirect reputation. Each node maintains the three 
reputations for each other in a reputation table that is updated in two different 
situations; during the request phase of a given function, and during the reply phase 
corresponding to the result of the function execution. In the first phase, only 
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subjective reputation related to misbehaviour is updated (relying on negative 
information provided from the monitor component). Whereas, in the second phase 
only indirect reputations are updated positively. That is, a reply message containing a 
list of all the entities that correctly behaved is supposed to be transmitted back to the 
source node at the end of the function execution, so that the indirect reputations of 
these well-behaving nodes are increased. 
CORE is implemented with DSR, and uses the watchdog for monitoring and 
collecting direct observations, thus both directed and broadcasted packets could be 
monitored. It can be applied to packet forwarding function, both on data and route 
request packets. For the route discovery function, the aim is to detect misbehaving 
nodes that do not participate in this function and do not forward route request 
packets. During the request phase of the route discovery, the negative rating factor of 
the next provider may be observed by the requestor's watchdog, like in [Marti'00], 
while the identity of the nodes that participate in the function are reported to the 
initiator during the reply phase. The routing service will be denied to route requests 
issued from nodes classified as misbehaving, i. e. nodes whose functional reputation 
values become negative (< 0). Similarly, the CORE scheme can be used to monitor 
the data packet forwarding function during the first step (negative rating 
observation). But as opposed to the route discovery function, the data packet 
forwarding function does not include separate operations that can be qualified as 
request and reply phases, which harden the indirect reputation updates. However, the 
authors propose to add end-to-end ACKs, the transfer of which can be considered as 
the reply phase. 
The signed token mechanism [Yang'02] problem in terms of preventing nodes with 
less than K neighbours to communicate described previously, does not exist in this 
solution. Also, in contrast to the previous solution nodes' observations are 
propagated beyond neighbourhoods. However, only the positive observations (of 
well-behaving) are propagated but not the negative ones. The purpose is to provide 
robustness for the solution and prevent the vulnerability of rumours propagation 
which can cause DOS (Denial Of Service) attacks. This reduces the potential of 
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learning from observations made by others and can decrease the efficiency of 
misbehaviour detections in the network. Contrary to the previous solution where the 
isolation is performed collectively by all nodes in neighbourhoods, the isolation in 
CORE is performed unilaterally by each node basing merely on its own view of 
nodes' behaviour. This could represent a potential threat of possible false 
accusations, as when an isolator does not forward packets for another node 
unilaterally isolated, other neighbouring nodes (that are not isolating the appropriate 
node) would consider this as illegal behaviour. Further, the solution does not allow 
redemption after detection, as when a node is excluded by another node it will not be 
asked to execute the service for this detector and will never be able to redeem and 
increase its reputation with it. If the nodes exchange their own experiences with each 
other (their views of reputations and not only observations), such a redemption 
would be possible. Moreover, all the watchdog's drawbacks related to detections are 
present in this solution, since the solution relies on the watchdog mechanism for 
monitoring. 
3) CONFIDANT 
CONFIDANT is another reputation-based solution, proposed in [Buchegger'02b, 
Buchegger'02a] [Buchegger'03]. It consists of four components present in each node. 
The first one is the monitor which is very similar to the watchdog [Marti'00]. It 
registers the deviations from the normal behaviour and calls the reputation system as 
soon as a given misbehaviour occurs. The trust manager is the second component 
that deals with the incoming and the outgoing ALARM messages. ALARM 
messages are sent by the trust manager of a node to warn others of misbehaving 
nodes, i. e. the protocol is based on negative information propagation. Outgoing 
ALARMS are generated by the node itself according to its experience observations, 
or after a misbehaviour report reception. The recipients of these ALARM messages 
are called friends, which are considered to be configured on a user-to-user basis. 
Incoming alarms, originate from either outside friends or other nodes, are checked 
for trustworthiness before triggering a reaction. The trust manager uses a filtering of 
incoming ALARM messages according to the trust level of the reporting node. To 
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define trust levels, a general mechanism similar to the trust management used in PGP 
for key validation and certification has been proposed. 
In their recent work [Buchegger'04], the authors propose a modified Bayesian 
mechanism that gives less importance to past observations than recent ones, and 
allows redemption. The third CONFIDANT's component is the Reputation System 
that manages the node's view on reputations of the others. Each node reputation is 
represented by a rating that is changed according to a rate function, assigning 
different weights to the type of behaviour detection, i. e. the greatest weight for own 
experience, a smaller weight for observations in the neighbourhood, and the smallest 
one to reported experience. The rationale for this weighting scheme is that nodes 
trust their own experiences and observations more than those of other nodes. Once 
the rating of a node exceeds a configured threshold, the path manager is called for 
action. This latter is the last component, it is responsible for punishing the 
misbehaving nodes by not relaying any packet for them, as well as deleting paths 
containing misbehaving nodes and path re-ranking according to nodes 
trustworthiness. 
Unlike the previous reputation-based solution (CORE), with CONFIDANT reliable 
negative information are propagated beyond the neighbourhood. To mitigate the 
vulnerability to DoS (Denial of Service) attacks by propagating rumours, the trust 
manager is proposed along with the rate function that assigns different weights to the 
types of behaviour detections in such a way to give more importance to local 
observations when computing the reputation rating. Moreover, the path manager 
component clarifies punishments against detected misbehaving. The simulation 
results [Buchegger'02b] show a significant improvement in term of throughput 
compared to the standard DSR (with which CONFIDANT has been implemented). 
Nevertheless, like the previous solution the isolation is performed independently by 
the path manager of each node. Recall that this could represent a potential threat of 
possible false accusations, as when an isolator does not forward packets for another 
node unilaterally isolated, other neighbouring nodes would observe that and consider 
it as illegal behaviour when they are not isolating the appropriate requestor. Also, all 
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the watchdog's drawbacks presented previously remain untreated in this solution, 
since the monitor component fully relies on this technique. 
4) OCEAN 
Barisal and Baker propose OCEAN [Bansal'03], a scheme for robust packet- 
forwarding. OCEAN, similarly to CORE and CONFEDENT schemes, is based on 
nodes' observations. In contrast to previous mechanisms, no rating is exchanged and 
every node relies on its own information, so the trust management is avoided. The 
rating is based on a counter that counts the positive and the negative steps a node 
performs and based on a faulty threshold, the node is added to a faulty list. In the 
method for route selection, a DSR node appends an avoid list to every generated 
RREQ and a RREP based on this list. A second-chance mechanism is provided to 
give nodes that were previously considered misbehaving another opportunity to 
operate. OCEAN suffers from similar drawbacks as CONFEDENT and CORE. 
5) SORI 
The Secure and Objective Reputation-Based Incentive (SORI) scheme was proposed 
by [He'04]. It targets the non-forwarding misbehaviour type and uses a watchdog- 
like mechanism for monitoring. The reputation system keeps counting of the packets 
forwarded both by and for neighbouring nodes. Reputation ratings consist of the ratio 
of these counts, taking into account the confidence in the rating proportional to the 
number of packets requested for forwarding. Nodes propagate reputation ratings 
locally; this second-hand information is weighted by credibility, which is derived 
from the ratio above. The response is given by packet dropping with a probability 
determined by reputation. SORI additionally employs hash-chain-based 
authentication for propagated reputation ratings. SORI mechanism is designed to 
treat generously the nodes that do not intentionally drop packets. It also has a 
complementary security mechanism which proposed to deal with a node that uses the 
following attacks: 1) impersonation of an adjacent node's id, ranked with a good 
reputation, in order to send more packets, and, 2) impersonating a distant node's id, 
ranked with a good reputation, to broadcast fake observation information in order to 
boost its reputation. This mechanism is based on a one-way hash chain and Message 
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Authentication Codes (MACs). SORI takes no countermeasures to prevent collusion. 
Finally, it suffers from the Watchdog drawbacks. 
6) Friends and Foes 
Contrary to CONFIDANT, friends and foes [Miranda'03] gives as much importance 
to the past observations as to the present ones. Thus, it uses a long-lived memory. In 
this solution nodes are permitted to publicly claim that they are unwilling to forward 
packets to some nodes, as each node maintains basically three sets: a set of friends to 
which it is willing to provide services, a set of foes to which it is unwilling to provide 
services, and finally a set of nodes known to act as if it is their foe (they do not 
provide services packets for it) named set of selfish. These three sets are periodically 
broadcast in the neighbourhood. Each node also maintains other variables for its 
neighbours, especially its view of their friends and foes, that are updated according to 
its experience and to the messages it receives periodically from its neighbours. When 
a node is asked to forward a packet it does so only when the asker is a friend, and 
count accordingly a credit for this friend. Also, every node chooses routes such that 
the next forwarder is its friend, then monitors the forwarding using the watchdog 
technique. It deletes a credit for the monitored node if this latter is perceived to 
correctly forward the packet, and puts it in the selfish set as soon as the number of 
packets it drops exceeds a given threshold. The solution allows redemption and 
permits a selfish node to be reintegrated by broadcasting a special packet (SelfState) 
acknowledging that it has behaved selfishly with the appropriate nodes. To prevent 
abusing this mechanism, the selfish node is first charged with penalties; it must 
broadcast two SelfState packets to consume additional energy, and the maximum 
value of its credit (the maximum number of packets it can send without providing 
forwarding services) is decreased by all neighbours. In addition to data packets, the 
authors propose the use of this solution to secure DSR control packets against selfish 
dropping. 
This solution defines a robust method of redemption that allows selfish nodes 
reintegration, while preventing these latter from abusing nodes' tolerance. 
Nonetheless, it suffers from some problems. First, it has all the watchdog problems 
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on which it relies for monitoring. The second problem is related to the overhead. The 
authors argued that the solution does not cause significant overhead because control 
packets of each node are merely sent in its neighbourhood. However, these packets 
are broadcast periodically, which could be significant in networks with high 
connectivity. Moreover, because of the fact that each node keeps only information 
about its current neighbours, and subsequently if the information of nodes leaving its 
neighbourhood are arisen, then a mobile selfish node will take advantages and can 
easily circumvent without being detected. Finally, the solution is integrated with 
DSR, and is used to secure DSR's control packets from dropping. However, a basic 
principle of the solution is that each forwarder chooses the next one among its 
friends. Therefore, routing is made hop-by-hop and the solution is not applicable to a 
source routing protocol as DSR. Indeed, any reactive hop-by-hop routing protocol 
could be integrated with this solution, such as AODV. 
7) Context-Aware Detection 
With this mechanism by Paul and Westhoff [Paul'02], accusations of nodes are 
related to the context of a unique route discovery process and to a stipulated time 
period. To detect attacks in the route discovery phase source and destination use un- 
keyed hash chains and promiscuous mode of link layer to observe malicious acts of 
neighbourhood nodes. Observers of the attacker independently communicate their 
accusation to the source node. The source node executes an inference scheme based 
on majority voting to rate an accused. Source node can later on advertise these rating 
along with adequate proofs to trusted nodes. Such ratings are used by the 
knowledgeable nodes to deny any future service to the attackers. In contrast to 
watchdog and pathrater, several types of misbehaviour are detected. The decision of 
how to treat nodes in the future, the response, is based on accusations of others, 
whereby a number of accusations pointing to a single attack, approximate knowledge 
of the topology, and context-aware inference enable a node to rate an accused node. 
Accusations are sent to the source, which infers based on majority voting and can 
inform trusted nodes. 
54 
Chapter 3: MANET Nodes Misbehaviour Detection Mechanisms 
8) Dependency Graphs approach 
Dependency Graphs approach is proposed in [Badonnel'05a, Badonnel'05b] to 
estimate Ad-hoc Node Influence and to detect the most influential routing nodes in 
the ad-hoc network. This method can also be applied to detect misbehaving nodes 
performing for instance flooding in the network. However this work lacks of clarity 
and verification especially in terms of the detection of the flooding node. The method 
used in [Badonnel'05b] is inspired by the work described by Mark Burgess in 
[Burgess'04] related to the estimation of nodes influence in fixed wired networks. In 
Burgess's method a simple starting definition of well-connected could be 'of high 
degree', i. e. count the neighbours. This method is inspired from research in social 
sciences, where social relationships are studied in order to detect individuals capable 
to influence important parts of a social network. 
3.1.2 Preventive Solutions 
So far, we have presented reactive solutions that aim at detecting selfish 
misbehaviour on packet forwarding when it appears in the network. Another class of 
solutions includes approaches that proactively try to mitigate the misbehaviour or its 
effects, either by motivating nodes to cooperate or by taking measures to prevent 
packets from being dropped before sending them. This is helpful to reduce the 
problem but does not eliminate it completely. Thus, a reactive solution which detects 
such misbehaviour remains essential. In this section we present three approaches 
classified as preventive: economic-based solutions, data dispersal, and game theory 
based solutions. 
1) Economic-based 
In the following we present two economic-based solutions, inspired by some 
economic principles, which they project on to the forwarding service in MANET. 
a) Nuglets 
Buttyan and Hubaux [Buttyan'01] propose an economic-based approach stimulating 
nodes to cooperate for packet forwarding in MANET, which they model and analyse 
in [Buttyan'03]. They introduce what they call virtual currency or nuglets, along with 
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mechanisms for charging the service usage. The basic idea of this technique is that 
nodes which utilize a service must pay for it (in nuglets) to the provider ones. This 
makes nuglets essential for utilising the network, and renders each node interested in 
increasing its stock of nuglets by providing services for other nodes. Besides 
stimulating for the provision of services, this mechanism can also force nodes to 
make a moderate usage of the network services, since they are charged. Nuglets are 
represented by counters at nodes, each one's value corresponds to the wealth of the 
holder. In order to prevent a node from illegitimately increasing its own counter, this 
latter is maintained by a trusted and tamper-resistant hardware module, called 
security module. Only this module can directly perform operations on the counter. 
Nuglets loaded in a packet are protected from illegitimate modification and 
detachment from its original packet by cryptographic mechanisms. The physical and 
data link layers (where the security module is built) are assumed to be robustly 
protected, such that users cannot modify them. Furthermore, the neighbourhood of a 
node is assumed not to change very fast, so as to make it feasible for a node to keep 
track of its neighbours by running a hello protocol. Besides discovering its 
neighbours, the security module uses the hello protocol (like the signed token 
described before) to establish and maintain security associations with the security 
modules of the neighbouring nodes. 
As for packet forwarding charging, the authors suggest three models: Packet Pursue 
Model (PPM), Packet Trade Model (PTM), and a hybrid one. In the first model the 
source is charged. It estimates the required nuglets on each hop and puts the total 
number of estimated nuglets in the packet, then each forwarder acquires the required 
nuglets from the packet. The required nuglets charged by a forwarder may depend on 
many things, such as the amount of energy used for the forwarding operation, the 
current battery status of the forwarder, and its current nuglets number. If a packet has 
not enough nuglets to be forwarded then it is discarded. The advantage of this model 
is that it may deter nodes from sending useless data and overloading the network. 
However, the drawback is that it is difficult to estimate the total number of nuglets 
required for a packet to reach to a given destination. If the source under-estimates 
this number then the packet will be discarded and the source loses its investment in 
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this packet, whereas an overestimation causes a wasting of the precious nuglets. On 
the other hand, in the PTM approach the packet does not carry nuglets, but it is 
traded for nuglets by intermediate nodes on each hop. Each intermediary buys it from 
the previous one for some nuglets (except the first intermediary that receives the 
packet for free from the source), and sells it to the next one (or to the destination) for 
more nuglets. This way, each intermediary that provides a service by forwarding the 
packet increases its number of nuglets, and the total cost of forwarding the packet is 
covered by the packet's destination. In contrast to the previous model, in this one the 
source does not need to know in advance the number of nuglets required to deliver a 
packet. Furthermore, letting the destination pay for the packet forwarding makes this 
approach applicable in the case of multicast packets. However, a serious 
disadvantage is that this approach does not deter nodes from overloading the 
network. Another disadvantage is of overhead, since a price negotiation is required 
on each hop for each packet. The two models can be combined in the following way: 
the source loads the packet with some nuglets before sending it, the packet is handled 
according to the PPM until it runs out of nuglets, then it is handled according to the 
PTM until the destination buys it. This hybrid model gets over the packet loss 
problem of PPM. 
Nuglets is a new economic-based approach that motivates and obliges nodes to 
cooperate and forward packets for each other, because when a node behaves selfishly 
it will be unable to send its own packets. Moreover, this solution allows the nodes 
redemption, since a node which is unable to send its own packets because it runs out 
of nuglets is not excluded from being asked to participate in the data forwarding 
service and earning nuglets. But this approach suffers from some disadvantages. If a 
well-behaved node is not asked to route enough packets then it cannot send enough 
packets, and will be unfairly excluded. A node may be excluded from the routing 
process because of its position (it has few neighbours and belongs to just few routes) 
or because of the communication patterns of its neighbours (they have no 
communications with nodes to which it has routes). Furthermore, this technique does 
not prevent a node with enough nuglets from misbehaving, especially if it has not 
enough packets to send. Another issue related to this technique is that its robustness 
57 
Chapter 3: MANET Nodes Misbehaviour Detection Mechanisms 
totally relies on tamper-resistant hardware, but this is known to be a difficult 
problem. 
b) SPRITE 4 
[Zhong'03] propose another economic-based solution termed SPRITE, in which each 
node has a virtual credit maintained and continuously updated by a central authority 
called Credit Clearance Service (CCS). The principle is simple; when a node sends 
its own messages (as a source) it loses credits, and gains credits when it forwards 
messages for other nodes. To implement this each forwarder is assumed reporting to 
the CCS for each message it forwards a receipt, a signed small message derived from 
the original one. This reporting is assumed to be performed whenever the node 
switches to a fast connection with a backup power. When the CCS gets reports 
related to a receipt, it charges the source of the message and compensates the 
intermediate nodes. The credit that an intermediary receives depends on whether its 
forwarding has been successful, and whether the message has reached its final 
destination. Forwarding is considered successful if the next node on the route reports 
a valid receipt. Signing receipts prevents nodes from forging them, so none can 
report a receipt without really receiving a message. However, as soon as a node 
receives a message, it can easily report the receipt without forwarding the message. 
The compensation strategy takes this problem into account, and prevents reporters 
that provide receipts of messages which do not reach the finale destination (messages 
not reported by the destination) from earning credits. The authors provide a 
modelling and a formal proof of the solution, which shows that the solution is cheat- 
proof (under a set of conditions). That is, truth telling (reporting receipt only when 
forwarding a message, and not denying any forwarding) is the optimal strategy for 
every node. The proof also illustrates that the solution is collusion-resistant. Further, 
the solution was extended with little modifications to broadcast control packets (like 
route request of the routing protocol), for which the CCS computes a tree based on 
receipts it receives before updating credits. This way, redundancy is avoided. 
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Like Nuglets, SPRITE is an economic-based strategy that motivates nodes to 
collaborate. However, the major advantage of SPRITE is that it does not require any 
tamper-resistant hardware. Also, virtual money in this solution are considered as 
credits and are not held in packets, contrary to Nuglets. Consequently, the strategy of 
charging the source is efficient for SPRITE, since the problem of packet dropping 
due to virtual money lack presents with the packet pursue model of Nuglets does not 
exist here. Remember that the source-charging strategy has the advantage of 
preventing nodes from sending useless data that overload the network, and makes 
them rational when using the network services. Further, the proposed compensation 
strategy overcomes collusion (on falsely reporting receipt), providing that the 
destination well-behaves. Nevertheless, the elimination of the tamper-resistant 
dependency was ensured by using a central authority (CCS) that manages credits, 
which makes the solution centralized, and thus introduces another drawback. 
Distributing the CCS is mandatory for this solution to be applicable in MANET, 
basically featured by the total decentralization. Another disadvantage of this solution 
is that it assumes the cost of reporting a receipt to be negligible, and requires the 
reporting to be performed when the node switches to a fast connection and gets 
backup power, which is not always possible in MANET. 
c) Data Dispersal 
This scheme [Papadimitratos'03] is based on Rabin's algorithm [Rabin'89] and takes 
advantage of the existence of multiple routes from a source to a destination, to 
increase the reliability when transmitting packets. It consists of adding redundancy to 
the message to be sent, then the message and the redundancy are divided into a 
number of pieces and dispersed on the available routes, so that even a partial 
reception can lead to the successful reconstruction of the message at the receiver. 
Note that node-disjoint routes ensure more efficiency. This technique can overcome 
partial packets loss that can occur due to misbehaviour on some used routes. Also 
this approach is based on a mathematical framework. The redundancy factor is a 
crucial parameter for this solution. Increasing this ratio ensures more reliability, since 
few pieces among the overall sent pieces would be required to reconstruct B, but 
high values of this ratio cause significant overhead. On the other hand decreasing the 
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redundancy factor reduces the overhead, but gives less reliability. Therefore, the 
choice of this parameter is a trade-off issue. It should strike a balance between 
reliability and overhead. Even though this mechanism does not prevent nodes from 
misbehaving and does not motivate nodes to cooperate, unlike the previous ones, it is 
helpful to reduce the selfish misbehaviour effects on the communication reliability, 
and can be combined with a reactive solution. In [Papadimitratos'03] the authors 
propose SMTP, a solution that uses this mechanism. However, this solution has the 
end-to-end feedback technique drawbacks presented previously, since it relies on it. 
2) Game Theory Based 
In this approach the forwarding process is viewed as a game, where nodes have to 
continually decide whether to forward or not to forward packets. The purpose of this 
approach consists of defining strategies to ensure fairness to all nodes. Since users 
may be selfish, there is no guarantee that they will follow a particular strategy unless 
they are convinced that they cannot do better by following some other strategy. In the 
game theory terms a strategy which constitutes a Nash equilibrium [Myerson'91] 
needs to be identified. Nash equilibrium can be defined as a strategy profile having 
the property that no player can benefit from unilaterally deviating from the strategy 
[Srinivasan'03]. In other words it is a feature which ensures that if a cheating player 
tries to deviate from the strategy whereas all the others follow it, the cheater cannot 
receive more benefits than the others. 
Some solutions based on this approach have been proposed, such as [Srinivasan'03, 
Wang'06]. For instance, in [Srinivasan'03] nodes are distributed among classes 
according to their energy constraints and their expectation of lifetime. The source 
node asks intermediate ones to relay packets before sending them, then each node 
has to decide whether to accept or reject forwarding packets for this source. If one 
node refuses to forward packets then it returns a negative ACK back to the source, 
and consequently the session is blocked. Otherwise, the request is forwarded until 
reaching the last router (destination's predecessor) which sends a positive ACK back 
to the source. A node that has relayed much more traffic than the amount that has 
been relayed for it (according to a defined factor) refuses to participate in the session. 
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A node that has relayed more traffic than a defined amount also rejects the 
participation. In other cases, the node agrees to forward packets. It has been proved 
that the proposed algorithm leads to a Nash equilibrium. That is, if all nodes 
accurately execute the algorithm then any individual deviation from a node will not 
allow it to reach a greater throughput than the so-called Pareto optimal value, 
reached by all well-behaved nodes in the Nash equilibrium. This solution, as well as 
all the ones based on game theory, trusts the ACKs of intermediate nodes. Indeed, a 
selfish node may agree to participate in a session and to forward packets, in order to 
give impression that it executes accurately the protocol, but actually would not 
forward packets when it receives them. The approach needs to be combined with a 
reactive monitoring solution for resolving this problem. 
3.2 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
An intrusion may be defined as "any set of actions that attempt to compromise the 
integrity, confidentiality, or availability of a resource" [Heady'90], or "any 
unauthorized or unwanted activity on a system or a network" [Lee'03]. An IDS may 
also be defined as "a system that tries to detect and alert on attempted intrusions into 
a system or a network" [Lee'03]. The history of security research has taught us a 
valuable lesson: no matter how many intrusion prevention measures are inserted in a 
network, there are always some weaknesses in the systems that one could exploit to 
break in [Zhang'03]. These weaknesses include design and programming errors and 
various social engineering penetration techniques as well. Hence, intrusion 
prevention measures (proactive solutions) cannot eliminate attacks, and they must be 
fortified with IDSs. An IDS presents a second wall of defence and is essential for any 
high-survivability network. There are mainly two classes of IDSs, Anomaly 
detection and Misuse detection explained below. 
3.2.1 Anomaly detection 
These IDSs consider activities that deviate significantly from the established normal 
usage profiles as anomalies, i. e., possible intrusions, where "normal" patterns are 
defined beforehand. The main advantage of anomaly detection is that it does not 
require prior knowledge of intrusions and can thus detect new intrusions. The main 
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disadvantage is that it might be unable to describe what the attack is and might have 
a high false positive rate. An example of this type of IDS in traditional networks is 
IDES [Lunt'92]. 
3.2.2 Misuse detection (signature-based) 
These IDSs rely on the use of specifically known patterns of well known 
unauthorised behaviour and attacks to match and identify known intrusions. The 
main advantage of this technique is that it can accurately and efficiently detect 
instances of known attacks. Its main drawback is that it lacks the ability to detect the 
truly innovative (i. e., newly invented) attacks, whose patterns are unknown. IDIOT 
[Ilgun'95] and STAT [Kumar, S. '95] are examples of signature-based IDSs in 
traditional networks. Another classification of traditional IDSs is based on the type of 
audit data used. This class includes Network-based IDS and Host-based IDS. 
Network-based IDS normally runs at the gateway of a network, where it captures and 
examines packets that go through the network hardware interface. On the other hand, 
Host-based IDS relies on operating system audit data to monitor and analyse the 
events generated by programs or users on a host. 
Recently some IDSs have been proposed [Anjum'03, Huang'03, Kachirski'03, 
Zhang'03, Liu, Y. '06, Karim'06] for MANET. Most of these IDSs are distributed, 
host-based, anomaly-based, and cooperative. The cooperation, however, may be fully 
and equally distributed among nodes, or it may be based on hierarchal node 
organization. The existing intrusion detection techniques mostly deal with nodes 
misbehaviour problem at the application layer but not cross other layers, and most of 
them based on trace analysis of historical data. 
3.3 Summary 
In this chapter we surveyed the literature and related works. We presented and 
discussed the existing solutions that aim at detecting misbehaviour on packet 
forwarding. These solutions classified into two main techniques, Reactive and 
Preventive. Reactive solutions aim at actively detecting the misbehaviour when it 
appears, while preventive ones try to either proactively prevent any misbehaviour by 
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motivating and forcing nodes to cooperate, or to take precautions to avoid packets 
from being lost before sending them. The reactive solutions divided into two main 
classes, monitoring and reputation-based solutions. The monitoring class includes 
basic approaches that focus on the monitoring phase and suggest techniques to 
control the forwarding process. The major drawback related to these monitoring 
solutions is the post-detection issues, i. e. punishment and selfish nodes knowledge 
exchange between nodes. Reputation solutions on the other hand are more detailed 
and principally deal with these issues. However, all the reputation-based solutions in 
this chapter used the Watchdog [Marti'00] for their monitoring approach; 
subsequently inherit all its drawbacks. We realize that designing a solution basing on 
a more reliable monitoring approach represents an open research topic. Preventive 
techniques proactively try to mitigate the misbehaviour or its effects, either by 
motivating nodes to cooperate or by taking measures to prevent packets from being 
dropped before sending them. We noted that the major drawback of these techniques 
is that it totally trusts nodes; thus it needs to be combined with a reactive monitoring 
technique. We also discussed Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and its two main 
classes Anomaly and Misuse detections. We pointed out IDS weaknesses that 
include design and programming errors as well as various social engineering 
penetration techniques. 
This chapter pointed the main drawbacks of the existing work and issues that need to 
be addresses as: 
9 Most of the existing approaches have high cost in terms of communication 
overhead produced. 
" Existing detection mechanisms are not independent of the routing protocol 
and operate as an extension of it. Many mechanisms work only with one 
particular routing protocol. 
0 
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" Existing monitoring/detection solutions suffer from the post-detection 
drawback, in terms of punishment and selfish nodes knowledge exchange 
between nodes. 
" Most of the existing mechanisms use monitoring approaches that depend on 
promiscuous monitoring, which has many drawbacks regarding the accuracy 
on detections, especially when employing the power control technique. 
" Techniques using proactive approaches trust all nodes and do not prevent 
nodes from overloading the network, thus they can not work effectively alone 
and they require to be combined with a reactive monitoring technique. 
" Most of the existing solutions are applicable only for a small MANET with 
limited number of nodes and as such scalability has not been addressed, 
especially when dealing with wireless sensors network which has a large 
number of nodes. 
" Energy saving has not been considered properly, and as such many existing 
approaches have a high-energy consumption. 
In the following Chapter we will present our new framework for misbehaviour 
detection and its different components. We will also discuses the aim and 
requirements of our new framework based on shortcomings in the related work. 
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4. SESSIONS-BASED MISBEHAVIOUR 
DETECTION FRAMEWORK (SMDF) 
Having introduced existing misbehaviour detection mechanisms in MANET, we 
now present our new framework. In this chapter, we discuss our novel framework 
objectives, requirements and techniques that address the gaps in the related work. We 
will start with the overall aims and specific objectives of our work. Then we will 
identify specific requirements, issues and challenges important when designing an 
effective misbehaviour Detection Framework in stationary MANET and static 
wireless sensor network. Next, we create a structured overview on what kinds of 
attacks in Ad hoc networks our new framework will target. Finally, we present our 
new framework Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection Framework (SMDF) and 
briefly describe its different components. 
4.1 Aims and Objectives 
In this section, we discuss the overall aims and specific objectives of our work. Our 
aims were born from the security emerging of the new security threats and attacks that 
targeting mobile ad hoc networks. The evolving of MANET and its widely advance 
applications such as wireless sensors network in today's IT and Telecommunication 
industries trigger our attentions to find effective solutions to such attacks. Security 
research in finding low cost and effective security mechanisms to detect attacks is still 
not enough in this particular evolving area. Much less progress has been made on 
providing new and efficient detection approaches. 
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The aim of our research is to provide a set of security mechanisms to overcome nodes 
misbehaviour problem in MANET. The major research objectives that we address in 
the problem area are: 
" To develop novel detection mechanisms that can monitor and detect nodes 
misbehaviour in stationary MANET and wireless sensor network. These 
mechanisms will detect node misbehaviour with low cost in terms of reducing 
the amount of communication overhead. These mechanisms can be evaluated 
by comparing them to existing approaches to show how much overhead 
reduction it achieves. This can be carried out through simulation. 
" To design a decision scheme to determine and judge whether nodes 
misbehaved deliberately or not. This scheme will be responsible for ensuring 
that nodes are not wrongly accused of misbehaviour. It will also allow node 
redemption before taking decision. Such mechanism can be enhanced from the 
existing mechanisms and be mathematically evaluated. 
" To design an isolation scheme that can deal with misbehaving nodes that has 
been charged by the decision scheme. This isolation scheme will be able to 
punish misbehaving nodes by isolating them from the network, so they can not 
harm the network or attacking it again. This scheme can be implemented 
mathematically. 
" To integrate the developed schemes into a framework that can efficiently 
monitor, detect, make decisions and isolate misbehaving nodes, to prevent 
security attacks such as Data Dropping attack and Black-hole attacks from 
targeting MANET and wireless sensor network. 
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4.2 Framework Requirements 
The next stage is to identify requirements, issues and challenges when designing an 
effective misbehaviour Detection Framework in stationary MANET and static 
wireless sensor networks. Our framework requirements designed under the 
assumptions that MANET is stationary and that misbehaving nodes (selfish and/or 
malicious) are dropping only data packets and not control packet. 
The requirements for the new system are specified as follows: 
" The new framework should use little system resources at low cost to run and 
should not degrade the system performance by introducing significant 
communication overhead and high power consumption. The overhead 
reduction has to be significant in comparison with existing approaches. By 
achieving this, the new framework will have novel aspect as it can be efficient 
at very low cost in comparison with other existing approaches. 
" The new framework should support cross-layer collaboration in order to reach 
valuable optimizations. This will require that the new framework being an 
active acknowledgment mechanism, which will ensure the correct delivery, 
and will take place only when data packets are sent contrary to most of the 
existing mechanisms. 
" The new framework has to be reliable in terms of minimizing detections that 
are false positives or false negatives. If the new framework achieved an 
optimal lower value of false positives or false negatives among other existing 
approaches, then it will be considered as a novel achievement. This also will 
reflect that the new framework is fair in terms of not wrongly misjudged well- 
behaved nodes in the network. 
" The new framework has to be precise and accurate in maximizing its true 
positives detection. If the new framework achieved the optimal higher rate of 
accuracy in comparison with existing approaches, then it will be consider as a 
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novel achievement. Such high accuracy will required that the new framework 
has to be capable of detecting node misbehaviour with partial dropping, where 
malicious nodes selectively forward some packets and drop others. Also 
capable of detecting dishonest nodes and nodes misbehaviour in the presence 
of collisions and most importantly it has to be capable of detecting node 
misbehaviour when limited transmission power is available or when using the 
power control technique which most of the existing approaches are not capable 
of detecting it. 
" The new framework is not required to be part or an extension of particular 
routing protocol, but it can work independently with any routing protocol. If 
achieving such independency the framework will include novel characteristic 
in comparison with all of the current existing approaches that are not 
independent of the routing protocols. 
" The new framework has to be flexible and has the capability of adding new 
components to it or removing existing component from it as necessary. This 
will add extra novelty to the new framework in that it can be updated with new 
components either from existing approaches or completely a new one. It will 
also allow the framework to be transparent in terms of integrating with other 
mechanisms as it is capable of accepting their components to be integrated to 
it. 
" The new system has to be scalable to support large numbers of nodes to reflect 
stationary wireless sensors network. Most of the existing approaches support 
limited number of nodes mostly up to 50 nodes. Therefore by increasing this 
number the new framework will has the advantages of supporting larger 
number of nodes which will increase its suitability for different kinds of 
MANET including wireless sensors network. 
" The new system has to use key management method to accurately enforce 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity by cryptography; requiring 
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distribution/exchange of encryption key information. So the message receiver 
must be able to determine the actual originator of message, and to verify the 
node's identity. The new system also has to perform availability by reaching 
all necessary recipient nodes. 
" After detecting and deciding a node is selfish and/or malicious, the new 
system has to isolate such node from the network so they can not harm it 
again. Redemption should not be allowed after the decision stage but rather 
before it. By doing this we prevent the misbehaving nodes from lunching 
another malicious attack on the network. 
4.2.1 Issues regarding Punishment and Reward Requirements 
There are two ways to enforce a desired behaviour in the network [Yau'03]: punishing 
misbehaving nodes or encouraging well-behaving nodes. Commonly, the nodes are 
more sensitive to punishment than to rewards, so we focus on effective punishment 
more than on reward. Punishment of the misbehaving nodes (which do not forward 
packet properly) is done by dropping all their packets - both control and data packets. 
The more nodes that identify a misbehaving node and punish it, the more useful the 
punishment is. A question that arises is whether to accept rating information from 
such nodes, or just ignore it. Traffic of misbehaving nodes, which pass through 
intermediate good nodes that are not aware of the misbehaviour, is also an open issue 
that should be decided. An appropriate punishment would drop the misbehaving 
node's traffic, whether it is obtained directly or indirectly. Such a policy, however, 
may cause suspects in well behaving nodes. Punishing liars is another issue. It is 
reasonable to penalize nodes that do not report honestly, to encourage proper 
information distribution. However, it may discourage other nodes from reporting on 
misbehaving nodes that have not been detected yet. Punishment of liars is commonly 
implemented by ignoring their reports. It may also be enhanced further to packet 
dropping, but then the problem of incorrect suspicions arises again. 
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4.2.2 Types of Attacks 
Before developing a security framework that prevents selfish or malicious nodes from 
harming the network, it is advisable to first create a structured overview on what kinds 
of attacks in Ad hoc networks the system will target. This way we can later verify 
what attacks are actually prevented by our security system and where there are still 
open problems. 
The security system we are to propose is targeting the following attacks: 
1) Dropping Data Packets Attack 
Since packets follow multi-hop routes and pass through other nodes, a malicious or 
selfish node can participate in routing, include itself in routes, and drop all packets it 
gets to forward. To do this, the malicious node first attacks the routing protocol to 
gain participation in the routing, using one or more of the attacks presented 
previously. This attack is launched by both selfish and malicious nodes, and it has the 
same effects as the selfish misbehaviour. 
2) Black-hole Attack 
In this attack, a malicious node uses the routing protocol to advertise itself as having 
the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to intercept. In flooding based 
protocol, if the malicious reply reaches the requesting node before the reply from the 
actual node, a forged route has been created. This malicious node simply drops data 
packets quietly, modify data content, replay, or flood data packets; they can also delay 
forwarding time-sensitive data packets selectively or inject junk packets. They can 
also choose whether to drop the packets to perform a denial-of-service attack or to use 
its place on the route as the first step in a man-in-the-middle attack. This attack 
launches by malicious nodes only. 
4.3 Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection Framework (SMDF) 
Our solution to the Misbehaviour problems in MANET is a new Sessions-based 
Misbehaviour Detection framework (SMDF) [Fahad'07b]. It consists of three new 
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components integrated together to detect and deal with nodes Misbehaviour in 
MANET. The first and most important component of the framework is the novel 
Detection component. For this component we have developed a novel Sessions-based 
Misbehaviour Detection Protocol (SMDP) [Fahad'06, Fahad'07a, Fahad'07b]. The 
second component of the new framework is the Decision Component [Fahad'07b] 
which will judge whether the nodes misbehave intentionally or not. The third and 
final component of our framework is the Isolation component [Fahad'07a] which will 
penalize nodes who are judged to have misbehaved. Figure 4-1 above shows our 
framework SMDF and its components. 
Detection Component 
(SA MP) 
Node has 
dropped packets 
Decision Component 
Node is not 
Misbehaving 
Node is 
Misbehaving 
Isolation Component 
Figure 4-1: SMDF Framework 
In our solution Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection Framework (SMDF) 
[Fahad'07a] each node in the route session monitors all of its direct neighbours (i. e. 
71 
Chapter 4: Sessions-Based Misbehaviour Detection Framework 
neighbours within a one hop communication), and checks whether they correctly 
forward packets. We define a session as the continuous traffic sent from the source 
node to the final destination node. The routing protocol has to be aware of the 
beginning and the end of each session. This has been done through cross-layer 
collaboration between the session layer and the network layer, shown in figure 4-2. 
Cross-layer is a paradigm in wireless network architecture design that takes into 
accounts the dependencies and interactions among layers, and supports optimisation 
across traditional layer boundaries [Conti'04]. In our framework it means the 
exchange of information between the session layer and the network layer. As a result, 
our protocol has two components, a session component and a network component. 
The first one informs the second about the beginning and the end of sessions. All the 
other operations are performed by the network component. In our solution (SMDF) 
[Fahad'07a] we monitor nodes only after the end of the session contrary to all of the 
other existing approaches such as [Marti'00, Buchegger'02b, Yang'02, Michiardi'02a, 
Miranda'03, He'04, Djenouri'05] where monitoring happens immediately after the 
node sent packets to its successor to forward them further in the network. This is 
because we believe that by using sessions based approach we will save a considerable 
amount of communication overhead and subsequently reduce the cost. 
Session Layer 
Network Layer 
Cross 
Layer 
Collaboration 
Figure 4-2: SMDF Cross-Layer Collaboration 
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After the end of each session, each node included in a path used by the session (apart 
from the originated source node and the final destination node) sends two 
cryptographically signed (i. e. using asymmetric encryption) packets. One to its 
successor containing the number of packets it has sent to it, we denote by NPS, and 
the other one to its predecessor containing the number of packets it has received from 
it, denoted NPR. The source node will send only the number of packets it has sent 
NPS to its successor, and the final destination node will send only the number of 
packets it has received NPR from its predecessor. NPR and NPS contain the sequence 
numbers of their sender, which is the number maintained by each node and 
monotonically increased (by 1) after including it in a packet. This prevents using an 
NPS or NPR more than once by selfish or malicious nodes. After sending and 
receiving this information, each node builds and broadcasts to all of its one-hop 
neighbours a Forwarding Approval Packet (FAP) shown in figure 4-3, which is 
divided into SENT/RECEIVED fields. Each field involves one neighbour 
participating in the session, and contains the following attributes: 
Ty / Ry : Number of packets node `i' has sent/received to/from neighbour 
id Ty / id RU : Node identification number (ID) of the sender/receiver node. 
STS / SRS :A node signature for authentication. 
mj: The sequence number of node j. 
SENT fields RECEIVED fields 
Tij id Ty mI STjj --- Raj idRý m] SRij ---- 
Figure 4-3: The Forwarding Approval Packet (FAP) 
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Note that contrary to almost all the other solutions, our new framework can work 
independently of the routing protocol, as it does not need to know the two-hop 
neighbor to monitor its successor. It does it locally with its neighbours as it will be 
seen in the detection component in the following section. Therefore, there is no 
requirement of a source routing protocol. Cooperation among nodes is a primary 
requirement for the network functioning that cannot directly be assumed. Providing 
service to each other consumes resources, which are generally limited on ad hoc 
nodes. Furthermore, nodes try to maximize their own utilities in a self-interested way. 
Each component in SMDF provides different functionalities and can work 
individually. However, and all of these components integrated as one framework to 
provide efficient and robust solution against node misbehaviour in MANET. Our 
SMDF has the advantages of being independent of the routing protocols, as well as 
transparent in terms of its capability to integrating with other mechanisms or routing 
protocols when it is required. The other advantages of SMDF are its flexibility and 
capability of adding new components to it or removing existing components from it 
when required to enhance its efficiency. 
The detection component of SMDF contains our novel Sessions-based Misbehaviour 
Detection Protocol SMDP to detect selfish or malicious nodes that drop packets 
partially or completely to launch either black-hole or data dropping attacks. For the 
decision component we have enhanced an existing Bayesian approach to decide 
whether the node deliberately misbehaved or not. For the Isolation component, we 
have modified an existing approach and used an Observation-Based Protocol to 
isolate misbehaving nodes. It uses neighbouring observations experience to isolate 
misbehaved nodes. 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have presented our framework and its cross layer collaboration. 
First we have described our research objectives that form a comprehensive set of 
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support mechanisms and schemes. We discussed the gaps in the current knowledge 
that this thesis will address in the requirements review. We identified requirements, 
issues and challenges important when designing an effective misbehaviour Detection 
Framework in stationary MANET and static wireless sensor network. Before 
developing a security framework that prevents selfish or malicious nodes from 
harming the network, it is advisable to first create a structured overview on what kinds 
of attacks in Ad hoc networks the system will target. Our new security framework is 
targeting at two major attacks in MANET and wireless sensor networks namely 
dropping data packets attack and black-hole attack. 
We have presented our framework Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection 
Framework (SMDF) and its cross layer collaboration between the session layer and 
the network layer. By applying a cross layer design, we increased optimisation in our 
security framework. SMDF has three components, namely the detection component, 
the decision component and the isolation component. Each component in SMDF 
provides different functionalities and can work individually. However, all of these 
components integrated as one framework to provide efficient and robust solution 
against node misbehaviour in MANET. 
The major advantages of our SMDF include its capability of working either 
independently or integrating with other routing protocols. The new framework is also 
flexible and extensible as it has the capability of adding new components to it or 
removing existing components from it as necessary. Moreover, the new framework 
design to be transparent in terms of integrating with other mechanisms as required. 
In the following chapter we will fully explain and discuses the different components 
of our SMDF. 
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5. SMDF COMPONENTS 
In this chapter, we present in details our new framework Sessions-based 
Misbehaviour Detection Framework (SMDF) components. We will start with our 
detection component, which performs through the new novel Sessions-based 
Misbehaviour Detection Protocol, SMDP, where we explain the concepts of the 
monitoring method that our protocol used, and the algorithm to do so. Then it will 
follow up with two case studies in order to illustrate how our SMDP works. Next we 
explain our modified Bayesian approach in our decision component. Finally, 
description of our isolation component where misbehaving nodes will be penalised 
and punished for their misbehaviour. 
5.1 SMDF Detection Component 
After receiving a Forwarding Approval Packet FAP (described in the previous 
chapter) broadcasted from its one hop neighbour, our detection component 
represented through our Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection Protocol (SMDP) 
will start working. Each node checks the authenticity of each T,, and Ry, respectively 
in the FAP using digital signature. It also checks that none of the sequence number 
has already been used. For this it keeps the last sequence number of each other node, 
so that the new received number should be greater than the previous one. Any failure 
in one of the previous verifications results in considering the appropriate number of 
packets to be zero, meaning do not accept such information. 
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If there are no packets dropped the following equation holds: 
Ti 
.1= 
Ril 
iE I iE I 
Thus far, nodes are assumed to not deny the sending and the reception of packets, 
and accordingly they correctly send the NPS and notably NPR packets, and include 
all the receptions in the FAPs as well. Now we deal with situations where selfish 
nodes lie. Assume that there is no more than one such node in a neighbourhood, and 
we do not consider collusions. If a well-behaving node does not receive NPR or NPS 
from a neighbouring node, it simply leaves the corresponding signature field empty 
in the FAP it sends. The neighbours receiving such a packet with an empty signature 
assume that either the node of the appropriate field or the FAP sender is 
misbehaving. They keep their IDs for further investigations. This will be enhanced in 
the following. 
We first deal with the situations where nodes do not lie, and all the required 
signatures are put in the FAP. From equation (1) we consider the following: 
T, j =T & 1: Rij =R 
iE I lE 1 
If R-T =0 then the node is forwarding packets correctly. Otherwise, (R-T) packets 
has been dropped. 
The following steps in figure 5-1, explain our algorithm for detection component 
when executed by nodes in ad hoc network sessions: 
After the end of each session in the network 
If nodes in the session are not the originated source nor the final destination Then 
Each node sends two signed packets; 
NPS to its successor; 
And NPR to its predecessor; 
Else 
If node is the originated source Then 
Sends only NPS to its successor; 
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End if 
Else 
If node is the final destination Then 
Sends only NPR to its predecessor; 
End if 
End if 
When all nodes in the session completed sending and receiving of NPS and NPR: 
If nodes in the session broadcasted a FAP to their all one hop neighbours Then; 
For a set of nodes I that surround a single neighbour j; 
If each node authenticated all T,, and R. fields inside the FAP Then 
If there in no packet drops Then 
J]Ty=YRY; 
iEI IEi 
End if 
Else 
If Y Tij =T&ER, =R Then 
1EI iel 
If R-T >0 Then 
(R-T) of packets will be monitored dropped by node j; 
End if 
End if 
End if 
End if 
rigure 3--i: uetection component Algorithm 
Now we treat the cases where a FAP's SENT field regarding some node, for example 
X lacks a signature. Lack of a signature in a RECEIVED field is of no impact if the 
sender of the FAP has correctly forwarded packets and shows proofs (signatures in 
the SENT fields). The previous sums (T and R) are calculated as before, and if R- 
7>0, this number (R-T) of packets will be considered dropped. But in addition, the 
node will not be immediately considered forwarding the T packets. In fact, either Xis 
denying the reception of packets, or the sender of the FAP has dropped packets and 
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is lying. The two nodes' IDs as well as the appropriate number of packets (claimed in 
the SENT field that lacks a signature) are safeguarded in what we call the suspicious 
set. Later, if one of these two nodes will be considered as suspicious in another 
experience, it will be charged of dropping packets (both in the first and the second 
experiences), and the innocent's id will be released from the suspicious set. In the 
following section we will provide two case studies to clarify the above explanation. 
5.1.1 Detection Component Case Study 1 (well-behaved nodes) 
To illustrate how our novel monitoring approach works consider the following case 
study as shown in figure 5-2 where an ad-hoc network is shown as a set of 25 nodes 
(5x5 nodes) in a squared grid surface. Node mobility is supposed to be low enough 
so that relative positions of nodes do not vary during the sessions. 
ý n5 nl 
n2 n3 
0 
Ens n7 n8 n9 n10 
n11 n12 " nl3 n14 n15 " 
"0ý 
n16 " 
n17 n18 n19 n20 
" " 
" 
n21 n22 n23 n24 n25 
Figure 5-2: MANET Two Sessions Case Study 
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There are two sessions running. The first one shown as a solid arrow in figure 5-2, 
starts at nl (session source) and ends at n20 (session final destination), and includes 
in total 60 packets. These packets are sent from nl to n7, which forwards them to 
n13, and then 20 packets are routed through n14 and the remaining 40 through n19. 
The second session is shown as dashed arrows in figure 5-2, starts form n5 (session 
source) and ends at node n21 (session final destination). The total number of packets 
of this session is 70. Node 5 sends the 70 packets to node 9 to forward them to node 
n13, then from n13 to n17 and finally the latter forwards them to the session final 
destination n2 1. 
Suppose all nodes are well-behaved. After the end of the first session which starts at 
n1, each of the nodes n7, n13, n19, n14, sends a signed packet including the number 
of packets it has received, and another signed packet including the number of packets 
it has sent. nl sends only the number of packets it has sent (it does not receive any 
packet as it is the originated source), while n20 sends only the number of packets 
received (as it is the final destination). 
After the end of the first session, node n13 will send the following signed packet to 
node 19: 
Tx 40 n13 m13 S13 
Where, Tx is the type of the packet (Tx stands for a packet that includes the number 
of packet sent and Rx for a packet that includes the number of packets received), 40 
is the number of packets sent from node n13 to n19, n13 is the ID of the sender, and 
finally S 13 is a signature of node n13 applied on the packet. 
n13 will also send the following signed packet to node n14: 
Tx 20 n13 m13 S13 
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And finally it will send the following signed packet to its predecessor n7: 
Rx 60 n13 m13 S13 
Node n13 will also receive the following packet from n7: 
Tx 60 n7 m7 S7 
And the following packet from n14: 
Rx 20 n14 m14 S14 
And finally the following packet from n19: 
Rx 40 n19 m19 S19 
After receiving from its neighbours the number of packets it has received and sent, 
n13 will broadcast the following FAP: 
40 n19 m19 S19 20 n14 m14 S14 
60 n7 m7 S7 
When receiving this packet, neighbouring nodes will check first the authentication of 
each Ty and Ry in the FAP. Then they will calculate the following: 
1 Ty = 40+20= 60,1 Rü = 60 
IEI ! EI 
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Based on this, neighbouring nodes of node 13 will detect that this latter is forwarding 
packets correctly without any dropping. On the other hand, the same nodes i. e. n7, 
n19 and n14 build FAP packets using the packets sent from n13 and their neighbours 
as well, then broadcast them. Subsequently, they will be evaluated by their 
neighbours in the same way that n13 has been evaluated. 
5.1.2 Detection Component Case Study 2: (Selfish and Liar Nodes) 
Note that thanks to the sequence number, fields used to construct the FAP cannot be 
reused. For instance, in a future session involving nodes n13 and n19, the former 
cannot drop packets and reuse the field (40, n19, m19, S19), as when neighbours 
receive such a field they remark that m19 has not increased, and consequently do not 
accept that n13 forwarded 40 packets to n19. 
Now we consider the situation where node n13 is selfish. It drops packets received 
from n7, then it can either put a field with an empty signature, or simply deny the 
reception of packets from n7 (not sending FAP, neither NPR to n7). Note that it 
cannot claim forwarding packets to both n19 and n14 with empty signatures, as in 
this case it will be suspicious simultaneously with the two nodes, thus it will be 
immediately detected. 
Assume it claims forwarding the 60 packets to one of the nodes, such as n14. It then 
sends the following FAP: 
60 n14 m14 60 n7 m7 S7 
When receiving such a packet, the neighbours will put nodes n14 and n13 in their 
suspicious set, along with the number 60. Next, when n13 drops packets of the 
second session, during which it receives packets from n9, either by sending a FAP 
with an empty signature regarding n17, or simply denying the reception from n9 and 
not sending neither the NPR to n7 nor the FAP. In the first case it will be suspicious 
with n17 then immediately detected by neighbours, after checking their suspicious 
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sets. Node n17 will not be put in the suspicious sets in this case, and n14 will be 
removed from the sets. Whereas in the second case, it will be suspicious with n9 
when this latter sends its FAP including n13 with an empty signature in the SENT 
field. n13 will be charged instead of n9, and n14 will be released. In the two cases, 
n13 will be charged of dropping 130 packets (the sum of the numbers of the two 
sessions 70+60). If in the earlier session n13 denies the reception of packets from n7, 
it will be simply suspicious with this latter (instead of n14), when it send its FAP 
including a SENT field regarding n13 with an empty signature. Identically to the 
previous scenario, n13 will be detected and n7 released at the end of the second 
session. 
5.1.3 Case Studies Analysis 
First, we consider the previous example in figure 5-2, then we will generalise the 
results to infer the communication complexity. In the first session, i. e. the one 
starting at nl and ends at n20, there are 6 nodes participating in this session. Let this 
number be denoted by h. At the end of the session, each of the nodes n1, n7, n13, n14 
and n19 will send a packet to its successor containing the number of packets it has 
sent. This makes a total of 5 packets, which is h-1. 
Also, each of the nodes n7, n13, n14, n19 and n20 will send a packet containing the 
number of packets it has received from its predecessor. Overall, 5 packets of such a 
kind will be sent. That is, h-1. After receiving the Rx and Tx packets (explained 
previously), each of the intermediate nodes (n7, n13, n14 and n19) builds and 
broadcasts a FAP packet to its direct neighbours, resulting in 4 transmissions, which 
is h-2. 
Generally speaking, we have: 
- h-1 packets containing the number of packets sent, i. e. all the nodes, except the 
destination, send one packet including such an information. 
- h-1 packets containing the number of packets received, all the nodes, except the 
source, send one packet including such an information. 
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- h-2 FAP packets. That is, every intermediate node (neither the source nor the 
destination) broadcasts such a packet. Overall, we have 3h-4 transmissions which is 
in term of complexity: 
O(3(h-1)) 
As we have mentioned, SMDP is operational and can detect misbehaviour when 
employing the power control technique, contrary to the watchdog-based solutions 
[Marti'00, Michiardi'02a, Buchegger'02b]. Compared with the random two-hop ACK 
[Djenouri'06b], our solution is low cost. Using power control technique will make 
our solution more efficient then the others. 
The communication complexity of that solution is: 
O((h-1)nPinsd 
Where n is the number of packets, and Pt,. ust is an intrinsic parameter of the solution. 
The mathematical study performed in [Djenouri'06b] illustrates that the best value of 
this parameter is 0.5. Thus, our solution outperforms this one (in terms of overhead 
reduction) by 6 packets/session. Thus, the reduction factor of the communication 
overhead is n16. To explain how we obtained the n/6 reduction factor we do the 
following: 
we calculated previously that our solution's communication complexity is 3 *(h-1), 
and the one of Two Hop ACK [Dj enouri'06b] is (h-1) *n *Pt 5g. 
When replacing Pm, si by 0.5, we get (h-1) *n/2. When calculating the reduction factor 
of our new solution, which is the communication complexity of Two Hop ACK over 
the one of our solution we obtained: 
((h-1) *n/2) / (3 *(h-1)) = n/6. 
As for probing, the communication complexity of that solution is: 
0((h-1)n). 
84 
Chapter 5: SMDFF' CO/fl/)onent. ti 
Our solution outperforms it by 3 packets/session. The reduction factor of the 
communication overhead is n/3. 
To explain how we obtained the n/3 reduction factor we do the following: 
((h-1)*n) l (3*(h-1)) = n/3 
5.1.4 Optimised SMDF Using Sessions Aggregation 
Our solutions SMDF can be optimised even further to reduce the communication 
overhead. This can be done by aggregating sessions. When using this approach, 
nodes that are involved in more than one session could wait a certain time until all 
sessions end before sending the FAP to their direct neighbours. For example, n13 in 
figure 5-2 can wait until both sessions end, then sends one aggregated 1A1' to its 
neighbours regarding the two sessions, instead of sending two FAPs separately. The 
aggregated packet is: 
40 n19 m19 19 20 n14 m14 S14 ý 70 111 
m17 S17 6( n7 m7 S7 70 n9 m9 S9 
In this way we reduce the communication overhead even further. 'I'll's 
optimisation is beneficial for well-behaving nodes. A selfish node, however, has no 
interest of aggregating FAPs, since lying in such a packet will inevitably include two 
nodes, which allows to directly detect it. 
5.2 SMDF Decision Component 
In this component we develop a modification approach of the standard Bavesian 
method. As described above the Decision Component of the new framework will 
judge whether the nodes misbehave intentionally or not. First we give an overview of 
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Our solution outperforms it by 3 packets/session. The reduction factor of the 
communication overhead is n/3. 
To explain how we obtained the n/3 reduction factor we do the following: 
((h-1) *n) / (3 *(h-1)) = n/3. 
5.1.4 Optimised SMDF Using Sessions Aggregation 
Our solutions SMDF can be optimised even further to reduce the communication 
overhead. This can be done by aggregating sessions. When using this approach, 
nodes that are involved in more than one session could wait a certain time until all 
sessions end before sending the FAP to their direct neighbours. For example, n13 in 
figure 5-2 can wait until both sessions end, then sends one aggregated FAP to its 
neighbours regarding the two sessions, instead of sending two FAPs separately. The 
aggregated packet is: 
40 n19 m19 s19 20 n14 m14 S14 70 n17 
m17 S17 4 60 n7 m7 S7 70 n9 m9 S9 
In this way we reduce the communication overhead even further. This 
optimisation is beneficial for well-behaving nodes. A selfish node, however, has no 
interest of aggregating FAPs, since lying in such a packet will inevitably include two 
nodes, which allows to directly detect it. 
5.2 SMDF Decision Component 
In this component we develop a modification approach of the standard Bayesian 
method. As described above the Decision Component of the new framework will 
judge whether the nodes misbehave intentionally or not. First we give an overview of 
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the original standard Bayesian method, and then we describe our modified Bayesian 
approach, which we used in our SMDF Decision Component. 
5.2.1 A Standard Bayesian Framework Overview 
The Bayesian approach [Davison'00, Davison'03] is a mathematical estimation 
method for estimating a parameter the observations of which follow a Bernouli 
distribution by a Beta distribution. The Bernoulli Distribution [Evans'00] is an 
example of a discrete probability distribution. A discrete probability distribution is a 
roster comprised of all the possibilities, together with the likelihood of the 
occurrence of each. The Bernoulli Distribution is an appropriate tool in the analysis 
of proportions and rates. 
Several distributions such as beta, Gaussian, Poisson and binomial can be used to 
represent the reputation of a node. However, the beta distribution has been the most 
promising due to its flexibility and simplicity as well as its strong foundations on the 
theory of statistics. It is based on probability distributions that are a fundamental 
concept in statistics. They are used both on a theoretical level and a practical level. 
One of the important practical uses of probability distributions is in simulation 
studies with random numbers generated from using a specific probability distribution 
are often needed. 
The general formula for the probability density function [Evans'00] of the beta 
distribution is: 
p-1 1 
Where p and q are the shape parameters, a and b are the lower and upper bounds, 
respectively, of the distribution, and B(p, q) is the beta function. The beta function has 
the equation: 
B(a, /3) =11 t°`-1(1- t)A-'dt 
0 
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The case where a=0 and b=1 is called the standard beta distribution. The equation 
for the standard beta distribution is: 
f ýzý =% 4) 
Oxi; p, q>0 
Typically the general form of a distribution is defined in terms of location and scale 
parameters. The beta is different in that we define the general distribution in terms of 
the lower and upper bounds [Evans'00]. However, the location and scale parameters 
can be defined in terms of the lower and upper limits as follows: location = a, scale = 
b-a. 
On the other hand, the Bayesian approach has the advantage of not needing a 
memory (i. e. only the latest updates are safeguarded, and not all the observations). 
For example, node i models the behaviour of node j as an actor in the base system 
as follows: 
Node i thinks that there is a parameter 0 such that node j misbehaves with 
probability 0, and that the outcome is drawn independently from observation to 
observation (Node i thinks that there is a different parameter 0 for every different 
node j, and every node i may believe in different parameters 0. Therefore, 0 
should be indexed by i and j). The parameters 0 are unknown, and node i models 
this uncertainty by assuming that 0 itself is drawn according to a distribution the 
"prior" that is updated as new observations become available. This is the standard 
Bayesian framework. We use the distribution Beta(a, ß) , as is commonly used in 
[Davison'03, Buchegger'04], since it is suitable for Bernoulli distributions and the 
conjugate is also a Beta distribution. 
The standard Bayesian procedure is as follows: 
Initially, the prior is Beta(1,1), the uniform distribution on [0,1]; this represents 
absence of information about 0 which will be drawn. Then, when a new observation 
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is made, say with S observed misbehaviours and f observed correct behaviours, the 
prior is updated according to 8: =a+8 and fl= , 
8+f. If 0, the true unknown 
value, is constant, then after a large number n of observations, a- nO (in 
expectation), ß- n(1- ©) and Beta(a, ß) becomes close to a Dirac at 0, as 
expected. The advantage of using the Beta function is that it only needs two 
parameters that are continuously updated as observations are made or reported. 
The Bayesian approach for nodes reputation regarding packet forwarding in MANET 
has already been used by [Josang'02, Mui'02, Buchegger'04, Djenouri'07], but 
requires periodic transmissions of huge control packets noticeable in most of them. 
5.2.2 Our New Modified Bayesian Decision Stage 
We have modified Bayesian approach for our new Decision Stage. Our new 
proposed Bayesian approach is similar to that used in [Buchegger'04, Djenouri'07] 
but with advantages of lower overhead. The monitoring method in SMDP described 
above allows the neighbouring nodes to decide whether each monitored node in the 
session has forwarded packets correctly or not. Therefore, when a monitoring node 
notices that some packet has been dropped over a link it should not directly accuse 
the monitored as misbehaving, since this dropping could be caused by collisions or 
channel conditions. Therefore, a threshold of tolerance should be fixed. 
In our new Bayesian approach, well behaving of nodes improves their reputation, 
whereas intentional or unintentional packet dropping decreases it. Since misbehaving 
is usually exception rather than the norm, information exchange in our solution is 
limited to negative impressions. It is simpler and creates no overhead when nodes 
well-behave. 
Each node A thinks that each other node B misbehaves with a probability 0, which 
is a random variable estimated by a Beta distribution Beta(a, b) described above. 
Initially with no prior information, 0 is assumed uniform in [0,1], which is identical 
to Beta(1,1). As observations (that follow a Bernoulli distribution with a parameter 0) 
are made, a and b are updated as follows: 
a=a+T, b=b+(R-T) 
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Where R is the number of packets received by the node (as a router), and T is the 
number of packets forwarded by it during the session, as mentioned in our detection 
component. The previous sums (T and R) are calculated as before in our detection 
component, and if R-7>O, this number (R-7) of packets will be considered dropped. 
But in addition, the node will not be immediately considered forwarding the T 
packets. If R-T=O then the node forwards packets correctly. Otherwise, (R-T) 
packets are dropped. 
After as many observations as the decision could be made (0 could be approximated 
by the mathematical expectation E(Beta(a, b)) ), B will be judged. This is denoted by 
the decision (or stationary) point i. e. E(Beta(a, b)) > Ems , while the number of 
observations is expressed by a+b . Upon reaching this point, B will 
be accused of 
misbehaviour. Note that: E(Beta(a, b)) = a/(a + b) . 
The following steps shown in figure 5-3 describe the decision algorithm when 
executed by a node i: 
Received a notification (R - T) from the detector regarding node j ((R - T) =1 if 
node is dropping packets and (R - T) =0 otherwise): 
af =a, +(R-T); 
bj =b, +1-(R-T); 
O= a/(a+b); 
If (Decision point reached) Then 
If (Oj > E,,,, x) 
Then 
Put node j in the suspicious set; 
Launch Observation REQ against node j; 
End if 
End if 
Figure 5-3: SMDF Decision Component Algorithm 
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Emax could be fixed to 0.5 (i. e. 50% of misbehaviour), or for more efficiency it 
should be estimated empirically for each network as follows: 
1) Make simulations with no misbehaving and calculate E at each node for different 
scenarios that estimate the network. 
2) Retrieve the maximum value in all scenarios from the decision point then consider 
it as E... 
In mathematical estimation methods, the decision (stationary) point is the one upon 
which the difference between two subsequent observations could be negligible. One 
usual choice is that fulfilling the following condition: 
Var(Beta(a, b)) < c. 
Such that Var is the mathematical variance and e is a very small positive. 
Note that: 
Var(Beta(a, b)) = 
axb 
(a+b+1)x(a+b)2 
However, this choice is inappropriate here, since Var(Beta) is not monotonous 
with a+b. We use the following variance like function, which is indeed decreasing 
witha+b: 
ba 
M 
((a 
+b)x (a+b+ 1)'(a +b)x (a+b+1) 
When enough observations with regard to a given monitored node are collected such 
that the judgment point is reached, the monitoring node will accuse the monitored 
one as soon as the estimated probability (E(Beta(a, b))) exceeds the configured 
maximum tolerance threshold, i. e. E(Beta(a, b)) > E. E. 
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E(Beta(a, b)) >EFa >E. F-)a> 
bx Ems 
: 
a+b 
This latter 
i 
bx Emax 
represents the tolerable number of packets a node is allowed to 
drop without being accused. This maximum tolerable threshold is proportional to b, 
the number of packets forwarded. The more a node forward packets, the more its 
tolerable threshold increases. Forwarding packets after unintentional or intentional 
droppings that do not result in an accusation would decrease E, which allows 
redemption. This redemption could not be possible when setting the tolerable 
threshold to a fixed number of packets. In our SMDF the redemption is just before 
Decision, a node that forwards packets will need much more packets to be dropped 
before being accused compared to the one that does not forward, so it is like the 
forwarding redeem its dropping. However, there is no redemption after the decision. 
In [Buchegger'04], every node periodically broadcasts in its neighbourhood its view 
of 0 regarding all the other nodes. Nodes use these information (known as second 
hand information) to update their own opinion on nodes' behaviour. To decide about 
the acceptance of the provided information, each node performs complicated tests on 
the trustworthiness of the provider. The problem with this proactive solution is that it 
causes an increase in the amount of overhead generated, even if nodes well-behave. 
This overhead is also noticeable in [Djenouri'07] when misbehaviour detected. Our 
approach is rather reactive, thus no such information are exchanged. Indeed, each 
node performs monitoring separately and informs the others as soon as a 
misbehaving node is approved, as we will see in the next section with more details. 
5.3 SMDF Isolation Component 
Our Isolation Component derived from the social sciences principle that a person that 
accuses another of misconduct must show proof. One possible way to prove the 
accusation is to get observers against the accused person. In order to mitigate false 
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detections and false accusations vulnerability, we have proposed a Observation- 
Based Protocol similar to that used in [Du'03, Djenouri'07] to isolate a detected node. 
In this protocol, a node that detects and accuses another as misbehaving must 
approve its accusation before taking any measure against it. It should not isolate the 
assumed misbehaving unilaterally, because this could result in false detections 
against it. However, it could avoid routing its own packets through this node. 
Isolating a misbehaving node in MANET required two actions. First, not to route 
packets through it, to avoid losing them; second, do not forward packets for it, in 
order to punish it. For example, node A that judges some other node B as 
misbehaving should not isolate it unilaterally, but must ensure its isolation by all 
nodes. This is because when A unilaterally isolates B, the others could consider A as 
misbehaving when they realize that it does not forward packets for B. 
The way that our proposed Observation-Based Protocol work is describe as follow: 
Upon detection, the detector informs nodes in its neighbourhood about the dropper 
(the accused), and asks for observers by broadcasting an Observation REQuest 
(OREQ) packet. It also puts the detected node ID in a special set called a suspicious 
set. Each node receiving the OREQ investigates the issue as follows: 
The packets recipient immediately sends a signed Observation REPly (OREP) packet 
to the accuser in the following two cases: 
  if the accused node's misbehaving expectation reach E.., or the number of 
control packets considered dropped reach the configured maximum 
threshold. 
  if its suspicious set includes the accused node. 
Otherwise, when it has not enough experience with the accused node (B), and if B is 
its neighbour then it asks the successor of this latter whether it has received packets 
forwarded from it, by sending an ACcusation REQuest ACREQ packet (using a route 
that does not include B). But first, in order to avoid false accusations, the investigator 
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(i. e. the node received the ACREQ packet from the accuser), should ensure that the 
accuser has really sent a packet to B to be forwarded to the appropriate successor. 
One possible way to do this is to check whether such a packet has been recently 
overheard, using the promiscuous mode. The node also should check whether B has 
sent the accuser an ACK just after overhearing the data, to ensure that the former has 
really received the packet and that the latter is not impersonating it. If B's successor 
has not recently received any packet forwarded from B, it sends a signed ACREP 
(ACcusation REPly) packet to the investigator, then this latter testifies for the 
accusation and sends the accuser a signed Observation REPly- OREP packet. The 
signature of the packets prevents their spoofing, thus no node could testify using the 
ID of another. 
The accuser node has to collect 'S' different signatures to approve its accusation. 
Theoretically, S -1 is the maximum number of misbehaving nodes that could exist 
at any time. In practice, however, it is hard to determine such a number, so it should 
be fixed to strike a balance between efficiency and robustness. Setting S to a high 
value increases the robustness of the protocol against false detections and rumours, 
but decreases its efficiency regarding true detections. On the other hand, a low value 
of S allows high detections, but opens the vulnerability of rumours and increases the 
unintentional false detections (false positives), since S nodes could collude to accuse 
maliciously (respectively wrongly) any node. 
Once the accuser collects S valid signatures, it broadcasts an Isolation Packet 
(ISOP) including all signatures through the network to isolate the guilty. This 
broadcast is not performed until a node is detected and approved as misbehaving. 
Apart from the monitoring stage, our solution requires no overhead as long as nodes 
well behave, as no opinions are exchanged periodically. This gives our solution the 
advantages of being a reactive one, unlike the other reputation-based solutions that 
were presented before. The following algorithm description in figure 5-4 and case 
study in section 5.3.1 will illustrates the isolation component further. 
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When receive a Observation REQ sent by node A against node j: 
If (j E the suspicious set or Oj - Em., or Num Pkt Drop Threshold) then 
send a direct signed Observation REP to A; 
Else 
If (j is a direct neighbour of i in the session) Then 
send ACcusation REQuest toward j 's successor using a route does not include j; 
End if 
End if 
When receive a ACcusation REQuest sent by B against j where A is the previous 
hop: 
If (no packet has been recently forwarded from j including A as the previous hop) 
Then 
send Ba ACcusation REPIy ; 
End if 
When receive a ACcusation REPly regarding' A 'accusation: 
send Aa signed undirect Observation REPly; 
When receive an Observation REPly sent by A against j 
If (Observation REPly type = direct) Then 
num dirct Obs = num dirct Obs + 1; 
Else f 
num_undirctObs = num_undirct_Obs + 1; 
End if 
If (num_dirct Obs + num_undirct Obs =S and num_dirct_Obs >0 Then 
broadcast ISOP to isolate the misbehaving j; 
End if 
Figure 5-4: SMDF Isolation Component Algorithm 
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5.3.1 Isolation Component Case Study 
In this example we assume the short session shown in figure 5-5 and running through 
nl, n2, n7 and ending in n8. The source originator n1 sent 40 packets to to be 
delivered to the final destination n8. When nl accuses n2 for not forwarding all 
packets to n7 and sends a call for observation, n6 which is a one hob neighbour of ni 
and n2 investigates the issue. But before asking n7 it ensures that nl has really sent 
the packet and n2 has received it, by checking FAP packets it has received. This is 
because n6 could not ensure that n2 has received the data packet by just overhearing 
it. For example, if n6 is closer to n1 than n2, nl attempting a DoS attack against n2 
could send the packet using a power strong enough to be overhead by n6, but not by 
n2. Requiring the FAP reception from n2 just after the data ensures that n2 has really 
received the data from nl. To do so, n6 simply safeguards the overheard packets in 
this case their headers during a short period. 
n1 
ý n2 ` n3 n4 
n5 
n9 n10 n11 n12 
Figure 5-5: SMDF Isolation Component Case Study 
In this way, a node that asks the accused node's successor has no doubt that the 
accused node has received a data packet to forward to the successor in question. Any 
collision at n6 prevents it from testifying, but has no effect on false detections. Upon 
the reception of the ACREQ, the asked node n7 replies with a signed ACREP packet 
if it has not received any packet from n2. nl coincidental collision at n7 at that 
moment, however, would result in a false reply if nl is attempting a DoS attack, then 
in a false testimony. Nonetheless, the requirement of at least one direct observation 
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(be an observer from its direct experience) prevent wrong accusation caused by this 
kind of false testimonies. The signature of the packets prevents their spoofing, thus 
no node could testify using the ID of another. 
The accuser node nl has to collect 2 different signatures to approve its accusation. 
Once the accuser nl in this case collects 2 valid signatures from n5 and n6 as they 
are within one hop of n2, it will then broadcasts an Isolation Packet (ISOP) including 
all signatures through the network to isolate the misbehaving node, which is in this 
case n2. This broadcast is not performed until a node is detected through our first 
detecting component and then approved through our decision component as 
misbehaving. In theory, as it has been described above, (2-1) is the maximum 
number of misbehaving nodes that could exist at any time. In reality, it is difficult to 
determine such a number of signatures, so it should be fixed to keep a balance 
between efficiency and robustness. Furthermore, setting the number of signatures to 
a high value will increases the robustness of the protocol against false detections, 
however, it will decreases its efficiency regarding true detections. In contrast, a low 
value of this number allows high detections, but opens the vulnerability of rumours 
and increases the unintentional false detections (false positives), since certain number 
nodes could collude to accuse maliciously any node. 
5.4 Summary 
The different components of our framework have been fully described in details in 
this chapter. We started with our detection component through the new Sessions- 
based Misbehaviour Detection Protocol SMDP, where we explained the concepts of 
the detection/monitoring that our protocol used, and the algorithm to do so. We have 
given two case studies in order to illustrate how our SMDP work. We also explained 
how our detection component can be optimised even further to reduce the 
communication overhead using aggregating sessions. When using this approach, 
nodes that are involved in more than one session could wait a certain time until all 
sessions end before sending the FAP to their direct neighbours. In this way we 
96 
Chapter 5: SMDF Components 
reduce the communication overhead even further. It is a trade-off issue as reducing 
the cost is more valuable and important than increasing the waiting time until the end 
of all sessions. 
Then we went to explain our Decision component. We have proposed a modified 
Bayesian approach for this component. The advantages of this approach are that it 
allows redemption before making decisions, and it decreases false accusations due to 
wireless channel conditions. Following our decision component, we presented and 
explained our SMDF final component the Isolation component. At this component 
misbehaving nodes will be penalised and punished for their misbehaviour. For this 
component, we have modified an existing approach and we used an Observation- 
Based Protocol to isolate misbehaving nodes. In this protocol, a node that detects and 
accuses another as misbehaving must approve its accusation before taking any 
measure against it. This increase fairness and reduce false accusations among nodes. 
Once the accuser collects enough valid signatures from other neighbouring nodes, it 
broadcasts an Isolation Packet including all signatures through the network to isolate 
the misbehaving node. 
In the following chapter we will evaluate our proposed framework SMDF using 
simulation techniques. 
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6. EVALUATION AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
The previous chapter described our new framework SMDF to detect misbehaving 
nodes in MANET. In this chapter we present the evaluation of our work. We apply 
our methodology for testing and this phase defines the requirements and 
assumptions. We describe the performance evaluation and we discuss different 
simulation scenarios that show what happens when we modify the initial system 
state. We outline the metrics and parameters within our simulator that are the 
container for the initial data set for any scenario. We show through simulation the 
effect on node misbehaviour on the network throughput. We analyse overall 
detection rate performance on the network simulator when using our new framework 
SMDF. We show how our SMDF framework succeeds in detecting misbehaving 
nodes at different levels of misbehaviour with low overhead and high rate of 
detection success. We evaluate the proposed mechanism using simulation techniques 
by determining the utilization level of network resources achieved using them, and 
by comparing our results based on simulation models to the best possible 
deterministic schemes available on the literature. We then take a very broad view of 
the research and look at the overall achievements including evaluation against our 
initial requirements specified in chapter 4 and discuss the problems remaining. 
6.1 Simulation 
Simulation is a fundamental tool in the development of MANET protocols, because 
of the difficulty to deploy and debug them in real networks. The simulation cases the 
analysing and the verification of the protocols, mainly in large-scale systems. It 
offers flexible testing with different topologies, mobility patterns, and several 
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physical and link-layer protocols. However, a simulation cannot provide evidence in 
real-world scenarios, due to assumptions and simplifications that it makes. Various 
examinations, such as [Sasson'02], show significant divergences between different 
simulators that demonstrate an identical protocol. Therefore, the results obtained 
from the simulations should be evaluated appropriately. Three well-known 
simulators are used for MANET simulations: NS-2 [NS2'07], GloMoSim and 
OPNET [OPNET'07]. We chose GloMoSim [GloMoSim'07], because it is a scalable 
simulator that was designed especially for large wireless networks. It supports 
thousands of nodes, using parallel and distributed environments. 
6.1.1 GIoMoSim Overview 
G1oMoSim [Zeng'98, Bajaj'99, Nuevo'03], was designed as a set of library modules, 
each of which simulates a communication protocol in the protocol stack. The library 
uses the OSI layer approach shown in table 6-1 and supports multiple protocols in 
each layer. The layers are separated and each layer has its own API. The layers 
interact with each other using message-passing approach. A combination of different 
protocols at various layers into a complete protocol suite, as well as extension with 
alternative protocols can be done simply. The simulator is built above PARSEC 
[PARSEC'07], a C-based language that was developed for discrete-event 
simulations. The simulator enables various scenarios, using configuration files, and 
allows analysis by a trace file with statistics. The visualization tool of GloMoSim, 
written in Java, shows the network topology, nodes' mobility and packet 
transmissions. 
6.1.2 Validation 
The validation is a feedback loop utilising empirical network data and the simulation. 
For performance evaluation, we collect and analyse the results from the simulation. 
We compare the performance of our techniques with other results from key literature. 
We also relate the experimental results to the research objectives, and we discuss the 
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extent to which the project has succeeded in its goal. The research objectives check 
against the performance evaluation, and we discuss conclusions. In this way, we are 
able to reason about the advantages and possible limitations of our techniques. 
Layers Protocols 
Mobility Random waypoint, Random drunken, Trace based 
Radio Propagation Two ray and Free space 
Radio Model Noise Accumulating 
Packet Reception Models 
SNR bounded, BER based with BPSK/QPSK 
modulation 
Data Link (MAC) CSMA, IEEE 802.11 and MACA 
Network (Routing) 
IP with AODV, Bellman-Ford, DSR, Fisheye, LAR 
scheme 1, ODMRP, WRP 
Transport TCP and UDP 
Application CBR, FTP, HTTP and Telnet 
Table 6-1: GloMoSim OSI Library 
6.2 Simulations Parameters 
To study the effect of node misbehaviour on MANET and to assess the performance 
of the proposed detection protocol, we have developed a G1oMoSim-based 
[G1oMoSim'07] simulation study. We have simulated a network of 100 nodes, 
located in an area of 2500 x 2000 m2 where nodes are deployed randomly for 1800 
seconds of simulation time. To generate traffic we have used five Constant Bit Rate 
(CBR) sessions between five pairs of remote nodes, each consists of continually 
sending a 512 byte data packet each second. On each hop, each data packet is 
transmitted using a controlled power according to the distance between the 
transmitter and the receiver. 
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We have set the seed parameter to number 3, which represent the random number 
seed used to initialise part of the seed of various randomly generated numbers in the 
simulation. This can be used to vary the seed of the simulation to see the consistency 
of the results of the simulation. The two parameters "TERRAIN-DIMENSIONS 
(2500,2000)" stand for the physical terrain in which the nodes are being simulated. 
In our case it represents an area of size 2500 meters by 2000 meters. All range 
parameters are in terms of meters. 
The parameter "NODE-PLACEMENT" represents the node placement strategy, 
which we set to RANDOM meaning nodes are placed randomly within the physical 
terrain. We set the nodes mobility parameter "MOBILITY" to NONE, meaning there 
is no movement of nodes in the model and nodes are static. The PROPAGATION- 
LIMIT parameter set to -111.0. This value must be smaller than (RADIO-RX- 
SENSITIVITY + RADIO-ANTENNA-GAIN) explained below, of any node in the 
model. Otherwise, simulation results may be incorrect. Lower value should make the 
simulation more precise, but it also makes the execution time longer. 
The RADIO-TYPE which is the radio model to transmit and receive packets set to 
"RADIO-NONOISE" an abstract radio model which is compatible with version 
(2.1b5) of ns-2 radio model. RADIO-FREQUENCY parameter (in hertz) (Identifying 
variable for multiple radios set to 2.4e9, and RADIO-BANDWIDTH to 2000000 
bit/sec. RADIO-RX-TYPE packet reception model parameter set to SNR- 
BOUNDED, If the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) is more than RADIO-RX-SNR- 
THRESHOLD (in dB), it receives the signal without error. Otherwise the packet is 
dropped. RADIO-RX-SNR-THRESHOLD set to 10 dB. The RADIO-TX-POWER 
parameter is the radio transmition power (in dBm), and it set to 7dBm. The RADIO- 
ANTENNA-GAIN set to 0.0 dB. The RADIO-RX-SENSITIVITY parameter which 
represent the sensitivity of the radio set to -91.0 dBm and RADIO-RX- 
THRESHOLD parameter represent the Minimum power for received packet (in 
dBm) set to -81.0. 
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We also set the PROMISCUOUS-MODE parameter to YES and is necessary if 
nodes want to overhear packets destined to the neighbouring node as the case in the 
Watchdog. Also this option needs to be set to YES only when DSR is selected as 
routing protocol. Setting it to "NO" may save a minor amount of time for other 
protocols. 
The NETWORK-PROTOCOL parameter set to IP the only choice. The following 
parameters determine our interest in the statistics of a single or multiple layers. By 
specifying the following parameters as YES, the simulation will provide us with 
statistics for that particular layer. All the statistics are compiled together into a file 
called "GLOMO. STAT" that is produced at the end of the simulation. 
APPLICATION-STATISTICS YES 
TCP-STATISTICS NO 
UDP-STATISTICS NO 
ROUTING-STATISTICS NO 
NETWORK-LAYER-STATISTICS YES 
MAC-LAYER-STATISTICS NO 
RADIO-LAYER-STATISTICS YES 
CHANNEL-LAYER-STATISTICS NO 
MOBILITY-STATISTICS NO 
Table 6-2 shows the important simulation parameters that have been used in our 
simulation. These parameters are typical for MANET simulations (see 
e. g. [Broch'04]) and are used for all following simulations. For the results of the 
simulation to be meaningful, it is important that the model on which is based the 
simulator matches the reality as closely as possible. As mentioned in chapter 4 that 
various examinations, such as [Sasson'02], show significant divergences between 
different simulators that demonstrate an identical protocol. Therefore, the results 
obtained from the simulations should be evaluated appropriately. 
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Parameter Value 
Number of Nodes 100 
Area X (m) 2500 
Area Y (m) 2000 
Traffic Model Constant Bit Rate (CBR) 
Sending Rate (Packets/S) 1.0 
Packet Size (Byte) 512 
Simulation Time (S) 1800 
Node Placement Random 
Table 6-2: Simulation parameters 
6.3 Simulation Metrics 
We evaluate our proposed SMDF using the following six metrics: 
" Throughput: This is the percentage of sent data packets actually received by 
the intended destinations. 
" Overhead: This is the amount of control-related transmissions (control 
packets including FAPs) measured in bytes, and generated during each 
session in the network. We count the amount of the actual control packets in 
bytes instead of the number of packets, because it is reflect the real amount of 
overhead, as you might have small number of packets that generates huge 
amounts of bytes and vice versa. Control packets are broadcast to all one hop 
neighbours as in the case of FAPs, which described previously in Chapter 4. 
" True Positive Detection Rate: The rate of true dropping detection, when 
nodes correctly detected dropping packets. 
" False Positive Detection Rate: The rate of false dropping detection, when 
nodes wrongly accused of misbehaviour, when in fact they are not. 
" Power Consumption Rate: The effect of node misbehaviour on the 
detection protocol's power consuming. 
9 Scalability: How scalable the new protocol is if the network number of nodes 
increased. 
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6.4 Evaluation of the Effect of Node Misbehaviour on MANET 
Throughput 
In order to study how node misbehaviour affects a MANET performance, we have 
done a number of simulations where we modelled a varying number of selfish nodes. 
In order to compare the affect of node misbehaviour in the network, we first run the 
simulation without selfish nodes (i. e. all of the nodes in the sessions are behaving 
correctly and forwarding packets as required from them without any dropping). Next, 
we run the simulation and in this case we have injected the network with selfish 
nodes who misbehave by not forwarding packets they received from other nodes. We 
have varied the number of selfish nodes from I to 20 nodes of the total numbers of 
100 nodes. Figure 6-1 shows the results of these simulations. It is obvious that this 
number has a significant effect on the rate of packets that are successfully delivered 
in the network. In this simulation we have used DSR routing protocol, the selfish 
node has not been detected by DSR and no countermeasures are taken. 
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Figure 6-1: Node Misbehaviour Effects on MANET's Throughput 
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6.5 Evaluation of the Effect of Packet Dropping Attack in MANET 
In this simulation we study the effect of packet dropping attack on MANET. Unlike 
the previous simulation in figure 6-1 where the dropping rate is fixed to 50%, in this 
simulation the dropping rate is vary from 0% to 100%. We simulated 20 nodes 
launching this attack by different rate of dropping as shown in figure 6-2. It can be 
seen from figure 6-2 that when the dropping rate of the attacker is low, the 
throughput (i. e. number of packet received) is high. As the dropping rate increased 
the throughput is severely affected until it reaches 0 as the attacking nodes increased 
their dropping rate to 100%. This clearly shows the affect of such attack on the 
performance of MANET and wireless sensor network. The result shows that 
malicious nodes can silently drop some or all of the data packets sent to it for further 
forwarding even when no congestion occurs. It also shows that the more number of 
such malicious nodes inside the network the more the harmful impact on the overall 
network performance. 
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6.6 Evaluation of the True Positive Detection Rate 
This metric is an important one, as it shows how successful our proposed protocol is 
in terms of detecting misbehaving nodes correctly. We have set the misbehaving rate 
to be varied from 0% to 20%, which means that 0-20 nodes are misbehaving and 
dropping packets at the rate of 50% of the overall packets they have received. This 
scenario reflects the partial dropping case, which is really difficult to detect, and it is 
used by malicious nodes to perform the black-hole attack as described above in 
chapter 4. First we present our proposed SMDF True Positive Detection Rate 
Simulation results, then we compare it with the other existing mechanisms. 
6.6.1 Evaluation of SMDF True Positive Detection Rate 
Here we only show our evaluation through simulations results in regards to our 
proposed SMDF. It can be clearly seen from figure 6-3 that our proposed SMDF 
successes at 100% accuracy in detecting correctly the misbehaving nodes that is 
dropping packets to lunch e. g. a black-hole attack. In the next stage we will evaluate 
our proposed SMDF by comparing it with the Watchdog [Marti'00] and the Random 
Two Hob ACK [Djenouri'05] approaches. In real MANET environment reaching 
100% accuracy in true positive rate can not be achieve due to the characteristic of 
MANET described in Chapter 1. 
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6.7 Comparison With Existing Approaches for (True Positive 
Detection Rate) 
Having seen true detection positive rate results for our SMDF, we are now 
comparing it with other mechanisms. Figure 6-4 show a comparison between our 
proposed SMDF and the Watchdog [Marti'00] and Random Two Hop ACK 
[Djenouri'05]. We have used same simulation parameters mentioned in section 6.2 
and run the simulations using each protocol separately (i. e. WD then Random Two 
Hop ACK). In addition, as in our SMDF simulation case we have set the POWER 
COTROL parameter to YES in order to see how the other two protocols perform. 
The result shows that our proposed SMDF outperformed Watchdog, which suffers 
from a sharp fluctuation between (98% - 100%), whereas SMDF remains constant at 
100%. On the other hand, SMDF has as same true detection rated as the random Two 
Hop ACK. The pink line which represents WD fluctuated rapidly twice when the 
misbehaving rate reached 3% and 10% respectively. This is due to the fact that WD 
use promiscuous mode monitoring which can not detect nodes misbehaviour when 
employing power control technique. Therefore, in two occasions WD was below our 
SMDF and R2H ACK. 
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6.8 Evaluation of False Positive Detection Rate 
This metric shows the number of well-behaved nodes falsely classified as 
misbehaving. The dropping rate remained at 50% as previous scenarios. This 
scenario gives us an idea whether our proposed SMDF unfairly accused well- 
behaved nodes of misbehaviour or not. Figure 6-5 shows that SMDF has 0% false 
positive detection rate in all of the 20 cases we simulate. This means that SMDF 
have never wrongly accused well behaving nodes in the network that forward packet 
correctly of misbehaviour. Next we validate this result by comparing it to other 
existing mechanisms. Again in real MANET environment reaching 0% accuracy in 
false positive rate can not be achieve due to the characteristic of MANET as well as 
other network conditions such as collisions, faulty nodes and low connectivity 
network. 
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6.9 Comparison With Existing Approaches for (False Positive 
Detection Rate) 
As we have done in the true detection positive rate comparison, we have compared 
our SMDF False Positive Detection Rate result with the Watchdog and the Random 
Two Hop ACK. Figure 6-6 show clearly the considerable advantages of SMDF over 
both the Watchdog and the Random Two Hop ACK in keeping the false detection 
rate steady at 0% level. As the highest false detection rate was produced by the 
Watchdog which was between (35% - 75%), the Random Two Hob ACK performed 
slightly better than the Watchdog as it fluctuates around 20%. The Watchdog 
suffered from such a high False Positive Detection Rate because its operation 
requires the nodes within a MANET to operate in promiscuous mode. As a result the 
Watchdog failed to detect the misbehaviour in cases of collisions, partial collusion, 
and power control employment. The Random Two Hop ACK on the other hand has 
much less False Positive Detection Rate in compare to Watchdog due to its used of 
power control employment. Our SMDF outperformed both approaches because of 
first, its detecting component based on sessions and not promiscuous mode, second 
its decision component allowed redemption before judgment resulting in 0% false 
positive and finally SMDF Decision threshold set to reflect as much as possible of 
real MANET environment including collisions. 
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6.10 Evaluation of SMDF Communication Overhead 
In this scenario we simulate the amount of communication overhead generated by 
our proposed SMDF. We measure the communication overhead in terms of control 
packets generated throughout the detection stage such as the FAPs packets. Figure 
6-7 shows the overhead produced for the whole of the 4 sessions in the simulation. It 
can be seen that the amount of overhead increased gradually after the first session 
from just above 500 bytes to 2000 bytes at the fourth sessions. After the fourth 
session it remains stable at 2000 byte until the end of the fifth session. The gradual 
increasing of overhead from the first session to the fourth one in Figure 6-7 was due 
to the exchange of FAPs between the one hop neighbouring nodes in each session. In 
the fifth session, the overhead remain stable. This is because the number of nodes 
involved in this session was less than the other. As a result, the exchanges of FAPs 
packets were less in comparison of that in the other four sessions. 
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6.10.1 Comparison of SMDF vs. Optimised SMDF with Sessions Aggregation 
In this scenario we compare the overhead produced previously by SMDF in figure 6- 
7 to the optimised SMDF described in chapter 5. The optimised SMDF uses sessions 
aggregation approach. When using this approach, nodes that are involved in more 
than one session could wait a certain time until all sessions end before sending the 
FAP to their direct neighbours. Figure 6-8 shows the comparison between the 
aggregated SMDF and non-aggregated SMDF in terms of the overhead produced. 
The figure shows a significant reduction in the amount of communication overhead 
produced by the aggregated SMDF in comparison with that in non-aggregated 
SMDF. It can be seen form Figure 6-8 that in aggregated SMDF and non-aggregated 
SMDF, after the fourth session the overhead remains stable. Again, we believe this is 
because the number of nodes involved in the fifth session was less than the other. As 
a result, the exchanges of FAPs packets were less in comparison of that in the other 
four sessions. 
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6.11 Comparison of Overhead Reductions Between SMDF and 
Random Two Hop-ACK 
In this scenario, we evaluate SMDF by comparing it with Random 2 Hop ACK in 
terms of the communication overhead. We will compare both SMDF non-aggregated 
and aggregated version with Random 2 Hop ACK. Table 6-3 below shows the 
amount of overhead produced in each mechanism for the 5 sessions we simulate. It 
can be seen clearly that Random 2 Hop ACK produces a considerable amount of 
communication overhead compared to both SMDF mechanisms (i. e. aggregated and 
non-aggregated). 
Overhead Amount (Bytes Per Session) 
Sessions 1 2 3 4 5 
SMDF 724 1088 1512 2012 2028 
Optimised 
SMDF 
724 1022 1096 1436 1450 
R2 Hop ACK 11260 13300 20520 42800 43860 
Table 6-3: Comparison between SMDF and R 21-lop ACK (Overhead) 
6.12 Evaluation of SMDF Power Consumption 
One crucial issue for almost all kinds of MANN, "[' supported by battery powers is 
power saving. Without power, any mobile device will become useless. Battery power 
is a limited resource, and it is expected that battery technology is not likely to 
progress as fast as computing and communication technologies do. hence, how to 
design a detection protocol using less power is an important issue, especially for 
MANET, which is all supported by batteries. 
In this scenario we have simulated the amount of energy measured in milliwatt hour 
(mWhr) (i. e. 10 ` W). In our proposed SMDP we measured the energy produced with 
various rate of misbehaviour starting from I to 20 misbehaving nodes as shown in 
figure 6-9. It is apparent that, as the misbehaving nodes increase the energy decrease. 
This is due to the fact that misbehaving nodes are dropping packets that they should 
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6.11 Comparison of Overhead Reductions Between SMDF and 
Random Two Hop-ACK 
In this scenario, we evaluate SMDF by comparing it with Random 2 Hop ACK in 
terms of the communication overhead. We will compare both SMDF non-aggregated 
and aggregated version with Random 2 Hop ACK. Table 6-3 below shows the 
amount of overhead produced in each mechanism for the 5 sessions we simulate. It 
can be seen clearly that Random 2 Hop ACK produces a considerable amount of 
communication overhead compared to both SMDF mechanisms (i. e. aggregated and 
non-aggregated). 
Overhead Amount (Bytes Per Session) 
Sessions 1'. 2 3 4 5, 
SMDF 724 1088 1512 2012 2028 
Optimised 
SMDF 
724 1022 1096 1436 1450 
R2 Hop ACK 11260 13300 20520 42800 43860 
Table 6-3: Comparison between SMDF and R 21-lop ACK (Overhead) 
6.12 Evaluation of SMDF Power Consumption 
One crucial issue for almost all kinds of MANET supported by battery powers is 
power saving. Without power, any mobile device will become useless. Battery power 
is a limited resource, and it is expected that battery technology is not likely to 
progress as fast as computing and communication technologies do. Hence, how to 
design a detection protocol using less power is an important issue, especially for 
MANET, which is all supported by batteries. 
In this scenario we have simulated the amount of energy measured in milliwatt hour 
(mWhr) (i. e. 10-3 W). In our proposed SMDP we measured the energy produced with 
various rate of misbehaviour starting from 1 to 20 misbehaving nodes as shown in 
figure 6-9. It is apparent that, as the misbehaving nodes increase the energy decrease. 
This is due to the fact that misbehaving nodes are dropping packets that they should 
112 
Chapter 6: Evaluation and Simulation Results 
forward to other nodes. This will result in less transmission of data packets in the 
network, as a result less power usage. Next we will compare our SMDF energy result 
with other mechanisms to evaluate it. As the number of misbehaving nodes is 0, 
SMDF power consumption was just below 450.04 (mWHr) and the network is fully 
working and all nodes forwarding packets correctly. As the number of misbehaving 
node increased the power usage decreased with it gradually, as explained above. 
SMDF 
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450.02 
£ 450.01 
ö 450 
Ia 
449.99 
449.98 
i 
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ä'ýý 
05 10 15 20 
Misbehaving nodes rate 
Figure 6-9: Evaluation of SMDF Power consumption 
6.13 Comparison With Existing Approaches for (Power 
Consumption) 
Having seen the SMDF power consumption results in previous section, we now 
compare them with the Watchdog and Random Two Hop ACK results. The 
comparison results in figure 6-10 shows that our SMDF clearly outperform both the 
Watchdog and Random Two Hop ACK in saving energy with less power 
consumption. There is a very small difference between the Watchdog and Random 
Two Hop ACK, with slight advantages to Watchdog. This could be due the huge 
amount of overhead that the Random Two Hop ACK generates. It can be seen from 
figure 6-10 that when no misbehaviour occur (i. e. the number of misbehaving nodes 
is 0) SMDF power consumption was just below 450.04 (mWHr) less than both the 
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Watchdog and Random Two Hop ACK. This is because in SMDF the exchanging of 
information and control packets between nodes takes place only and the end of the 
session resulting in saving energy. In contrast, the watchdog exchange of information 
and control packets happen every each hop, and in Random Two Hop ACK it happen 
every each two hop resulting in more power consumption than SMDF. 
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Figure 6-10: Comparison of power consumption of SMDF with existing 
approaches 
6.14 Comparison with Existing Approaches for Scalability 
Our proposed protocol SMDF has already been evaluated using 100 nodes, which is 
higher than 50 nodes average used in many other existing mechanisms evaluated 
using simulation. Since the scalability property is one of the desired characteristics 
especially in wireless sensor network, we have increased our previous number of 
nodes to 500 to examine our protocol. The main difference between small and large 
networks is the average path lengths (e. g. 3-4 hops in small network vs. 8-13 hops in 
large network). We have increased the network sessions from 5 to 50 sessions to 
reflect the increase in the number of nodes. If our SMDF achieve same accuracy and 
rate of true and false positives as with the previous 100 nodes scenarios, then we will 
consider our framework as scalable. It can be seen from figure 6-11 that SMDF is 
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scalable and still has the true positive detection rate at 100%. Figure 6-12 shows that 
SMDF has the false positive detection rate at 0% compared with the WD and 
Random 2 Hop ACK. 
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Figure 6-11: Comparison of True Positive Detection Rate (Scalability) 
The pink line which represents WD in figure 6-12 decreased gradually as the number 
of sessions increased, but without reaching 0% as SMDF. The gradual decrease of 
the WD was because as the number of nodes increase to 500 the conectivety of the 
network increase. As a result the use of promiscuous mode by WD will be more 
effective in terms of false detection when the network is well connected. 
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Figure 6-12: Comparison of False Positive Detection Rate (Scalability) 
115 
0 lU zu 3U 4U bU 
Number of Sessions 
Chapter 6: Evaluation and Simulation Results 
As mentioned previously, in a real MANET environment reaching 100% accuracy in 
true positive and 0% of false positive rates can not be achieve due to the 
characteristic of MANET as well as other network conditions such as collisions, 
faulty nodes and low connectivity network. We believe that SMDF can achieve as 
high as 90s% of accuracy in true positive and as low as 5-10% of false positive when 
it is apply to a real MANET. We also expect that our SMDF will work effectively 
with well connected MANET that has large number of nodes as we have shown in 
our simulations. 
6.15 Overall Project Evaluation 
This section is divided into two parts, first a comparison of our work with existing 
work in the area, and then evaluation against our initial requirements mentioned in 
chapter 4, and finally a discussion of the shortcomings of the SMDF. The aim here is 
to take a very broad view of the research and look at the overall achievements and 
the problems remaining. 
6.15.1 Evaluation Against Our Initial Requirements 
Our simulation result shows that our proposed framework succeeded in fulfilling our 
initial requirements we presented in chapter 4. This has been achieved as follows; 
our propose framework SMDF has used an active acknowledgment mechanism, as 
its detection take place only when data packets are sent during the session. SMDF 
used little system resources at low cost, and has produced very low communications 
overhead. SMDF was reliable in minimizing the false positives and false negatives 
detections to nil. It also was capable of detecting lying nodes that perform partial 
dropping attack, as we have seen in our simulation results above. SMDF was also 
capable of detecting nodes misbehaviour in the presence of collisions, which has 
been already achieved because our SMDF employing the power control technique. 
SMDF is independent, and can work with all of the MANET routing protocols and 
not only DSR. 
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The simulation results already showed that SMDF is scalable and can work to 
support up to 500 nodes to reflect stationary wireless sensors network. The 
simulation shown also that SMDF can integrate with other mechanises and routing 
protocols such as DSR. Our SMDF performed availability by reaching all necessary 
recipients nodes involved inside each session in the network. Appropriate 
authentication, integrity and confidentiality, of the detection mechanisms have been 
achieved through digital signatures and cryptography primitives (i. e. asymmetric 
encryption) used by the FAP packets in our SMDF. Our SMDF also support cross- 
layer collaboration between the session layer and the network layer in order to reach 
valuable optimisations. Through simulations our SMDF was fair, and precise in 
determining exactly the misbehaving nodes, and has high rate in its true positive 
which considered as a novel achievement. Our SMDF has an isolation component 
which has been evaluated and it successfully isolate misbehaving nodes from the 
network to prevent harming it again. 
6.15.2 Comparison with Related Work 
As mentioned before, the main objective of our misbehaviour detection framework is 
to provide a set of components and mechanisms that can detect misbehaviour and 
mitigated at low energy and communication overhead cost but with high accuracy. 
The problem of node misbehaviour in MANET has been treated by many research 
groups, and many mechanisms have been proposed. Our framework shares some 
similarities with prior work carried out in other projects. In this section we compare 
our framework with these works. 
The first and most famous mechanism in misbehaviour detection in MANET is The 
Watchdog [Marti'00]. We have compared our SMDF results with the Watchdog 
results on five of our six different metrics using simulation, and found that SMDF 
outperform the Watchdog in four of these metrics. The five metrics are True Positive 
Detection Rate, False Positive Detection Rate, Power Consumption Rate and 
Scalability. Where as the Watchdog has slightly lower overhead than SMDF, but 
only when there is no misbehaviour in the network. Moreover, all of the other 
Watchdog drawbacks including partial dropping do not exist in our SMDF. 
117 
Chapter 6: Evaluation and Simulation Results 
There are many other detection mechanisms especially the reputation mechanisms 
such as [Buchegger'02b, He'04, Michiardi'02a, Miranda'03, Yang'02] using the 
watchdog as their main monitoring component. Consequently, they inherited all the 
drawbacks that the watchdog suffers, even though their other system components are 
efficient. This gives our SMDF clear advantages over all of the mechanisms that 
adopting the watchdog concept in their detection system. 
We have also compared our framework with the other types of mechanism that do 
not use the watchdog as their monitoring component. The most recent solution of 
these is the Random Two-Hop ACK [Djenouri'05]. Our comparison through 
simulation showed us that our SMDF outperforms the Random Two-Hop ACK in 
four of our six simulation metrics. These matrices are Communication Overhead, 
False Positive Detection Rate, Power Consumption Rate and Scalability. Although, 
we have similar True Positive Detection Rate as the Random Two-Hop ACK. 
However, through our simulation comparison we noticed that the Random Two-Hop 
ACK failed to detect partial dropping in many occasions, and that it can often detect 
the full dropping case more than the partial one. 
Our framework evaluation and comparison with other existing mechanisms shows it 
performs better and has novel aspects that do not exist in other mechanisms. 
6.15.3 Discussion 
Whilst the SMDF solves an interesting problem with some novel aspects there 
remains several shortcomings. This section outlines these problems. 
Waiting until the end of all sessions to check node misbehaviour reduce the 
communication overhead considerably as we have seen in the simulation results. 
However, it will increase the delay before detection. It is a trade-off issue as reducing 
the cost is more valuable and important than increasing the waiting time. In some 
application such as video streaming, it is important to detect misbehaviour 
immediately as it occurred and not wait until the end of all sessions involved in the 
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network. This shortcoming can be reduced by waiting until the finishing of the first 
session only, and not all of the sessions. 
The SMDF assumes that nodes only drop data packets and not control packets. If the 
nodes drop the control packets, the SMDF can not detect them, as it only deals with 
data packets dropping. The increased amount of control packets is not preferable due 
to the overhead they generate. However, moderate number of control packets is 
important, and as such, dropping them will affect the performance of the network. 
Selfish nodes drop both data and control packets whereas malicious node targeting 
mostly data packets. This is a complex problem and the solution is not obvious. 
However the design of the framework is such that it would support the addition of a 
new component to enhance and/or complement the existing one. 
We intentionally examine the situation when MANET is stationary and the wireless 
sensor network is static, as this was the main target investigation of this research. 
However, it is possible to have mobile sensor nodes. In mobile sensor networks, 
nodes move freely to get necessary information about a certain event that moves in 
the nature, such as toxic gas cloud or a radioactive mobile object. In mobile wireless 
sensor networks applications, the user is also interested in high-level description 
information about the tracked event. It would be interesting to see how SMDF can be 
enhanced to support mobile scenarios in different types of both mobile wireless 
sensor network and mobile ad hoc network. Again, this is a difficult problem and 
solutions may take the form of Intrusion Detection modules or interaction with the 
underlying routing schemes to detect mobility. 
In our SMDF Decision component we have used a fixed threshold of tolerance over 
which node will be judged as misbehaving. This is fine for a stationary MANET and 
static WSN scenarios. However, it is more efficient to use variable threshold which 
can change according to the network topology and scenarios. The threshold can be 
also estimated empirically for each network by first, running simulations with no 
misbehaving and calculate the threshold at each node for different scenarios that 
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estimate the network. Then, retrieving the maximum value in all scenarios from the 
decision point and then consider it final threshold. 
In some application such as the battlefield or the rescue operations there is no need to 
run all of the three components in every node. For example isolating and punishing 
such nodes would not be beneficial. In this case there is no need for the isolation 
component and it need to be switch OFF. Therefore, deciding when to turn 
components ON/OFF is another challenges need to be resolved. One suggestion is to 
add a separate component with `intelligent' as decision capability to SMDF in order 
to deal with such situation. More efficient suggestion would be to add to each 
component of SMDF this intelligent capability to decide itself when and where to 
function according to the network and nodes status. 
For the purpose of evaluation and comparison with other approaches we have used 
simulations techniques. Performance evaluation through simulations is helpful but 
will not reflect the reality 100%. For example, in a real MANET environment 
reaching 100% accuracy in true positive and 0% of false positive rates can not be 
achieve due to the characteristic of MANET as well as other network conditions such 
as collisions, faulty nodes and low connectivity network. It will thus be fascinating to 
see the actual performance of our complete SMDF framework by integrating every 
component that it consisted of. By doing that we could measure new parameters that 
will add more understanding of the reality and that can not be performed clearly 
through simulations. Once the above tasks have been completed successfully, it 
would be interesting to implement the complete model in an experimental test-bed to 
see its practical feasibility. This task appears feasible in the near future as the prices 
of advanced sensors and handheld devices are already decreasing gradually. 
6.16 Summary 
In this chapter, we have described our simulation parameters and identified our 
simulation metrics that we measured in order to simulate our proposed framework 
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and evaluated it using simulation techniques, namely GloMoSim. The simulation 
metrics we used are Throughput, Overhead, True Positive Detection Rate, False 
Positive Detection Rate, Power Consumption Rate and Scalability. Using simulation 
to carry out experiments evaluation, we showed the significant consequence of node 
misbehaviour in reducing MANET throughput. 
Our proposed framework worked effectively and can be used as suitable and efficient 
security mechanism for ad hoc network and its special kind static wireless sensors 
network. Our framework achieved the highest True Positive Detection Rate 
compared to other existing approaches, which mean it has the highest success rate in 
detecting misbehaving nodes. It also achieved the lowest False Positive Detection 
Rate compared to other existing approaches, which means the lowest rate of wrongly 
misjudging well behaved nodes. SMDF also produced low communication overhead 
rate as well as less usage of energy compared with other existing approaches. 
We analysed SMDF system in the context of other existing systems namely, the 
Watchdog and the Random Two Hop ACK services, and quantified its performance 
benefits. There are many other detection mechanisms especially the reputation 
mechanisms such as [Buchegger'02b, He'04, Michiardi'02a, Miranda'03, Yang'02] 
that used the watchdog as their main monitoring component. Consequently, they 
inherited all the drawbacks that the watchdog suffers, even though their other system 
components are efficient. This gives our SMDF clear advantages over all of the 
mechanisms that adopting the watchdog as their detection system. 
Our framework is also shown to have lower overhead than Random Two Hop ACK. 
Moreover, SMDF has the lowest percentage (i. e. 0%) of False Positive Detection 
Rate compared to both the Watchdog and the Random Two Hop ACK systems. It 
also shows high percentage of True Positive Detection Rate among other schemes. 
Furthermore, it shows that it is scalable, as we increased the number of nodes from 
100 to 500 nodes. 
121 
Chapter 6: Evaluation and Simulation Results 
Finally, we took a very broad view of the research and look at the overall 
achievements including evaluation against our initial requirements specified in 
chapter 4 and discussed the problems remaining. Our simulation result shows that 
our proposed framework fully succeeded in fulfilling all framework initial 
requirements that we presented in chapter 4. Whilst the SMDF solves an interesting 
problem with novel aspects there remains several shortcomings. These include that 
SMDF assumes that nodes only drop data packets and not control packets. Also 
include the delay before detection in terms of waiting until the end of all sessions to 
check node misbehaviour. 
The next chapter is our conclusions and future works chapter, and it is the final 
chapter of this thesis. 
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This thesis has presented a new framework for detecting misbehaviour in 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks and Wireless Sensor Networks. The new framework is an 
integration of the novel components that we developed during our investigation. The 
new system aims at providing reliable detection mechanisms that achieving higher 
levels of accuracy while being at low cost and simple to implement. 
This chapter is the conclusion of our work and summary. The chapter is 
organized as follows. First we present a summary of the thesis in section 7.1. Our 
main contributions and a summary of the SMDF framework and the new components 
associated with it are presented in section 7.2. Then a comparison of SMDF with 
existing approaches discussed in section 7.3. Future work is investigated and 
proposed in section 7.4, and finally our concluding remarks are provided in section 
7.5. 
7.1 Thesis Summary 
Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks and Wireless Sensors Network is one of the 
most important concerns because these systems are more vulnerable to attacks than a 
wired or infrastructure-based wireless network. Designing an effective security 
protocol for MANET is a very challenging task. This is mainly due to the unique 
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characteristics of MANET, namely shared broadcast radio channel, insecure 
operating environment, lack of central authority, lack of association among users, 
limited availability of resources, and physical vulnerability. 
Due to these infrastructures-less features of MANET mentioned above, network- 
organisation functionality must be performed by the nodes. In particular, data packets 
sent between distant nodes are expected to be relayed by intermediate nodes, which 
act as routers and provide the forwarding service. The forwarding service relays the 
received packets from node to node until reaching their final destination, following 
routes selected and maintained by the routing protocol. These services (routing and 
data forwarding) together are at the core of the network layer. All of the existing 
research solutions in the area of data forwarding detection are only focusing on 
mobile scenarios in MANET (i. e. when nodes are freely mobile). However, little has 
been done in the terms of examine and applying such mechanisms to stationary 
MANET when nodes are static or with very low level of mobility. An example of 
stationary MANET is a wireless sensor networks for civil and military applications 
(e. g. security management, surveillance, automation, wildlife and environmental 
monitoring) that are typically deployed today, and have small to medium scale (tens 
to hundreds of sensors) a cross small to medium geographical distances. Since every 
node is potentially a router, this adds new vulnerabilities to the network-layer 
problems experienced on the Internet. Detection and routing protocols must be 
simple enough to scale up to large networks such as stationary wireless sensors 
networks, yet robust enough to cope with failures that occur many hops away from a 
source. 
Our work focuses on the design of a low cost Sessions-based Misbehaviour 
Detection Framework, SMDF, to detect node misbehaviour in terms of date packets 
drooping that occur in stationary MANET and wireless sensors network. Our novel 
system targeting most common attacks that MANET and WSN, suffered namely 
black-hole and data packet dropping attacks. The breakdown of the thesis is as 
follows: 
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Our introduction to the area in Chapter 1 discussed the wider context and outlines the 
problem of node misbehaviour in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. It outlined the definition 
of MANET and its main applications. It also identified MANET's main 
characteristics that make the design of routing and detection protocol of such kind of 
network challenging. These characteristics include: (1) Multi-hop routing, (2) 
Dynamic Network Topology (3) Autonomous terminal (4) Distributed operation (5) 
Fluctuating link capacity (6) Light-weight terminals. Chapter 1 also highlighted the 
consequences of node misbehaviour in MANET and its impact on MANET 
performance. 
An overview of MANET architecture and its security issues described in Chapter 2. 
It first discussed the security issues related to MANET Network layer. It also 
described two of MANET main routing protocols namely Dynamic Source Routing 
(DSR) and Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV). We then highlighted the 
security threats and attacks on routing protocols and list most common attacks such 
as Denial of Service attack (DoS). Next we moved down one step to the MAC layer 
and discuss its security issues in MANET, which includes misbehaviour issues in the 
channel access. At the end of this chapter we listed the main security attributes and 
considered some methods of achieving them including cryptography and digital 
signature. 
We surveyed the literature and related works relating to MANET misbehaviour in 
Chapter 3. We presented and discussed the existing solutions that aim at detecting 
misbehaviour on packet forwarding when it appears in the network. These solutions 
classified into two main techniques, Reactive and Preventive. The reactive solutions 
split up into two main classes, monitoring and reputation-based solutions. The 
monitoring class includes basic approaches that focus on the monitoring phase and 
suggest techniques to control the forwarding process. Reputation-based solutions 
propose mechanisms to isolate the nodes detected as selfish. However, these 
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solutions incorporate monitor components that use only promiscuous monitoring 
techniques. On the other hand, preventive techniques proactively try to mitigate the 
misbehaviour or its effects, either by motivating nodes to cooperate or by taking 
measures to prevent packets from being dropped before sending them. This chapter 
pointed out the main drawbacks of the existing work and issues that need to be 
addresses as: 
" Most of the existing approaches have high cost in terms of the amount of 
communication overhead produced. 
" Existing detection mechanisms are not independent of the routing protocol 
and operate as an extension of it. Many mechanisms work only with one 
particular routing protocol. 
" Existing monitoring/detection solutions suffer from the post-detection 
drawback, in terms of punishment and selfish nodes knowledge exchange 
between nodes. 
" Most of the existing mechanisms use monitoring approaches that depend on 
promiscuous monitoring, which has many drawbacks regarding the accuracy 
on detections, especially when employing the power control technique. 
" Techniques using proactive approaches trust all nodes and do not prevent 
nodes from overloading the network, thus they can not work effectively alone 
and they require to be combined with a reactive monitoring technique. 
" Most of the existing solutions are applicable only for a small MANET with 
limited number of nodes and as such scalability has not been addressed, 
especially when dealing with wireless sensors network which has a large 
number of nodes. 
" Energy saving has not been considered properly, and as such many existing 
approaches have a high-energy consumption. 
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In Chapter 4 we presented our framework Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection 
Framework (SMDF) and briefly described its three components. First we have 
described our research objectives that form a comprehensive set of support 
mechanisms and schemes. We discussed the gaps in the current knowledge that this 
thesis will address in the requirements review. We identified requirements, issues 
and challenges important when designing an effective misbehaviour Detection 
Framework in stationary MANET and static wireless sensor network. Then we have 
presented our SMDF and its cross layer collaboration between the session layer and 
the network layer. 
In Chapter 5 the different components of our framework have been fully described in 
detail. We started with our detection component through the new Sessions-based 
Misbehaviour Detection Protocol (SMDP), where we explained the concepts of the 
monitoring that our protocol used, and the algorithm to do so. We have given two 
case studies in order to illustrate how our SMDP work. Then we explained our 
modified Bayesian approach for the decision stage. This was followed by description 
of our Isolation component where misbehaving nodes are penalised for their attacks. 
Chapter 6 presented the simulation design, the analysis, results and performance 
evaluation. We show how selfish misbehaviour can badly affect the performance of 
MANET in terms of reducing the throughput. We then evaluated our system through 
simulation with two of the well-known existing systems in terms of six different 
metrics. We then evaluated our new protocol against the initial requirements listed in 
chapter 4, and proven that it achieved all of them. 
Finally, suggestions for future work and conclusions are presented in this current 
chapter. 
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7.2 Research Contributions 
This thesis contributes to our understanding of Security and Misbehaviour Detection 
Systems in wireless ad hoc environments in the following ways: 
" Our first contribution is to provide a set of requirements for an efficient 
misbehaviour detection framework in mobile ad hoc networking 
environments and examine these against existing research in literature 
[Fahad'06a]. These requirements enable the network providers to operate a 
secure system whilst consuming low energy and producing low 
communication overhead. The requirements are similar to those of existing 
work but have been reconsidered to reflect the changing nature of ad hoc 
networks, especially as it applies to sensor networks. A survey of research 
literature in the field revealed that no results completely meet these 
requirements. These techniques focus on either high accuracy detection rate 
at huge cost in terms of energy and communication overhead or on poor 
accuracy detection rate at a medium cost. Others fail because they aim to 
encourage good behaviour among nodes without fair and firm mechanisms to 
deal with those who misbehave. Additionally we also bring together relevant 
ideas of use in search for effective misbehaviour detection in MANET 
environments. 
" Using the set of requirements and inspiration from relevant literature, this 
thesis proposes a novel solution to accurately and effectively detect and deal 
with node misbehaviour in mobile ad hoc networking environments including 
wireless sensor network, and it is called Sessions-based Misbehaviour 
Detection Formwork (SMDF) [Fahad'07a, Fahad'07b]. The new framework 
consists of three components, Detection Component, Decision Component 
and finally Isolation Component. Each component in SMDF provides 
different functionalities, and all of these components integrated to provide 
efficient and robust solution against node misbehaviour in MANET. The 
major advantages of our SMDF included its capability of working either 
independently or integrating with other routing protocols. The new 
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framework also extensible and flexible as it has the capability of adding new 
components to it or removing existing components from it as necessary. 
Moreover, the new framework is transparent in terms of integrating with 
other mechanisms as required. The detection component contains our novel 
Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection Protocol SMDP to detect selfish or 
malicious nodes that drop packets partially or completely to launch either 
black-hole or data dropping attacks. For the decision component we have 
enhanced an existing Bayesian approach to decide whether the node 
deliberately misbehaved or not. For the Isolation component, we have 
modified an existing approach and used an Observation-Based Protocol to 
isolate misbehaving nodes. It uses neighbouring observations experience to 
isolate misbehaved nodes. We analysed and evaluated the proposed 
framework by simulation techniques. Our evaluation was focused on six 
important parameters, namely Throughput, Overheard, True Positive 
Detection Rate, False Positive Detection Rate, Power Consumption Rate and 
Scalability. By comparing our results to those of other mechanisms available 
on literature, we showed that our solution has low cost in terms of 
communication overhead than other approaches. We showed also that our 
framework has the lowest False Positive Detection Rate amongst other 
approaches, and that it has highest value of True Positive Detection Rate 
compared with other approaches. Our evaluation also showed that our 
solution has lower energy consumption rate compared with other existing 
approaches. The experiments showed also that our framework is scalable and 
can work with higher number of nodes, especially in wireless sensor 
networks. 
" The first new component of our framework we have developed is the 
Detection Component, which is the most important component in any 
misbehaviour detection framework. For this reason we have developed a new 
novel Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection Protocol (SMDP) [Fahad'06b, 
Fahad'07a, Fahad'07b]. The SMDP deals with the network in terms of 
sessions, and uses cross-layer collaboration between the session layer and the 
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network layer in order to know the start and the end of each session. In 
SMDP each node in the route session monitors all of its direct neighbours 
within a one hop communication, and checks whether they correctly forward 
packets or drop them completely or partially in order to lunch an attack such 
as black-hole and packet dropping attacks. SMDP is cost effective as it 
reduces the communication overhead, by using only one hop communication 
(no flooding), and sending control packets only at the end of sessions, instead 
of doing so for each packet, contrary the current solutions that exist in 
literature. The new SMDP also has an advantage of being independent of the 
routing protocol, as well as its ability to work with any MANET routing 
protocol, unlike most of the existing mechanism in literature who work as an 
extension of one particular routing protocol. We evaluated the proposed 
protocol by simulation and showed that our approach is more efficient and 
scalable than other approaches found in the literature. It showed also that it 
has a low cost in terms of both communication overhead and energy 
consumption compared to other approaches. 
We have developed the second component of our framework (SMDF) which 
is the Decision Component [Fahad'07a, Fahad'07b]. After detecting those 
nodes dropping packets using our detection component SMDP, we have used 
the decision component of the SMDF in order to decide whether the nodes 
misbehaved or not. As the nodes might drop packets for innocent reasons 
such as collision or faulty packets, the decision component of SMDF take all 
of this into account, in order to make a fair decision. For the decision 
component we have enhanced an existing mathematical estimation method, 
which has been used in the literature and we have modified it effectively to 
suit our new framework requirements. It based on Bayesian standard 
approach, which consists of estimating a parameter the observations of which 
follow a Bernouli distribution by a Beta distribution. In our approach, well 
behaving nodes improve their reputation, whereas misbehaving nodes in 
terms of either intentional or unintentional packet dropping will decreases it. 
Moreover, our approach allows redemption before making decisions, and 
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decreases false accusations due to, for example channel conditions or 
collision. Furthermore, in Bayesian approach only the latest observations are 
watched over, and not all the observations, as a result it has the advantage of 
not requiring a memory. We evaluated our proposed approach by simulations 
and showed that our approach is more accurate in identifying the real 
misbehaving nodes than existing approaches. It also has lower 
communications overhead compared to other approaches. 
" Having identified the misbehaving nodes locally, we developed our Isolation 
Component which will then punish them by not routing packets through them 
and by not forwarding packets for them. For this component, we have 
modified an existing approach and we used an Observation-Based Protocol to 
isolate misbehaving nodes. Once a node is judged locally as misbehaving by 
some other node, this latter must approve its detection to ensure the isolation 
by all nodes. The Observation-Based Protocol uses neighbouring 
observations experience to mitigate false detections and false accusations 
vulnerabilities that exist in other approaches. In this protocol, a node that 
detects and accuses another as misbehaving must approve its accusation 
before taking any measure against it. It should not isolate the assumed 
misbehaving unilaterally, because this could result in false detections against 
it. However, it could avoid routing its own packets through this node in all 
cases. The Observation-Based Protocol enforces the accusing node to collect 
a certain number of observations from neighbouring nodes in terms of 
signatures before isolating the detected node. Once the accuser node collects 
this number, it broadcasts an Isolation packet including all observations 
through the network to isolate the misbehaving node. This broadcast will not 
be performed until a node is detected and approved as misbehaving. As a 
result, our solution produces less overhead as long as nodes well-behave, as 
no opinions are exchanged periodically. Our simulation results suggest that 
our approach has the lowest percentage in falsely accusing well behaving 
nodes of misbehaviour compared to other existing approaches. It showed also 
that it has a low cost in terms of communication overhead. 
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9 Our final contribution is that this research poses some new questions that had 
not been made explicit before. Among the questions for further work are 
issues of tackling detection complications in hybrid ad hoc network 
environments. Two other important issues raised are those of dealing with 
control packets dropper and mobility handling issues in terms of mobile 
Wireless Sensor Networks. These questions are examined together with an 
evaluation of the project in terms of the shortcomings of the framework and 
comparison with closely related work. 
7.3 Comparison with Existing Approaches 
As mentioned before, the main objective of our misbehaviour detection framework is 
to provide a set of components and mechanisms that can detect misbehaviour and 
eliminated at low energy and communication overhead cost but with high accuracy. 
The problem of node misbehaviour in MANET has been treated by many research 
groups, and many mechanisms have been proposed. Our framework shares some 
similarities with prior work carried out in other projects. In this section we compare 
our framework with these works. 
The first and most famous mechanism in misbehaviour detection in MANET is The 
Watchdog [Marti'00]. We have compared our SMDF results with the Watchdog 
results on five of our six different metrics using simulation, and found that SMDF 
outperform the Watchdog in four of these metrics. The five metrics are True Positive 
Detection Rate, False Positive Detection Rate, Power Consumption Rate and 
Scalability. Where as the Watchdog has slightly lower overhead than SMDF, but 
only when there is no misbehaviour in the network. Moreover, all of the other 
Watchdog drawbacks including partial dropping do not exist in our SMDF. 
There are many other detection mechanisms especially the reputation mechanisms 
such as [Buchegger'02b, He'04, Michiardi'02a, Miranda'03, Yang'02] using the 
watchdog as their main monitoring component. Consequently, they inherited all the 
drawbacks that the watchdog suffers, even though their other system components are 
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efficient. This gives our SMDF clear advantages over all of the mechanisms that 
adopting the watchdog concept in their detection system. 
We have also compared our framework with the other types of mechanism that do 
not use the watchdog as their monitoring component. The most recent solution of 
these is the Random Two-Hop ACK [Djenouri'05]. Our comparison through 
simulation showed us that our SMDF outperforms the Random Two-Hop ACK in 
four of our six simulation metrics. These matrices are Communication Overhead, 
False Positive Detection Rate, Power Consumption Rate and Scalability. Although, 
we have similar True Positive Detection Rate as the Random Two-Hop ACK. 
However, through our simulation comparison we noticed that the Random Two-Hop 
ACK failed to detect partial dropping in many occasions, and that it can often detect 
the full dropping case more than the partial one. 
Our framework evaluation and comparison with other existing mechanisms shows it 
performs better and has novel aspects that do not exist in other mechanisms. It also 
shows that SMDF can be used as suitable and efficient security mechanism for ad 
hoc network in general and its special kind wireless sensors network. 
7.4 Future Work 
So far in this chapter we have reiterated the project aims, findings and main results 
and considered the novel contributions of our work. While the contributions of this 
research are valuable it raises, as research should, some interesting questions. This 
section deals with, in our view, the more significant of these questions. 
1. Dealing with Control Packets Dropper 
The Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection Framework (SMDF) we proposed in 
this work assumes that nodes only drop data packets and not control packets. At the 
network layer, the routing process can be interrupted through routing control packet 
modification, selective dropping, table overflow, or poisoning. As such, detecting 
nodes that drop control packet is highly desirable and challenging. The increase of 
control packets in MANET as well as wireless sensor networks lead to a high 
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communication overhead. However, these control packets are important in terms of 
routing and detecting misbehaviour. For example, if a misbehaving node dropped the 
control packets that include its neighbouring nodes number of data packets they have 
received and number of packets they have sent, then will result in wrongly accusing 
them of misbehaviour. Therefore, it is important to protect control packets and to 
detect nodes that drop them. To achieve this, a new component has to be added to the 
detection framework to deal with the control packets separately. The requirements of 
data packets detection are not appropriate for control packets in that, there are few 
packets of such kind compared to the first one. Further, dropping control packets 
should not be tolerated, as it completely excludes selfish nodes from routes. 
Therefore, any detection mechanism for control packets should be more severe in its 
judgment regarding this kind of packets. Strategy of dropping up to the tolerable 
threshold can be used, however it need more investigation since it can not know 
whether and how much the detection mechanise will notice false observations 
because of channel conditions. 
2. Detection in Hybrid ad hoc network 
A hybrid ad hoc network is a structure-based network that is a mixture of mobile 
nodes and fixed nodes that extended using multi-hop communications. Indeed, in this 
kind of network, the existence of a communication link between the mobile station 
and the base station is not required. A mobile station that has no direct connection 
with a base station can use other mobile stations as relays. For large scale sensor 
networks that may have thousands of nodes in the future, it is more realistic to have a 
sensor network involves a hybrid of resource-rich specialized nodes in conjunction 
with small sensor devices [Kumar, R. '03]. Compared with conventional (single-hop) 
structure-based networks, this new generation can lead to a better use of the available 
spectrum and to a reduction of infrastructure costs. The coverage of the network is 
increased while the number of fixed antennas is kept relatively small. Furthermore, 
the energy consumption of the nodes can be reduced because the signal has to cover 
a smaller distance. And finally, as the radiated energy is reduced, the interference 
with other nodes diminishes as well. However, a systematic denial of the packet 
forwarding service from the mobile nodes would remove all the benefits introduced 
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by the multi-hop aspect of the communications. It is a challenging task to deal with 
the problem of packet forwarding denial in such mixture environment. A hybrid 
framework can be designed to solve the node misbehaviour in such a network. This 
can be done through a framework, which has separate component for fixed nodes and 
separate component for the mobile nodes, for the misbehaviour detection. A More 
efficient suggestion would be to have these components integrated, and can function 
in both situations i. e. (fixed or mobile) as required. This will save cost and energy. 
3. Detection for Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks 
Even though we assumed in this research that the MANET is stationary and the 
wireless sensor network is static, it is possible to have mobile sensor nodes. In 
mobile sensor networks, nodes move freely to get necessary information about a 
certain event that moves in the nature, such as toxic gas cloud or a radioactive mobile 
object. In mobile wireless sensor networks applications, the user is also interest in 
high-level description information about the tracked event. It would be interesting to 
see how SMDF can be enhanced to support mobile scenarios in different types of 
both mobile wireless sensor network and mobile ad hoc network. This can be done 
by adding an Intrusion Detection Component to SMDF, specifically to deal with such 
mobility problem. 
4. Experimental Test-Bed Evaluation 
In this research we have measured the performance evaluation of our framework 
SMDF through simulations. Performance evaluation through simulations helpful but 
will not reflect the reality 100%. It will thus be fascinating to see the actual 
performance of our complete SMDF framework by integrating every component that 
it consisted of. Once the above tasks have been completed successfully, it would be 
interesting to implement the complete model in an experimental test-bed to see its 
practical feasibility. This task appears feasible in the near future as the price of 
advanced sensors and handheld devices already decreasing gradually. Most current 
research in Ad hoc networks and wireless sensor networks utilizes simulation and so 
there would be great benefit from quality test bed facilities, especially for security 
researchers. 
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7.5 Concluding Remarks 
Wireless networks have become increasingly popular in the past few decades when 
they are being adapted to enable mobility and wireless devices became popular. It 
has brought fundamental changes to data networking and telecommunications. One 
popular type of wireless networks is a mobile ad hoc network (MANET). It is a 
collections of mobile nodes connected together over a wireless medium. Nodes are 
computing and communication devices that can be laptop computers, PDAs, mobile 
phones or sensors. 
In MANET, security is one of the most important concerns because a MANET 
system is much more vulnerable to attacks such as data packet dropping and black- 
hole than a wired or infrastructure-based wireless network. Designing an effective 
security protocol for MANET is a very challenging task. This is mainly due to the 
unique characteristics of MANET, namely shared broadcast radio channel, insecure 
operating environment, lack of central authority, lack of association among users, 
limited availability of resources, and physical vulnerability. 
Existing solutions related to Misbehaviour Detection in MANET were shown to fail 
to meet all of our requirements, though many are excellent solutions in terms of their 
intended goals. Four major problems emerged from the literature, first, many 
detection solutions used one particular monitoring approach in their framework 
namely the Watchdog which suffers from many drawbacks including its failure to 
detect misbehaving nodes in cases of collisions, partial collusion, and power control 
employment power, and as a result their systems inherited same drawbacks even 
though their isolation component is effective. The other major problem is the high 
cost in terms of the huge amount of communication overhead that most of the 
existing solution produced. Finally, they suffer from low scalability and high energy 
consumption. 
The main direction of our work has been to look for an effective approach that can 
satisfy our initial requirements. The result is a new Low Cost framework entitled 
Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection Framework. It consists of three components, 
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the detection component, the decision component and the isolation component. The 
detection component contains our novel Sessions-based Misbehaviour Detection 
Protocol SMDP to detect selfish or malicious nodes that drop packets partially or 
completely to launch either black-hole or data dropping attacks. For the decision 
component we have enhanced an existing Bayesian approach to decide whether the 
node deliberately misbehaved or not. For the Isolation component, we have 
modified an existing approach and used an Observation-Based Protocol to isolate 
misbehaving nodes. It uses neighbouring observation experience to isolate 
misbehaved nodes. 
We analysed and evaluated the proposed schemes by simulation techniques. Our 
evaluation was focused on six important parameters, namely Throughput, Overheard, 
True Positive Detection Rate, False Positive Detection Rate, Power Consumption 
Rate and Scalability. By comparing our results to those of other mechanisms 
available on literature, we showed that our solution has low cost in terms of 
communication overhead than other approaches. We showed also that our framework 
has the lowest False Positive Detection Rate amongst other approaches, and that it 
has highest value of True Positive Detection Rate compared with other approaches. 
Our evaluation also showed that our solution has lower energy consumption rate 
compared with other existing approaches. The experiments showed also that our 
framework is scalable and can work with higher number of nodes, especially in 
wireless sensor networks. It is important to emphasise that though the proposed 
framework was developed for Stationary MANET and static wireless sensors 
network, the ideas by this framework are still applicable for other mobile wireless 
networks. 
To achieve the grand vision of pervasive computing where applications are enhanced 
through tools such as wireless sensors and integrated using mobile ad hoc networks 
still requires many problems to be solved. However, remarkable progress has been 
made in the last decade and we believe our SMDF contribution, addressing fairness 
within MANET, will help make a step toward this future. 
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